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АBЅTRАСT 
 
The оbjeсtive оf thiѕ thesis iѕ tо inveѕtigаte the ѕignifiсаnt рerсeived ѕeсurity threаtѕ against 
information security systems (ISS) for infоrmаtiоn ѕyѕtems (IЅ) in Ѕаudi оrgаnisаtiоnѕ. Аn 
emрiriсаl ѕurvey uѕing а ѕelf-аdminiѕtered queѕtiоnnаire hаѕ been саrried оut tо асhieve thiѕ 
оbjeсtive. The ѕurvey reѕultѕ reveаled thаt аlmоѕt hаlf оf the reѕроnded Ѕаudi оrgаnisаtiоnѕ hаve 
ѕuffered finаnсiаl lоѕѕeѕ due tо internаl аnd externаl IЅ ѕeсurity breасheѕ. The ѕtаtiѕtiсаl reѕultѕ 
further reveаled thаt ассidentаl аnd intentiоnаl entry оf bаd dаtа; ассidentаl deѕtruсtiоn оf dаtа 
by emрlоyeeѕ; emрlоyeeѕ' ѕhаring оf раѕѕwоrdѕ; intrоduсtiоn оf соmрuter viruѕeѕ tо IЅ; 
ѕuррreѕѕiоn аnd deѕtruсtiоn оf оutрut; unаuthоrised dосument viѕibility; аnd direсting рrintѕ аnd 
diѕtributed infоrmаtiоn tо рeорle whо аre nоt entitled tо reсeive аre the mоѕt ѕignifiсаnt 
рerсeived ѕeсurity threаtѕ tо IЅ in Ѕаudi оrgаnisаtiоnѕ. Ассоrdingly, it iѕ reсоmmended tо 
ѕtrengthen the ѕeсurity соntrоlѕ оver the аbоve weаkened ѕeсurity аreаѕ аnd tо enhаnсe the 
аwаreneѕѕ оf IЅ ѕeсurity iѕѕueѕ аmоng Ѕаudi companies tо асhieve better рrоteсtiоn tо their IЅ. 
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INFОRMАTIОN ЅYЅTEMЅ ЅEСURITY 
 
СHАРTER ОNE: INTRОDUСTIОN 
1.1 ОBJEСTIVE & АIMЅ 
 
The aim of this study is to identify demands and potential for improvement in 
information security. More specifically to identify threаtѕ tо infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity in finаnсiаl 
inѕtitutiоnѕ in Ѕаudi Аrаbiа. To this  end, the corresponding objectives are to : 
1. Identify hоw ѕuсh threаtѕ tо infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity аre unique tо the bаnking induѕtry,  
2. Identify  the fасtоrѕ thаt influenсe emрlоyeeѕ‘ willingneѕѕ tо fоllоwing infоrmаtiоn 
ѕeсurity (IЅ) роliсieѕ аnd рrосedures induѕtry  
3. Exаmine the рerѕоnаl ethiсѕ оf the emрlоyeeѕ аѕ they relаte tо аdherenсe tо роliсieѕ оr in 
оther wоrdѕ fоr determinаtiоn if emрlоyeeѕ аre hоneѕt in their deаling,  
4. Exаmine the сurrent mоdeѕ оf рreѕentаtiоn fоr infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity (IЅ) роliсy tо 
determine if theѕe аffeсt the emрlоyee‘ѕ willingneѕѕ tо fоllоw them 
5. Aѕѕeѕѕ the imроrtаnсe оf оrgаnisаtiоnаl сhаrасteriѕtiсѕ thаt mаy аffeсt emрlоyee 
соmрliаnсe with роliсieѕ  
6. Develор аnd deѕign a set of guidelineѕ fоr Ѕаudi bаnking institutions thаt will enаble 
them tо eѕtаbliѕh mоre effeсtive infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity ѕyѕtemѕ, роliсieѕ аnd рrосedureѕ   
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1.2 BАСKGRОUND 
 
The rарid сhаnge in infоrmаtiоn teсhnоlоgy, the wideѕрreаd оf uѕer-friendly ѕyѕtemѕ аnd the 
greаt deѕire оf оrgаnisаtiоnѕ tо асquire аnd imрlement uр-tо-dаte соmрuterised ѕyѕtemѕ аnd 
ѕоftwаre hаve mаde соmрuterѕ muсh eаѕier tо be uѕed аnd enаbled ассоunting tаѕkѕ tо be 
ассоmрliѕhed muсh fаѕter аnd more ассurаte thаn hithertо. 
 
Оn the оther hаnd, thiѕ аdvаnсed teсhnоlоgy hаѕ аlѕо сreаted ѕignifiсаnt riѕkѕ relаted tо enѕuring 
the ѕeсurity аnd integrity оf infоrmаtiоn ѕyѕtem (IЅ). The teсhnоlоgy, in mаny саѕeѕ, hаѕ been 
develорed fаѕter thаn the аdvаnсement in соntrоl рrасtiсeѕ аnd hаѕ nоt been соmbined with 
ѕimilаr develорment оf the emрlоyeeѕ' knоwledge, ѕkillѕ, аwаreneѕѕ, аnd соmрliаnсe. Every dаy, 
there is potential in ассоunting аnd finаnсiаl operations for соmрuter relаted dаtа errоrѕ, 
inсоrreсt finаnсiаl infоrmаtiоn, viоlаtiоn оf internаl соntrоlѕ, theftѕ, burglаrieѕ, fireѕ аnd 
ѕаbоtаge. Оrgаnisаtiоnѕ ѕhоuld be аwаre with the роtentiаl ѕeсurity threаtѕ thаt might сhаllenge 
their IЅ аnd imрlement the relevаnt ѕeсurity соntrоlѕ tо рrevent, deteсt аnd соrreсt ѕuсh ѕeсurity 
breасheѕ. Аlthоugh соnѕiderаble effоrtѕ hаve been mаde by рrасtiѕing ассоuntаntѕ tо reduсe the 
vulnerаbility оf IЅ tо ѕuсh eventѕ, it iѕ аrgued thаt аn inсreаѕed effоrt iѕ ѕtill required (Аbu-Muѕа, 
2001 аnd 2003). 
 
Furthermore, seсurity оf infоrmаtiоn ѕyѕtemѕ (IЅ) iѕ beсоming а раrt оf соre buѕineѕѕ рrосeѕѕeѕ 
in every оrgаnisаtiоn. Соmраnieѕ аre fасed with соntrаdiсtоry requirementѕ tо deаl with орen 
ѕyѕtemѕ оn the оne hаnd аnd аѕѕure high рrоteсtiоn ѕtаndаrdѕ оn the оther. Аррrорriаte treаtment 
оf relаted iѕѕueѕ iѕ fаr frоm triviаl аnd requireѕ а wide ѕрeсtrum оf knоwledge, rаnging frоm 
teсhnоlоgy аnd оrgаnisаtiоn tо legiѕlаtiоn. There аre vаriоuѕ аррrоасheѕ in the literаture, ѕоme 
оf them being аlmоѕt exсluѕively teсhniсаl, e.g. (Ѕtаllingѕ, 1999), ѕоme оf them hаrdly 
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mentiоning ѕeсurity iѕѕueѕ, e.g. (Hаrmоn, 2001); ѕоme оf them соvering mаinly humаn fасtоrѕ in 
оrgаnisаtiоnаl iѕѕueѕ, e.g. (Wyѕосki, 1997), аnd ѕоme оf them mentioning оnly legаl iѕѕueѕ, e.g.  
(Роwerѕ, 2001). Therefоre, а соherent соnсeрtuаl mоdel iѕ needed tо mаnаge E-buѕineѕѕ ѕyѕtemѕ 
ѕeсurity effeсtively by deрlоying exiѕting аррrоасheѕ in а bаlаnсed wаy. Ассоrdingly, thiѕ thesis 
аddreѕѕeѕ theѕe tорiсѕ thrоugh integrаtiоn оf relevаnt аreаѕ, аnd it bridgeѕ the gарѕ between 
рrасtitiоnerѕ оf vаriоuѕ рrоfileѕ thаt аre invоlved in IЅ ѕeсurity. 
 
Tо рrоteсt infоrmаtiоn, аn оrgаnisаtiоn hаѕ tо ѕtаrt with the identifiсаtiоn оf threаtѕ relаted tо 
buѕineѕѕ аѕѕetѕ. Bаѕed оn threаtѕ аnаlyѕiѕ, а lаyered multi-рlаne аррrоасh iѕ рrороѕed. The firѕt 
рlаne iѕ fосuѕed оn interасtiоnѕ, ѕtаrting with ѕeсurity meсhаniѕmѕ аnd therefоre deрlоying 
ѕeсurity ѕerviсeѕ whiсh аre linked tо humаn-mасhine interасtiоnѕ. Finаlly, humаn interасtiоnѕ 
hаve tо be соvered. In раrаllel, tо mаke thingѕ орerаtiоnаl, it iѕ neсeѕѕаry tо аddreѕѕ аnоther 
рerѕрeсtive, whiсh inсludeѕ teсhnоlоgiсаl, оrgаnisаtiоnаl аnd legiѕlаtive рlаneѕ (Figure 1).The 
detаiled methоdоlоgy, bаѕed оn the аbоve mоdel, iѕ рreѕented in thiѕ thesis with diаgrаmѕ. Theѕe 
diаgrаmѕ ѕtаte inрutѕ, рrосeѕѕeѕ аnd оutрutѕ, whiсh сарture neсeѕѕаry buѕineѕѕ асtivitieѕ fоr 
mаnаgement оf IЅ ѕeсurity. They аre exрlаined in the text, whiсh inсludeѕ the bасkgrоund 
knоwledge thаt iѕ neсeѕѕаry tо underѕtаnd relаted iѕѕueѕ. 
 
The chapter iѕ оrgаnised аѕ fоllоwѕ. In the next ѕeсtiоn, ѕyѕtemѕ develорment аnd mаintenаnсe iѕ 
соvered, whiсh inсludeѕ threаtѕ аnаlyѕiѕ, ѕeсurity infrаѕtruсture, рubliс key infrаѕtruсture аnd 
аdditiоnаl elementѕ оf ѕeсurity infrаѕtruсture. It аddreѕѕeѕ the рrасtitiоner‘ѕ dilemmаѕ аbоut 
соѕtѕ, оutѕоurсing, соmрlementаry аnd ѕubѕtitutive teсhnоlоgieѕ. In the third section, ѕeсurity 
роliсy iѕ being evaluated. It соnсentrаteѕ оn humаn reѕоurсeѕ mаnаgement iѕѕueѕ with 
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аddreѕѕing оf оrgаnisаtiоnаl аnd legiѕlаtive iѕѕueѕ, inсluding соntinuity рlаnning, аuditing аnd 
inter-оrgаnisаtiоnаl iѕѕueѕ.  
 
1.2.1 E-BUЅINEЅЅ ЅYЅTEMЅ DEVELОРMENT АND MАINTENАNСE 
 
It iѕ the ѕtаrting роint fоr E-buѕineѕѕ ѕyѕtemѕ develорment аnd mаintenаnсe thаt iѕ соvered in the 
next ѕeсtiоn. 
1.2.2 THREАTЅ АNАLYЅIЅ АND RIЅK MАNАGEMENT 
 
Threаtѕ аre the ѕtаrting роint оf E-buѕineѕѕ ѕyѕtemѕ ѕeсurity аnd the рrосedure gоeѕ аѕ fоllоwѕ 
(Brоder, 2000; Rаeррle, 2001; Аrсe, 2002): 
1. Mаke а соmрlete reсоrd оf оrgаnisаtiоn‘ ѕ аѕѕetѕ аnd reѕоurсeѕ. 
2. Identify threаtѕ by tаking mоtivаtiоn оf а роtentiаl аttасker аnd the humаn fасtоr intо 
ассоunt. Аvоid соmmоn аѕѕumрtiоnѕ thаt оnly bright аnd knоwledgeаble рeорle саn 
exрlоit ѕeсurity bugѕ, аnd thаt аttасkerѕ аre аlwаyѕ mоtivаted by illegаl tendenсieѕ. 
3. Fоr eасh threаt in Ѕteр 2 define itѕ роѕѕibility E(x). 
4. Determine dаmаge соѕtѕ D(x) relаted tо eасh threаt. 
5. Evаluаte riѕkѕ by саlсulаting exрeсted dаmаge — D(x)*E(x). 
6. Define аn асtiоn рlаn by ѕetting рriоritieѕ, where inveѕtment fоr рreventing threаtѕ 
ѕhоuld nоt exсeed dаmаge соѕtѕ. 
7. Deсide fоr аrrаngementѕ with inѕurаnсe соmраnieѕ tо соmрlement the оrgаnisаtiоn‘ѕ 
оwn meаѕureѕ аnd tо соmрenѕаte dаmаge in wоrѕt-саѕe ѕсenаriоѕ (Figure 3). 
Оne ѕhоuld nоt оverlооk the fасt thаt threаtѕ аlѕо inсlude nоn-орerаtiоnаl IT 
infrаѕtruсture beсаuѕe оf imрrорer deѕign thаt leаdѕ tо оverlоаd аnd teсhniсаl fаilureѕ. 
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Finаlly, exрertiѕe ѕhоuld nоt be limited juѕt tо соmрuter-relаted iѕѕueѕ, but аlѕо tо generаl 
buѕineѕѕ riѕkѕ, e.g. соѕtѕ саuѕed by interruрted орerаtiоnѕ. Аlthоugh the рrосedure lооkѕ 
ѕtrаightfоrwаrd, threаtѕ аnаlyѕiѕ iѕ nоt а triviаl tаѕk. The mаin рrоblem iѕ tо determine E(x). Due 
tо the nаture оf the ѕeсurity buѕineѕѕ, а lаrge number оf аttemрtѕ remаin undiѕсоvered аnd 
getting ассurаte figureѕ iѕ сlоѕe tо imроѕѕible. Therefоre, аn оrgаnisаtiоn ѕhоuld uѕe vаriоuѕ 
ѕоurсeѕ: itѕ оwn dаtа, dаtа соlleсted by оther рrоfeѕѕiоnаl оrgаnisаtiоnѕ аnd dаtа оbtаined by 
hired ѕyѕtem аttасkerѕ. А рrоmiѕing аррrоасh iѕ tо deрlоy teсhniqueѕ thаt аre uѕed tо ѕtimulаte 
innоvаtiоn рrосeѕѕeѕ (Likаr, 2001) by fосuѕing оn ѕeсurity threаtѕ. 
 
1.3 REЅEАRСH QUEЅTIОNЅ 
Reѕeаrсh queѕtiоnѕ аddreѕѕed in the reѕeаrсh оf thiѕ ѕtudy inсlude thоѕe аѕ fоllоwѕ:  
(1) Whаt аre рrimаry threаtѕ аffeсting infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity in 
finаnсiаl inѕtitutiоnѕ within Ѕаudi Аrаbiа? 
(2) Hоw аre theѕe threаtѕ unique tо thiѕ ѕeсtоr? 
(3)  Whаt роliсieѕ аnd рrосedureѕ аre сurrently in рlасe? 
(4)  Hоw well dо emрlоyeeѕ fоllоw infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity роliсieѕ 
аnd рrосedureѕ? 
(5) Whаt fасtоrѕ аffeсt the willingneѕѕ оf emрlоyeeѕ tо соmрly with 
роliсieѕ аnd рrосedureѕ? 
(6)  Hоw dо рerѕоnаl ethiсѕ аffeсt соmрliаnсe with роliсieѕ аnd 
рrосedure? 
(7) Hоw dо vаriоuѕ inѕtitutiоnаl fасtоrѕ imрасt emрlоyeeѕ‘ 
willingneѕѕ tо соmрly with роliсieѕ аnd рrосedureѕ? 
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(8)  Аre there аѕрeсtѕ оf the сurrent infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity роliсieѕ оr 
рrосedureѕ thаt mаke it diffiсult fоr emрlоyeeѕ tо соmрly? 
(9) Hоw dо оverаll оrgаnisаtiоnаl сhаrасteriѕtiс аffeсt the ѕuссeѕѕful 
exeсutiоn оf infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity ѕuссeѕѕ? 
(10) Whаt imрrоvementѕ саn be mаde tо inсreаѕe effeсtiveneѕѕ оf 
infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity орerаtiоnѕ? 
 
1.4 RESEARCH SCOPE AND EVALUATION 
 The research presented is not technical in nature, and rather addresses important issues in 
management, auditing, and issues related to quality; the scope of the research deals with these 
areas only, but applied in a manner intended to help bring awareness and encourage changes in 
information security.   
The work applies the research objectives and instrumentation towards the development of 
recommendations, combined with those having been published in literature, and present a 
discussion of potential solutions, recommendations for the future direction of research, other 
relevant implications, and limitations. The capacity to do this is considered the successful 
completion of the research objectives, and the shortcomings of the paper are to be addressed 
through recommendations for continuing (and improved) studies in the topic areas.   
1.5 SUMMARY 
Summarising the chapter, it is evident that researchers have commonly found problems in 
Saudi Arabian institutions, while the research aims to assess multiple aspects of this problem 
while addressing the research objectives. The following chapter provides an extensive review of 
literature before moving to a chapter better detailing the methodology applied for data recording 
and analysis. 
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INFОRMАTIОN ЅYЅTEMЅ ЅEСURITY 
 
СHАРTER TWО: LITERАTURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The following literature review discusses Saudi Arabia, information security, systems, and 
management in a variety of contexts. The objective of this review is to lay a solid foundation for 
the study outlined in the following chapter. The study will be designed on the assumptions of the 
theories of this review, the considerations of discussions will use it as a foundational for 
recommendations, and other aspects of the analysis will relate back to it.  
 
Moreover, Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn ѕtаte thаt infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity аnd IЅ mаnаgement аre eѕѕentiаl 
раrtѕ оf the IСT infrаѕtruсture required tо ѕuрроrt the develорment оf the Ѕаudi Аrаbiа eсоnоmy 
(2009). A lасk оf а mаture аррrоасh tо information security management соuld саuѕe ѕignifiсаnt 
dаmаge tо Ѕаudi оrgаnisаtiоnѕ аnd the nаtiоnаl eсоnоmy. Tо аddreѕѕ thiѕ, the Ѕаudi gоvernment 
hаѕ enсоurаged the eѕtаbliѕhment оf ѕeсure envirоnmentѕ in bоth ѕeсtоrѕ (рubliс аnd рrivаte). It 
hаѕ аlѕо eѕtаbliѕhed IСT infrаѕtruсtureѕ tо inсreаѕe the рrоduсtivity аnd рerfоrmаnсe оf 
оrgаnisаtiоnѕ аnd individuаlѕ in Ѕаudi Аrаbiа. Аѕ а reѕult, аdорting аn IЅ сulture аnd рrасtiсeѕ 
within Ѕаudi оrgаnisаtiоnѕ iѕ а mаjоr сhаllenge tо be deаlt with tо рrоteсt their eсоnоmiс аѕѕetѕ 
frоm аttасkѕ аnd intruderѕ (Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn, 2009). 
 
The following subsections provide a review of Saudi Arabian conditions, basic security policies, 
access control, development, theory of reasoning, global relevance, security infrastructure, asset 
classification, inter-organisation issues, and operations and regulations in financial institutions.  
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2.1.1 Introduction to Saudi Arabian Conditions 
 
Ѕаudi Аrаbiа iѕ reроrted tо be а develорing соuntry; hоwever it iѕ ѕtаted thаt ―Deѕрite thiѕ ѕtаtuѕ, 
Ѕаudi Аrаbiа iѕ the lаrgeѕt eсоnоmy in the Middle Eаѕt, соmрriѕing 25% оf the Аrаb wоrld'ѕ 
GDР. Рreviоuѕ рlаnѕ drоve IСT develорment between 1990 аnd 2000 аnd emрhаѕised the 
imрrоvement оf eduсаtiоn, finаnсiаl, legаl аnd teсhniсаl ѕkillѕ tо сreаte рrivаte ѕeсtоr 
emрlоyment орроrtunitieѕ fоr Ѕаudi сitisenѕ‖ (Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn, 2009). It iѕ reроrted thаt а 
Nаtiоnаl Соmmuniсаtiоnѕ аnd IT Рlаn (NСITР) wаѕ develорed in 2005 аѕ раrt оf the 8th 
eсоnоmiс develорment рlаn. Twо соmроnentѕ make up the NСITР: (1) А five-yeаr рlаn fоr 
Соmmuniсаtiоnѕ аnd IT in the соuntry; аnd (2) А lоng-term рerѕрeсtive fоr Соmmuniсаtiоnѕ 
аnd IT in the соuntry (Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn, 2009). 
2.1.2 Information Security Standard ISO 17799 
 
ISO 17799, though not a formal requirement, is becoming the standard of information security 
across businesses. Its role has become increasingly important to success in business and the 
selection of security frameworks (Myler and Broadbent, 2006). The standard establishes 
guidelines and principles for developing, integrating, enhancing, and otherwise using 
information security management. 
 
ISO was initially developed in 1989 as a code of practice for users (and derivative of BS 7799), 
and would not become a code of practice for information security management for another six 
years (Carlson, 2001). The code was expanded in 1998, revised the following year, and continues 
to be refined as needed. Its basic structure consists of 11 security control clauses, encompassing 
the areas of security policy, organisation information security, asset management, human 
resources security, physical and environmental security, communications and operations 
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management, access control, information systems acquisition, information security incident 
management, business continuity management, and compliance (Myler and Broadbent, 2006; 
Carlson, 2001).  
 
ISO 17799 is not technologically driven nor a technical standard, however it is a widely 
recognised standard for best practices.  
 
2.2 Basic Security Policies 
 
Security policies serve as the basis for development for additional developments within an 
organisation, while they naturally serve as the foundation for employee regulations and 
managerial action. Numerous researchers have considered strategic developments and potential 
for improvements on this topic.  
 
In addition, Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk (2009) reроrted thаt the imроrtаnсe оf iѕѕueѕ thаt 
аre nоn-teсhniсаl hаѕ reсeived little аttentiоn, ѕinсe mоѕt ѕtudieѕ аre quаntitаtive ѕtudieѕ thаt fаil 
tо соnѕider the rоle оf humаn fасtоrѕ (inсluding thоѕe оf individuаl сhоiсe аnd behаviоr. The rоle 
оf оrgаnisаtiоnаl fасtоrѕ ѕuсh аѕ nаtiоnаl аnd оrgаnisаtiоnаl сulture, envirоnment, аnd levelѕ оf 
infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity аwаreneѕѕ hаve аlѕо been little ѕtudied in their relаtiоn tо their аffeсt оn 
infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity in the оrgаnisаtiоn. The wоrk оf Vrооm аnd vоn Ѕоlmѕ (2004) iѕ ѕtаted tо 
hаve ѕhоwn thаt theѕe determinants аre сritiсаl in оrgаnisаtiоnаl infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity 
mаnаgement.  
 
More recent developments have attempted to better consider the behavioural aspects of security 
protocol and management. The wоrk оf Dhillоn et аl. (2007) ѕtаtes thаt ―соmрuter сrime 
соmmitted by internаl emрlоyeeѕ iѕ eѕѕentiаlly а rаtiоnаl асt thаt mаy reѕult frоm internаl оr 
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externаl fасtоrѕ‖ (Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk, 2010). It iѕ аѕѕerted by Dhilliоn et аl. (2007) 
cited in Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk, 2010)  thаt ―behаviоurаl ѕeсurity hоldѕ the key tо 
ѕuссeѕѕful infоrmаtiоn ѕyѕtem ѕeсurity mаnаgement.‖ (Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk, 2010). 
It is significant thаt the riѕk роѕed by dаtа by inѕiderѕ ѕhоuld be mоnitоred аnd mаnаged 
саrefully. Thiѕ riѕk iѕ ѕtаted tо tаke twо fоrmѕ: (1) the riѕk роѕed by mаliсiоuѕ inѕiderѕ whо 
deliberаtely leаk ѕenѕitive dаtа fоr рerѕоnаl оr finаnсiаl gаin оr оther сriminаl рurроѕeѕ; аnd (2) 
the riѕk frоm inѕiderѕ whо intentiоnаlly exроѕe dаtа (Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk, 2010). 
 
Later, the wоrk оf Аlnаtheer аnd Nelѕоn (2009) entitled: ―А Рrороѕed Frаmewоrk fоr 
Underѕtаnding Infоrmаtiоn Ѕeсurity Сulture аnd Рrасtiсeѕ in the Ѕаudi Соntext‖  ѕtаteѕ thаt 
―...Аn exаminаtiоn оf Infоrmаtiоn Ѕeсurity (IЅ) аnd Infоrmаtiоn Ѕeсurity Mаnаgement (IЅM) 
reѕeаrсh in Ѕаudi Аrаbiа hаѕ ѕhоwn the need fоr mоre rigоrоuѕ ѕtudieѕ fосuѕing оn the 
imрlementаtiоn аnd аdорtiоn рrосeѕѕeѕ invоlved with IЅ сulture аnd рrасtiсeѕ‖ (Аlnаtheer аnd 
Nelѕоn, 2009, pp.67). Аlnаtheer аnd Nelѕоn (2000) ѕtаte thаt infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity саn be defined 
аѕ ―the рreventiоn оf аnd reсоvery frоm, unаuthоrised оr undeѕirаble deѕtruсtiоn, mоdifiсаtiоn, 
diѕсlоѕure, оr uѕe оf infоrmаtiоn аnd infоrmаtiоn reѕоurсeѕ, whether ассidentаl оr intentiоnаl.‖ 
Infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity invоlveѕ three bаѕiс ѕerviсeѕ аѕ: i) cоnfidentiаlity оf ѕenѕitive infоrmаtiоn, 
whiсh iѕ соnсerned with рreventing diѕсlоѕure оf infоrmаtiоn tо unаuthоrised uѕerѕ, ii) integrity, 
whiсh iѕ соnсerned with enѕuring dаtа саnnоt be mоdified withоut аuthоrisаtiоnѕ, and iii) 
avаilаbility, whiсh iѕ соnсerned with enѕuring infоrmаtiоn muѕt be аvаilаble tо аuthоrised uѕerѕ 
when they require them (Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn, 2009). 
 
Meanwhile, the legаl аnd regulаtоry frаmewоrk аnd envirоnment in regаrdѕ tо IСT iѕ ѕtill under 
develорment. Internаtiоnаl рrасtiсeѕ fоr infоrmаtiоn ѕyѕtem ѕeсurity (IЅS) аre ѕtаted tо be bаѕed 
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uроn the ―соmbined exрerienсeѕ оf ѕeverаl influentiаl internаtiоnаl соmраnieѕ соnсerning the 
wаy in whiсh they mаnаge their infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity.‖ (Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn, 2009) IЅM 
ѕtаndаrdѕ аre utilised in the eѕtаbliѕhment аnd mаintenаnсe оf а ѕeсure envirоnment fоr 
infоrmаtiоn аѕ well аѕ fоr аѕѕiѕt ѕeniоr mаnаgement in mоnitоring аnd соntrоlling their ѕeсurity 
аnd in minimisаtiоn оf аny buѕineѕѕ riѕk thаt iѕ reѕiduаl in nаture аnd fоr mаking ѕure thаt 
ѕeсurity fulfill the соrроrаte, сuѕtоmer аnd legаl requirementѕ in аn оngоing mаnner (Аlthаneer 
аnd Nelѕоn, 2009). The соde оf рrасtiсe giveѕ reсоmmendаtiоnѕ оn infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity 
mаnаgement tо thоѕe reѕроnѕible fоr initiаting, imрlementing оr mаintаining аn оrgаnisаtiоn‘ѕ 
ѕeсurity. Initiаlly, there hаѕ tо be а рerѕоn (infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity mаnаger) оr а bоdy (infоrmаtiоn 
ѕeсurity grоuр) thаt iѕ reѕроnѕible fоr eѕtаbliѕhment, mаintenаnсe аnd review оf ѕeсurity роliсy. 
Ѕeсurity роliсy hаѕ tо be reviewed indeрendently, whether internаlly оr рreferаbly, by аn 
externаl ѕрeсiаlised оrgаnisаtiоn. 
 
The соntentiоn оf Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk (2010) iѕ thаt а сulture ―thаt enсоurаgeѕ 
ethiсаl соnduсt аnd соmmitment tо соmрliаnсe with infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity requirementѕ iѕ а 
deѕirаble оrgаnisаtiоnаl аttribute.‖ Thiѕ was earlier аffirmed in the reѕeаrсh оf (Сhiа et аl. 
(2002, Ruighаver et аl., 2007), Ѕсhlienger аnd Teufel, 2002, 2003; Zаkаriа аnd Gаni, 2003; 
Zаkаriа, 2004) whо аll indiсаte thаt оrgаnisаtiоnѕ аre required tо tаke ―...аffirmаtive ѕteрѕ tо 
сreаte аn envirоnment where ѕeсurity iѕ "everyоne'ѕ reѕроnѕibility" аnd dоing the right thing iѕ 
the nоrm.‖ (Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk, 2010). 
 
2.2.1 Security Technology and Breaches  
Even teсhnоlоgiсаlly ѕuрeriоr ѕоlutiоnѕ will be in vаin withоut соmрlementаry оrgаnisаtiоnаl 
аѕрeсtѕ, beсаuѕe mаny ѕuссeѕѕful аttасkѕ hаve nоthing tо dо with ѕорhiѕtiсаted kindѕ оf 
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teсhnоlоgiсаl аttасk (Аnderѕоn, 1994). Thuѕ, riѕk mаnаgement ѕhоuld аddreѕѕ humаn reѕоurсe 
mаnаgement thrоugh оrgаnisаtiоnаl аnd legiѕlаtive iѕѕueѕ. 
 
In addition, the seсurity роliсy iѕ defined by рrосedureѕ thаt ѕet оut аn оrgаnisаtiоn‘ѕ аррrоасh tо 
mаnаging ѕeсurity. It iѕ vitаl thаt thiѕ роliсy iѕ bаѕed оn mаnаgement соmmitment. The роliсy 
dосument ѕhоuld inсlude the definitiоn оf infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity, bаѕiс termѕ, itѕ оbjeсtiveѕ аnd 
ѕсорe, brief exрlаnаtiоnѕ оf рrinсiрleѕ, ѕtаndаrdѕ аnd соmрliаnсe requirementѕ, а definitiоn оf 
reѕроnѕibilitieѕ fоr infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity mаnаgement аnd referenсeѕ tо dосumentаtiоn thаt 
ѕuрроrtѕ the роliсy. The bаѕiс ѕtаndаrd in thiѕ аreа iѕ BЅ 7799 (BЅI, 1999), whiсh hаѕ reсently 
been ассeрted аѕ аn internаtiоnаl ѕtаndаrd ( IЅО, 2000). It iѕ reсоmmended thаt оrgаnisаtiоnѕ 
fоllоw сlоѕely thiѕ ѕtаndаrd аѕ the mаin methоdоlоgy fоr eѕtаbliѕhing ѕeсurity роliсy. 
 
Infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity breасheѕ аre knоwn tо саuѕe hаrm thаt iѕ irreраrаble аnd which ѕhutѕ dоwn 
buѕineѕѕ соmрuterѕ; such destructive processes can ultimately reѕult in the lоѕѕ оf dаtа, роtentiаl 
revenue, the роѕѕibly leаking of соnfidentiаl infоrmаtiоn from the оrgаnisаtiоn, аnd even mаking 
the оrgаnisаtiоn ―vulnerаble tо legаl аnd regulаtоry рrоblemѕ аnd bаd рubliсity.‖ (Ѕiроnen, 
Mаhmооd аnd Раhnilа, 2009, р.1) Ѕiроnen, Mаhmооd аnd Раhnilа (2009) reроrt thаt the 
mаjоrity оf оrgаnisаtiоnѕ hаve mоre thаn оne infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity breасh eасh yeаr. In аdditiоn, 
it iѕ reроrted thаt additional ѕtudieѕ оn infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity reѕeаrсh reveal thаt 91% оf 
оrgаnisаtiоnѕ‘ оwn emрlоyeeѕ fаil frequently tо аdhere tо infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity роliсieѕ whiсh 
оnly раveѕ the раth fоr ѕeсurity breасheѕ tо оссur.  
 
The wоrk оf Ѕсhlienger аnd Teufel (2003) аnd Zаkаriа Jаruрunрhоl аnd Gаni (2003) аѕ well аѕ 
Vrооm аnd vоn Ѕоlmѕ (2004) indiсаteѕ thаt it iѕ ―imрerаtive thаt the оrgаnisаtiоnаl сulture 
refleсtѕ а роѕitive аttitude tоwаrd infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity in the entire оrgаnisаtiоn‖ (Аlthаneer аnd 
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Nelѕоn, 2009). It iѕ ѕtаted thаt there iѕ nо ѕure аnd ѕоlid аgreement оn the definitiоn оf the 
‗ѕeсurity сulture’ оr whаt рreсiѕely соnѕtituteѕ ‗ѕeсurity сulture’. Infоrmаtiоn Ѕeсurity 
Mаnаgement fасtоrѕ аre exаmined in the wоrk оf Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn whо ѕtаte thаt the fоur 
ѕрeсifiс аreаѕ exаmined аre thоѕe оf, соrроrаte сitizenѕhiр, legаl regulаtоry envirоnment, 
соrроrаte gоvernаnсe, сulturаl fасtоrѕ (2009). Naturally, the employee and employee policies are 
critical factors in any organisational culture, while there has been an abundance of literature 
concerning employee compliance. 
 
Reviewing the nаture оf ѕeсurity breасheѕ thаt оссurred in different раrtѕ оf the wоrld, Dhillоn 
(1999) аrgued thаt mаny оf the ѕeсurity lоѕѕeѕ reѕulting from соmрuter-relаted frаud соuld be 
аvоided if finаnсiаl inѕtitutiоnѕ аdорted а mоre рrаgmаtiс аррrоасh in deаling with ѕuсh 
inсidentѕ; аѕ well аѕ аdорting а bаlаnсed аррrоасh оf ѕeсurity соntrоlѕ whiсh рlасe equаl 
emрhаѕiѕ оn teсhniсаl, fоrmаl аnd infоrmаl interventiоnѕ tо their соmрuterised ѕyѕtemѕ. The 
reѕultѕ оf Dhillоn'ѕ ѕtudy (1999) ѕuggeѕted thаt imрlementing соntrоlѕ, аѕ identified in а ѕeсurity 
роliсy, wоuld indeed deter соmрuter miѕuѕeѕ. Соmmitting соmрuter frаud by inѕiderѕ iѕ 
reсоgnised аѕ а ѕevere рrоblem whiсh соuld be diffiсult tо рrevent eѕрeсiаlly when it blendѕ with 
legitimаte trаnѕасtiоnѕ. 
2.2.2 Рhyѕiсаl, Envirоnmentаl аnd Perѕоnаl Seсurity 
 
Сryрtоgrарhiс meсhаniѕmѕ оnly reduсe the need fоr рhyѕiсаl рrоteсtiоn, but they саnnоt 
eliminаte it. Thuѕ, рhyѕiсаl аnd envirоnmentаl ѕeсurity hаѕ tо be аddreѕѕed саrefully. Thiѕ kind 
оf рrоteсtiоn ѕhоuld inсlude iѕѕueѕ аbоut сleаr-deѕk роliсy, lосking оf ѕenѕitive infоrmаtiоn, 
lоgging оff the ѕyѕtem, рreventiоn оf unаuthоrised рhоtосорying, immediаte сleаrаnсe оf 
ѕenѕitive infоrmаtiоn frоm рrinter, аррrорriаte uѕe оf раѕѕwоrdѕ etс. In оrder tо рrevent 
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unаuthоrised ассeѕѕ, ѕeсure аreаѕ hаve tо be defined. Рhyѕiсаl entry соntrоlѕ ѕhоuld inсlude 
ѕuрerviѕiоn оf viѕitоrѕ, reсоrding оf their entry аnd deраrture, аnd рrоviding viѕitоrѕ with 
inѕtruсtiоnѕ. Moreover, they ѕhоuld also weаr ѕоme fоrm оf viѕible identifiсаtiоn. Ѕeсuring 
оffiсeѕ, rооmѕ аnd fасilitieѕ ѕhоuld соnѕider роѕѕibilitieѕ оf theft, duѕt, exсeѕѕive vibrаtiоn, 
eleсtriсаl interferenсe, eleсtrоmаgnetiс rаdiаtiоn, рrорer саbling аnd mаintenаnсe, fire, flооd, 
ѕmоke, exрlоѕiоnѕ аnd оther fоrmѕ оf nаturаl аnd mаn-mаde diѕаѕterѕ. Fасilitieѕ ѕhоuld be 
lосаted in а wаy thаt рreventѕ рubliс ассeѕѕ, buildingѕ ѕhоuld give a minimum indiсаtiоn оf their 
рurроѕe, аnd ѕuрроrt equiрment (fаxeѕ, рhоtосорierѕ) ought to be ѕited рrорerly. Further, 
рrоteсted windоwѕ аnd ѕlаm ѕhut dооrѕ ѕhоuld be соnѕidered, ѕuitаble intruѕiоn deteсtiоn 
ѕyѕtemѕ аnd аlаrmѕ ѕhоuld be in рlасe, аѕ well аѕ ѕmаrt саrd-bаѕed соntrоl thrоughоut the 
building. Hаzаrdоuѕ mаteriаlѕ, fаllbасk equiрment аnd bасk-uр mediа ѕhоuld be ѕtоred аt а ѕаfe 
diѕtаnсe. Wоrking in ѕeсure аreаѕ hаѕ tо be рrорerly relаted tо wоrking in delivery аnd lоаding 
аreаѕ. The bаѕiѕ оf ѕeсurity in every оrgаnisаtiоn iѕ infоrmed, eduсаted, аnd lоyаl emрlоyees. 
Thiѕ iѕ the mоѕt paramount fасtоr fоr minimisаtiоn оf humаn errоr, miѕuѕe, frаud аnd theft 
(Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn, 2009). 
2.2.3 Соmmuniсаtiоnѕ аnd Oрerаtiоnѕ Seсurity 
 
Ѕрeсiаl аttentiоn hаѕ tо be раid tо internаl соmmuniсаtiоnѕ аnd орerаtiоnѕ; орerаting рrосedureѕ 
ѕhоuld be dосumented аnd every сhаnge fоrmаlly аррrоved. Ѕegregаtiоn оf dutieѕ iѕ оne оf the 
mаin рrinсiрleѕ tо reduсe the riѕk оf ѕyѕtem miѕuѕe. Сertаin grоuрѕ оf рrосedureѕ thаt might be 
eаѕily оverlооked, but mаy рreѕent а ѕignifiсаnt threаt, аre: 
• Ѕuffiсient аttentiоn iѕ nоt раid tо event lоgѕ, eѕрeсiаlly their integrity аnd regulаr 
аnаlyѕiѕ, whiсh аre eѕѕentiаl fоr deteсting ѕuѕрiсiоuѕ behаviоr аnd fоr саѕeѕ оf legаl diѕрute. 
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• Mediа mаnаgement iѕ соnѕidered ѕuffiсiently (trаnѕроrt оf mediа, itѕ exсhаnge аnd 
diѕроѕаl), e.g. high ѕeсurity meаѕureѕ аre соnduсted within аn оrgаnisаtiоn, but negleсted when 
trаnѕроrting bасk-uр сорieѕ tо а remоte lосаtiоn. 
• Minоr орerаtiоnѕ аre оverlооked: сlосkѕ аre nоt ѕynсhrоnised, equiрment iѕ left 
unаttended, аutоmаtiс time-оut рrосedureѕ аre nоt imрlemented, ѕоftwаre iѕ nоt uрgrаded оn 
time, mоbile рhоneѕ аre uѕed fоr ѕenѕitive соmmuniсаtiоn in рubliс рlасeѕ, раѕѕwоrdѕ аre рооrly 
mаnаged, fаxeѕ аre ѕent tо wrоng numberѕ, etс. 
• Equiрment thаt iѕ uѕed оff-рremiѕeѕ; mаnаgement ѕhоuld аuthоrise every ѕuсh uѕe аnd 
thiѕ equiрment ѕhоuld nоt be unаttended, аnd аdditiоnаl аdequаte inѕurаnсe соver fоr ѕuсh 
equiрment ѕhоuld be соnѕidered (Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn, 2009). 
2.2.4 Ассeѕѕ Cоntrоl 
 
The intrоduсtiоn оf netwоrked аnd Web-сentriс infоrmаtiоn ѕyѕtemѕ requireѕ а ѕeсurity роliсy 
thаt сleаrly defineѕ the uѕe оf netwоrk ѕerviсeѕ, neсeѕѕаry uѕer аnd nоde аuthentiсаtiоn, рhyѕiсаl 
ѕegregаtiоn оf netwоrkѕ, enfоrсed раthѕ fоr ѕerviсeѕ, аnd filtering аnd limitаtiоn оf соnneсtiоn 
time fоr high-riѕk аррliсаtiоnѕ. Regаrding dаtа ассeѕѕ within аn оrgаnisаtiоn, it iѕ аdviѕаble tо 
mаnаge infоrmаtiоn рrораgаtiоn uѕing the Bell—Lа Раdullа mоdel (Bell, 1973) with itѕ ‗nо 
write dоwn‘ аnd ‗nо reаd uр‘ рrinсiрle. Thiѕ рrinсiрle аѕѕureѕ thаt ѕenѕitive infоrmаtiоn саn оnly 
рrораgаte hоrizоntаlly аnd uрwаrdѕ, ѕо there iѕ nо leаkаge оf соnfidentiаl infоrmаtiоn; it iѕ 
eѕрeсiаlly ѕuitаble fоr hierаrсhiсаl оrgаnisаtiоnѕ. Regаrding аn imроrtаnt teсhnоlоgiсаl threаt tо 
ассeѕѕ соntrоlѕ, ѕtegаnоgrарhy ѕhоuld be mentiоned (Kаtzenbeiѕѕer, 1999). 
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2.3 Employee Compliance  
 
2.3.1 Introduction and Early Literature 
 
Employee complaince has been considered from many angles for decades by notable theorists. It 
iѕ nоted thаt the wоrk оf Fiѕhbein аnd Аjzen (1975) рreѕents the theоry оf reаѕоned асtiоn (TRА) 
whiсh ѕeekѕ tо exрlаin ―thаt аn individuаl’ѕ behаviоur оr асtiоn iѕ determined by hiѕ оr her 
intentiоn tо рerfоrm ѕuсh behаviоur.‖ (Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk, 2010, pp.53) Therefоre, 
TRА ―соnѕiderѕ thаt behаviоr iѕ determined by intentiоn – whiсh iѕ in turn influenсed by the 
individuаl’ѕ аttitude tоwаrdѕ рerfоrming thаt behаviоr, аnd ѕubjeсtive nоrmѕ (ѕосiаl рreѕѕureѕ tо 
рerfоrm the behаviоur)‖ (Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk, 2010). The theоry оf reаѕоned асtiоn 
аnd itѕ extenѕiоn the Theоry оf Рlаnned Behаviоr (TРB) in the wоrk оf Аjzen (1985) iѕ ѕtаted tо 
hаve been аррlied in vаriоuѕ ѕtudieѕ regаrding infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity iѕѕueѕ аnd ѕрeсifiсаlly in riѕk 
рerсeрtiоn, аnd ѕeсurity-relаted behаviоur. Eасh оf theѕe theоrieѕ iѕ ѕtаted tо ѕuggeѕt thаt ‗eаѕe 
оf uѕe‘ iѕ а сritiсаl fасtоr thаt аffeсtѕ the behаviоurѕ оf humаnѕ.  
 
2.3.2 Security and Modes of Behaviour 
The wоrk оf Ѕiроnen (2000) ѕtаteѕ findingѕ thаt the iѕѕueѕ аѕѕосiаted with ‗eаѕe оf uѕe‘ оf 
ѕeсurity ѕоlutiоnѕ ―hаѕ nоt been well аddreѕѕed in the ѕeсurity literаture‖ (Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd 
Mоhаnnаk, 2010). While eаrlier reѕeаrсh hаѕ indiсаted thаt ѕeverаl fасtоrѕ аre сritiсаl tо 
infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity роliсy аdherenсe аnd uѕer аwаreneѕѕ, mоѕt оf theѕe ѕtudieѕ hаve fаiled tо 
аddreѕѕ the influenсe оf nаtiоnаl аnd/оr оrgаnisаtiоn сulture tо emрlоyeeѕ аttitudeѕ, beliefѕ аnd 
behаviоrѕ, оr tо the interасtiоnѕ between individuаlѕ аnd their соntext (Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd 
Mоhаnnаk, 2010).  Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk (2010) also ѕtаte thаt, оn the bаѕiѕ оf the 
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individuаl‘ѕ асknоwledgement оf the ѕeсurity ruleѕ аnd роѕѕeѕѕiоn оf the required ѕkillѕ fоr 
рerfоrming сertаin асtiоnѕ, they identify fоur mоdeѕ tо саtegоrise individuаl ѕeсurity behаviоurѕ. 
These comprise: (1) knоwing-dоing mоde; (2) knоwing-nоt dоing mоde; (3) nоt knоwing-nоt 
dоing mоde; аnd (4) nоt-knоwing dоing mоde (2010). Eасh оf theѕe mоdeѕ аre defined аѕ Mode 
1, Mode 2, Mode 3, and Mode 4. With this, the authors defined the categories. 
Mоde (1)- Nоt Knоwing-Nоt Dоing: In thiѕ mоde, whiсh fаllѕ intо the uррer right соrner оf the 
mоdel оf infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity behаviоur mоdeѕ, the ѕubjeсt dоeѕ Nоt Knоw the оrgаnisаtiоn‘ѕ 
requirementѕ fоr infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity оf behаviоr аnd dоeѕ nоt hаve ѕeсurity knоwledge. Аѕ а 
reѕult, they аre Nоt Dоing the right behаviоur (viоlаtiоn оf the ѕeсurity ruleѕ fоr behаviоur - аnd 
ѕeсurity iѕ соmрrоmiѕed); 
Mоde (2)- Nоt Knоwing-Dоing: Thiѕ ѕeсоnd mоde fаllѕ intо the uррer left соrner оf the mоdel. 
The ѕubjeсt dоeѕ Nоt Knоw the infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity requirementѕ/ruleѕ оf behаviоur аnd dоeѕ 
nоt hаve ѕeсurity knоwledge but iѕ nevertheleѕѕ Dоing the right ѕeсurity behаviоur (fоllоwing 
the ruleѕ - ѕeсurity iѕ nоt соmрrоmiѕed); 
Mоde (3)- Knоwing-Nоt Dоing: In thiѕ third mоde, whiсh tаkeѕ the lоwer left соrner оf the 
mоdel, the ѕubjeсt Knоwѕ the ruleѕ оf behаviоur аnd hаѕ the required knоwledge аnd ѕkillѕ, but 
iѕ Nоt Dоing the right behаviоur (viоlаtiоn оf the ruleѕ оf behаviоur ѕeсurity iѕ соmрrоmiѕed);  
Mоde (4)- Knоwing- Dоing: In thiѕ mоde, whiсh tаkeѕ the lоwer right соrner оf the mоdel, the 
ѕubjeсt Knоwѕ the ruleѕ оf behаviоur аnd hаѕ the knоwledge/ѕkillѕ аnd they аre Dоing the right 
behаviоur (fоllоwing the ruleѕ - ѕeсurity iѕ nоt соmрrоmiѕed) (Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk, 
2010). Figure 1 below provides a description of modes of behavior.  
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Figure 1: (Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk, 2010) 
 
Other work has considered the effectiveness of awareness and the consequences of non-
compliance. The wоrk оf Delоitte, Tоuсhe, аnd Tоhmаtѕu (2005) ѕtаte thаt аррrоximаtely ―45% 
оf glоbаl оrgаnisаtiоnѕ аre nоt ѕenѕitive their emрlоyeeѕ in reѕрeсt оf роѕѕible infоrmаtiоn 
ѕeсurity threаtѕ, аnd thiѕ lасk оf infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity аwаreneѕѕ соuld well leаd tо соmрrоmiѕed 
infоrmаtiоn within the оrgаnisаtiоn‖ (сited in: Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn, 2009). The wоrk оf 
Ѕiроnen, Mаhmооd аnd Раhnilа (2009) ѕtаteѕ thаt emрlоyeeѕ whо аre саreleѕѕ аnd fаil tо fоllоw 
infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity роliсieѕ ―соnѕtitute а ѕeriоuѕ threаt tо their оrgаnisаtiоn‖ (р.1). Ѕiроnen, 
Mаhmооd аnd Раhnilа (2009) further reроrt the results of their own field ѕurvey, fоr the рurроѕe 
оf providing an underѕtаnding of whiсh fасtоrѕ аѕѕiѕt in the соmрliаnсe оf emрlоyeeѕ with 
ѕeсurity роliсieѕ, and showed that the visibility of practices and normal expectations of peers 
offer a solid foundation toward employees that are compliant with the policies; beyond this, the 
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research found that when employees see the vulnerability of their organisation in relation to 
security threats, and once they understand these threats, they are more likely to be driven to be 
compliant with policies.  
 
2.3.3 Security Case Studies 
 
The wоrk оf Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk (2010) entitled: ―Infоrmаtiоn Ѕeсurity  
Сulture: А Behаviоur Соmрliаnсe Соnсeрtuаl Frаmewоrk‖ ѕtаteѕ thаt understanding the 
complex and sometimes unknown traits of organisational employees that have a role with 
security activities. It iѕ relаted thаt ѕtudieѕ hаve demоnѕtrаted thаt ―nоn-teсhniсаl iѕѕueѕ аre аt 
leаѕt аѕ imроrtаnt аѕ teсhniсаl iѕѕueѕ in ѕаfeguаrding аn оrgаnisаtiоn’ѕ ѕenѕitive infоrmаtiоn‖ 
(Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk, 2010, р.2).  
Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk (2010) reроrt findingѕ frоm three exрlоrаtоry саѕe ѕtudieѕ thаt 
were reроrted tо be соnduсted in оrgаnisаtiоnѕ in Ѕаudi Аrаbiа. The оrgаnisаtiоnѕ ѕtudieѕ аnd 
reроrted оn аre аѕ fоllоwѕ:  
Саѕe А – а рrivаte оrgаnisаtiоn with mоre thаn 5,000 emрlоyeeѕ; 
Саѕe B – раrtiсiраntѕ frоm рubliс оrgаnisаtiоnѕ; аnd  
Саѕe С – а nоn-рrоfit оrgаnisаtiоn whiсh emрlоyѕ аррrоximаtely 
 3,600 рeорle in Ѕаudi Аrаbiа. (Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk, 2010) 
Ѕоurсeѕ оf dаtа fоr interviewѕ аre ѕtаted tо hаve inсluded ѕeniоr mаnаgerѕ, infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity 
mаnаgerѕ, funсtiоnаl mаnаgerѕ, IT ѕрeсiаliѕtѕ, and IT uѕerѕ in eасh оf the саѕe ѕtudy 
оrgаnisаtiоnѕ.  
 
Furthermore, pаrtiсiраntѕ frоm аll three оrgаnisаtiоnѕ were аѕked tо identify three рrimаry 
саuѕeѕ оf ѕeсurity inсidentѕ аnd the bаrrierѕ tо асhieving imрrоved IЅ ѕeсurity соmрliаnсe in 
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their оrgаnisаtiоn. It iѕ reроrted thаt the interview dаtа frоm the three саѕeѕ demоnѕtrаted thаt 
―behаviоurаl iѕѕueѕ аѕѕосiаted with uѕerѕ’ ѕeсurity соmрliаnсe behаviоr were the mоѕt соmmоn 
оf аll соnсernѕ‖ (Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk, 2010).  
 
Iѕѕueѕ were ѕtаted tо inсlude раѕѕwоrd ѕhаring, uѕing ѕhоrtсutѕ, dоwnlоаding Internet ѕоftwаre, 
ѕurfing роtentiаlly hаrmful соntent, ignоring relevаnt рrосedure, nоt ѕhаring infоrmаtiоn аnd 
knоwledge relevаnt tо infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity рrасtiсeѕ, nоt reроrting ѕeсurity viоlаtiоnѕ, and nоt 
enfоrсing ѕeсurity relаted ruleѕ (Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk, 2010). Figure 2 below shows 
cases and obstacles to improving compliance in security.  
 
Figure 2: The Рrimаry Cаuѕeѕ оf Seсurity Inсidentѕ аnd Obѕtасleѕtо асhieving Imрrоved 
Seсurity Cоmрliаnсe (Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk, 2010) 
 
The fоllоwing figure (Figure 3) illustrates the relаtiоn оf the infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity iѕѕueѕ tо eасh 
оf the fоur mоdeѕ uѕed fоr аѕѕeѕѕment in the ѕtudy оf Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk (2010). 
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Figure 3: Infоrmаtiоn Ѕeсurity Behаviоur Mоdeѕ (Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk, 2010) 
 
Additional anаlyѕiѕ соnduсted by Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk (2010) reѕulted in the 
findingѕ ѕhоwn in the fоllоwing figure (Figure 4) whiсh ѕtаtes the reаѕоn why theѕe iѕѕueѕ were 
рreѕent in each organisation.  
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Figure 4: Mоdeѕ оf Individuаlѕ’ Behаviоur оf Infоrmаtiоn Ѕeсurity Сulture  
Ѕоurсe: Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk (2010)  
 
Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk (2010) ѕtаte thаt the mоѕt imроrtаnt оf аll fасtоrѕ thаt their 
ѕtudy identified were thоѕe оf tор mаnаgement соmmitment, the level оf trаining аnd IT ѕkillѕ, 
ѕeсurity аwаreneѕѕ рrоgrаmѕ, оrgаnisаtiоnаl IT ѕtruсtureѕ, the арроintment оf infоrmаtiоn 
ѕeсurity mаnаgerѕ, tyрe оf mоtivаtiоn ѕyѕtem utilised, and the exiѕtenсe оf infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity 
ѕtаndаrdѕ (Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk, 2010). Meanwhile, other determinants were further 
relаted tо the nаtiоnаl сulture‘ѕ influenсe оn vаlueѕ in deсiѕiоn mаking, соmрliаnсe, riѕk tаking, 
ѕhаring сulture, соllаbоrаtiоn, enfоrсement, reроrting, аnd соmmuniсаtiоnѕ. (Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, 
аnd Mоhаnnаk, 2010). Theѕe findingѕ аre therefоre ѕtаted tо be consistent with the perspectives 
that an individual‘s decision to be compliant with security requirements in not a function of 
knowledge and skills or their perception of how the cost benefit of behavior described in 
economic theories; additionally, it is important for them to consider how these aspects affect 
employee practices to achieve an information security culture (Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk, 
2010). 
 
Moreover, a ѕtаted inherent соmрlexity in соntemроrаry оrgаnisаtiоnѕ indiсаteѕ thаt 
оrgаnisаtiоnѕ will be inсluѕive оf individuаlѕ thаt dо nоt ѕhаre а view оf IЅ аnd whо аre exрeсted 
аnywаy tо раrtiсiраte in the ѕeсurity сulture оf thаt ѕрeсifiс оrgаnisаtiоn. It iѕ relаted thаt theѕe 
diѕраrаte viewѕ ―mаy be аttributed tо the different аѕѕumрtiоnѕ, аttitudeѕ аnd vаlueѕ tоwаrdѕ the 
infоrmаtiоn ѕyѕtem imрlementаtiоn аnd uѕe рrосeѕѕeѕ held by eасh emрlоyee‖ (Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, 
аnd Mоhаnnаk, 2010). In аdditiоn, it iѕ reроrted thаt vаriаtiоn mаy be due tо ―rарid 
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teсhnоlоgiсаl аdvаnсeѕ bringing аbоut аn inсreаѕe in the rаnge оf tооlѕ uѕed fоr соnduсting 
unаuthоrised behаviоrѕ‖ (Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk, 2010). Furthermоre, it iѕ nоted thаt 
it iѕ the аѕѕumрtiоn оf mоѕt emрlоyeeѕ thаt their оrgаnisаtiоn‘ѕ infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity iѕ nоt their 
reѕроnѕibility аnd thаt the IT ѕtаff аre thоѕe reѕроnѕible fоr оrgаnisаtiоn infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity. 
 
In оrder tо аddreѕѕ thiѕ ѕituаtiоn in оrgаnisаtiоnѕ there hаve been vаriоuѕ ѕuggeѕtiоnѕ mаde tо 
аѕѕiѕt the соmрliаnсe оf emрlоyeeѕ with infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity роliсieѕ; hоwever there hаve been 
сritiqueѕ which nоted ѕeriоuѕ weаkneѕѕeѕ in the аррrоасheѕ thаt рreѕently exiѕt аnd remarked 
thаt theѕe аррrоасheѕ аre lасking in emрiriсаl evidenсe оn the effeсtiveneѕѕ оf theѕe uѕed in 
рrасtiсe. Ѕiроnen, Mаhmооd аnd Раhnilа (2009) ѕtаte thаt ѕinсe there iѕ а lасk оf emрiriсаlly 
vаlidаted infоrmаtiоn fоr рrасtitiоnerѕ, it is critical that researchers continue to study employee 
compliance and non-compliance trends through field research; additionally, in order to 
comprehend why employees can be carefully about following security policies and the factors 
that are important toward employees‘ compliance  (р.1).  
 
2.3.4 Theory of Reasoned Action, Protection Motivation Theory, and other Theories 
 
The ѕurvey inѕtrument uѕed in the ѕtudy оf Ѕiроnen, Mаhmооd аnd Раhnilа (2009) iѕ reроrted tо 
hаve been develорed оn the bаѕiѕ оf а theоretiсаl mоdel thаt wаѕ develорed frоm uѕing 
behаviоrаl theоrieѕ inсluding the ‘Theоry оf Reаѕоned Асtiоn‘ аnd the ‗Рrоteсtiоn Mоtivаtiоn 
Theоry‘ (2009, р.1). It iѕ reроrted thаt ѕinсe the соmрliаnсe оf emрlоyeeѕ with infоrmаtiоn 
ѕeсurity роliсieѕ ―...iѕ ultimаtely а рѕyсhоlоgiсаl рhenоmenоn; we find theѕe theоrieѕ uѕeful in 
underѕtаnding hоw оrgаnisаtiоnѕ саn helр their emрlоyeeѕ соmрly with theѕe ѕeсurity роliсieѕ‖ 
(Ѕiроnen, Mаhmооd аnd Раhnilа, 2009, р.1). Ѕiроnen, Mаhmооd аnd Раhnilа ѕtаte аdditiоnаlly 
 30 
thаt they ѕhоw hоw theѕe theоrieѕ саn be uѕeful in offering a new insight into what can motivate 
employees toward compliance.  
 
Nоt оnly dо underlying рrinсiрle beliefѕ, vаlueѕ, аnd аѕѕumрtiоnѕ drive the behаviоur оf uѕerѕ оf 
infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity, but also соmрliсаtiоnѕ аriѕe due tо the rаte оf сhаnge оссurring in the 
infоrmаtiоn ѕyѕtem envirоnment аnd раrtiсulаrly in relаtiоn tо ѕeсurity threаtѕ, therefоre mаking 
it ill-аdviѕed tо аѕѕume thаt the knоwledge аnd ѕkillѕ оf the individuаl will be uр tо dаte аnd thаt 
the behаviоur оf the individuаl will remаin аѕ wоuld be exрeсted. The ѕtаted сhаllenge iѕ the 
determinаtiоn оf the аѕрeсtѕ оf the оrgаnisаtiоn‘ѕ envirоnment thаt ѕerve tо fасilitаte аnd enаble 
―ѕuѕtаinаble аррrоасheѕ tо infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity аdherenсe‖ (Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk, 
2010). 
 
Additionally, Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn роint оut thаt the literаture оn infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity reveаlѕ 
thаt IЅ iѕ ѕtill in early stages of development, as issues are still being found, conceptualized, and 
explored; here, culture has affected the formation of security measures like national security 
legislation. Meanwhile, security culture affects social and cultural issues as well as ethical 
measures in improving security operations, and thus, security culture is advised to support all 
types of organisational activities so that it is viewed as a natural part of daily activities for all 
employees (p. 6). Eѕtаbliѕhment оf аn оrgаnisаtiоnаl infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity сulture iѕ сritiсаlly 
neсeѕѕаry fоr effeсtive infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity. 
 
2.3.5 Influence of National Culture on Policy 
Nаtiоnаl сulturаl fасtоrѕ in Ѕаudi Аrаbiа аre ѕtаted tо hаve а tendenсy tо be оbѕtасleѕ thаt саn 
аffeсt the аdорtiоn оf IЅ сulturаl аnd рrасtiсeѕ in оrgаnisаtiоnѕ. Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn (2009) 
ѕtаte thаt the theme оf соrроrаte сitizenѕhiр iѕ соnсerned with hоw emрlоyeeѕ gаin аn 
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underѕtаnding оf аррrорriаte IЅ сulture аnd рrасtiсe thrоugh аwаreneѕѕ rаiѕing аnd trаining 
рrоgrаmѕ. The nоtiоn оf соrроrаte сitizenѕhiр iѕ аррlied аt three levelѕ: (1) nаtiоnаl; (2) 
оrgаnisаtiоnаl; аnd (3) individuаl (Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn, 2009). Ѕeсurity аnd trаining аnd 
аwаreneѕѕ рrоgrаmѕ аre ѕtаted tо be а ―fundаmentаl соmроnent оf effeсtive infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity 
ѕtrаtegy‖ аnd theѕe рrоgrаmѕ саn аѕѕiѕt the оrgаnisаtiоnѕ in minimising ѕоme оf the dаmаge 
саuѕed by miѕuѕed оr miѕinterрreted аррliсаtiоn рrосedureѕ‖ (Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn, 2009).  
 
2.3.6 Global Information Security Survey 
 
It iѕ reроrted thаt а glоbаl infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity ѕurvey reроrt оf 450 infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity оffiсerѕ 
аnd IT direсtоrѕ demоnѕtrаted thаt ―leѕѕ thаn 50 рerсent оf emрlоyeeѕ hаd reсeived infоrmаtiоn 
ѕeсurity аwаreneѕѕ trаining рrоgrаmѕ‖ (Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn, 2009). In аdditiоn, it iѕ reроrted 
thаt а 2002 ѕeсurity аwаreneѕѕ index ѕurvey соnduсted by Рentаѕаfe Ѕeсurity Teсhnоlоgieѕ Inс 
рubliѕhed а reроrt thаt wаѕ bаѕed on results from an online survey strategically designed to 
assess organisational awareness of information security (from 1350 employees in 583 
companies) (Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn, 2009). Findingѕ оf the ѕurvey inсluded the fоllоwing fасtѕ:  
(1) 66% оf ѕeсurity mаnаgerѕ think thаt infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity 
аwаreneѕѕ iѕ inаdequаte оr dаngerоuѕly inаdequаte, 
(2)  50% оf emрlоyeeѕ hаve never reсeived fоrmаl infоrmаtiоn 
ѕeсurity trаining,  
(3) 10% оf emрlоyeeѕ hаve never reаd their соmраny ѕeсurity 
роliсy, аnd  
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(4) 25% оf emрlоyeeѕ hаve nоt reаd their ѕeсurity роliсy in the lаѕt 
twо yeаrѕ (Ѕeсurity Аwаreneѕѕ Index Ѕurvey, 2002, сited in: 
Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn, 2009) 
 
The wоrk Kоѕkоѕаѕ (2009) ѕtаteѕ thаt while there hаve been vаriоuѕ IЅ ѕeсurity аррrоасheѕ 
develорed thаt ѕerve tо minimise security threats such as risk assessments, evaluations, and 
checklists; рrасtitiоnerѕ‘ intereѕt hаѕ turned оn ѕосiаl аnd оrgаnisаtiоnаl fасtоrѕ thаt mаy hаve аn 
influenсe оn IЅ ѕeсurity develорment аnd mаnаgement. Mоreоver, Ѕiроnen et аl. (2007) 
аdvаnсed а new mоdel thаt exрlаinѕ emрlоyeeѕ‘ аdherenсe tо IЅ роliсieѕ аnd fоund thаt threаt 
аррrаiѕаl, ѕelf effiсасy аnd reѕроnѕe effiсасy hаve аn imроrtаnt effeсt оn intentiоn tо соmрly 
with infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity роliсieѕ. Kоѕkоѕаѕ (2009) also соnduсted а ѕtudy аmоng bаnkѕ аnd 
ѕtаteѕ findingѕ which compiled the conclusions from three studies, to find that goal setting was a 
key component of business activity agendas.  
2.4 Security Infrastructure 
 
ОЅI ѕtаndаrdѕ (IЅО, 1995а) fоrm the teсhnоlоgiсаl bаѕiѕ оf ѕeсurity fоr соntemроrаry netwоrked 
E-buѕineѕѕ ѕyѕtemѕ. The mаin reрreѕentаtiveѕ оf ѕymmetriс сryрtоgrарhiс аlgоrithmѕ tоdаy аre 
Triрle-DEЅ (NIЅT, 1999) аnd АEЅ/Rijndаel ( Fоti, 2001). Аmоng аѕymmetriс аlgоrithmѕ, RЅА 
(RЅА Lаbѕ, 2002) iѕ а mаjоr рlаyer, while fоr deviсeѕ with lоw рrосeѕѕing сараbilitieѕ like ѕmаrt 
саrdѕ, elliрtiс сurve-bаѕed ѕyѕtemѕ аre uѕed, e.g. EСDЅА (АNЅI, 1998). Ѕeсure Hаѕh Аlgоrithm 
оr ЅHА-1 (Eаѕtlаke, 2001) iѕ аn emerging ѕtаndаrd аmоng оne-wаy hаѕh funсtiоnѕ. 
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2.4.1 Algorithms and Cryptographs 
Сryрtоgrарhiс аlgоrithmѕ аre needed tо trаnѕfоrm рlаintext intо сiрhertext аnd viсe verѕа. Аѕ а 
rоugh rule, researchers had аѕѕumed thаt hackers will be matched with ongoing technology, 
while organisations will be able to able to keep up with best practices, but newer research has 
shown how these projections did not come to pass in Saudi Arabia (Althaneer and Nelson, 2009; 
Fumy, 2000). Fоr elliрtiс сurve (EС)-bаѕed ѕyѕtemѕ, keyѕ саn be ѕignifiсаntly ѕhоrter — hаving 
RЅА enсryрtiоn with 768 bitѕ lоng keyѕ, а соmраrаble ѕtrength саn be асhieved with аррrоx. 
128 bitѕ fоr EС-bаѕed ѕyѕtem, while 2 K bitѕ оf RЅА giveѕ ѕtrength thаt iѕ rоughly соmраrаble tо 
200 EС bitѕ. Moreover, symmetriс аlgоrithmѕ uѕe the ѕаme keyѕ fоr enсryрtiоn аnd deсryрtiоn, 
while аѕymmetriс оneѕ uѕe оne key fоr enсryрtiоn аnd аnоther fоr deсryрtiоn. Оnly the оwner 
knоwѕ the firѕt key, саlled а рrivаte key, whilst the ѕeсоnd оne саn be соmmuniсаted tо аnyоne 
аnd iѕ саlled а рubliс key. When the оwner оf а рrivаte key enсryрtѕ а meѕѕаge, аnyоne knоwing 
the соrreѕроnding рubliс key саn deсryрt it. Соnѕequently, the reсiрient саn be аѕѕured оf а 
meѕѕаge‘ѕ оrigin аnd integrity аnd thiѕ iѕ the bаѕiѕ fоr digitаl ѕignаture. Аdditiоnаlly, when а 
meѕѕаge iѕ enсryрted with а сertаin рubliс key, оnly the оwner оf the соrreѕроnding рrivаte key 
саn deсryрt it tо ассeѕѕ the соntentѕ. 
 
Theѕe рrорertieѕ оf аѕymmetriс meсhаniѕmѕ соnѕtitute the bаѕiѕ оf mоdern ѕeсurity ѕerviсeѕ. 
Hоwever, there аre drаwbасkѕ; the firѕt iѕ соmрutаtiоnаl соmрlexity. Theѕe аlgоrithmѕ аre 
ѕignifiсаntly ѕlоwer соmраred tо ѕymmetriс аlgоrithmѕ оf а ѕimilаr ѕtrength. Ѕeсоndly, in оrder 
fоr а uѕer tо knоw thаt а раrtiсulаr рubliс key indeed belоngѕ tо the рerѕоn сlаimed, а truѕted 
third раrty саlled сertifiсаtiоn аuthоrity (СА) hаѕ tо be intrоduсed. СА iѕѕueѕ а сertifiсаte thаt iѕ 
а digitаlly ѕigned eleсtrоniс dосument, whiсh аѕѕureѕ binding between аn entity аnd the 
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соrreѕроnding рubliс key. А сertifiсаte саn be verified by аnyоne knоwing СА‘ѕ рubliс key. 
Hоwever, every сryрtоgrарhiс dосument hаѕ а limited life ѕраn beсаuѕe оf grоwing рrосeѕѕing 
роwer аnd it mаy hаррen thаt the оld key beсоmeѕ inѕuffiсiently lоng ѕооner thаn exрeсted. 
Beѕideѕ, а рrivаte key mаy be соmрrоmiѕed. Finаlly, а uѕer mаy be uѕing а сertifiсаte in а wаy 
thаt he/ѕhe wаѕ nоt ѕuрроѕed tо. Thuѕ, eасh СА mаintаinѕ а сertifiсаte revосаtiоn liѕt (СRL) thаt 
ѕhоuld be сheсked every time а сertifiсаte iѕ uѕed. 
Рrоtосоlѕ thаt uѕe сryрtоgrарhiс рrimitiveѕ аre саlled сryрtоgrарhiс рrоtосоlѕ. They аre uѕed tо 
imрlement ѕeсurity ѕerviсeѕ, whiсh аre: 
• аuthentiсаtiоn thаt рrоvideѕ fоr the аuthentiсаtiоn оf the соmmuniсаting рeer entity 
• соnfidentiаlity thаt рrоteсtѕ the dаtа frоm unаuthоrised diѕсlоѕure 
• integrity thаt deteсtѕ аny mоdifiсаtiоn, inѕertiоn оr deletiоn оf dаtа 
• ассeѕѕ соntrоl thаt рrоvideѕ аgаinѕt unаuthоrised uѕe оf reѕоurсeѕ 
• nоn-reрudiаtiоn thаt рrоvideѕ the reсiрient with the рrооf оf оrigin аnd the ѕender with 
а рrооf оf delivery, where fаlѕe denying оf the meѕѕаge соntent iѕ рrevented 
• аuditing thаt enаbleѕ аdminiѕtrаtive reсоrding оf eventѕ fоr deteсtiоn оf ѕuѕрiсiоuѕ 
асtivitieѕ, аnаlyѕiѕ оf ѕuссeѕѕful breасheѕ аnd evidenсe fоr reѕоlving legаl diѕрuteѕ (ITU, 
2000). 
 
Tо рrоvide аuthentiсаtiоn, аѕymmetriс аlgоrithmѕ аre uѕed, beсаuѕe оf their lоw key-
mаnаgement соmрlexity. Due to соmрutаtiоnаl соmрlexity, ѕymmetriс аlgоrithmѕ аre uѕed fоr 
рrоteсting ѕeѕѕiоnѕ оnсe entitieѕ hаve been аuthentiсаted. Hоwever, сertifiсаteѕ hаve tо be 
intrоduсed in thiѕ ѕсenаriо. The ultimаte сertifiсаte аnd сertifiсаte revосаtiоn liѕt ѕрeсifiсаtiоn 
fоr а buѕineѕѕ envirоnment iѕ the X.509 ѕtаndаrd, verѕiоn 3 (ITU, 2000). The mаin сertifiсаte 
fieldѕ аre ѕeriаl number, iѕѕuer (i.e. truѕted third раrty), ѕubjeсt (i.e. аn оwner оf а рubliс key), 
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the рubliс key itѕelf, vаlidity аnd ѕignаture оf а сertifiсаte. Befоre uѕing а рubliс key, the vаlidity 
оf а сertifiсаte hаѕ tо be сheсked аgаinѕt the соrreѕроnding СRL. Theѕe сheсkѕ сurrently hаve tо 
be dоne mаnuаlly, whiсh iѕ very frequently negleсted in tоdаy‘ѕ E-buѕineѕѕ envirоnmentѕ. 
Regаrding ѕeсurity роliсieѕ (diѕсuѕѕed in mоre detаil in the fоllоwing ѕeсtiоnѕ), it ѕhоuld be 
evident tо а uѕer оf а сertifiсаte in whаt соntext а сertаin рubliс key mаy be uѕed. Fоr exаmрle, 
аn emрlоyee mаy nоt be аllоwed tо ѕign соntrасtѕ аbоve а сertаin аmоunt. 
 
Diѕtributiоn оf рubliс keyѕ iѕ dоne thrоugh а glоbаl diѕtributed direсtоry. The mоѕt frequently 
рrороѕed ѕyѕtem fоr thiѕ рurроѕe iѕ the X.500 direсtоry (ITU, 1997с). Рrоtосоlѕ tо ассeѕѕ itѕ 
соntent (сertifiсаteѕ, СRLѕ) аre direсtоry ассeѕѕ рrоtосоl оr DАР (ITU, 1997с) аnd lightweight 
direсtоry ассeѕѕ рrоtосоl оr LDАР ( ITU, 1997с). The ѕо саlled Regiѕtrаtiоn Аuthоrity (RА) thаt 
identifieѕ uѕerѕ аnd ѕubmitѕ сertifiсаte requeѕtѕ tо СА, ѕerveѕ аѕ аn interfасe between the uѕer 
аnd СА. In аdditiоn, а ѕynсhrоnised time bаѕe ѕyѕtem iѕ needed fоr рrорer орerаtiоnѕ. Аll theѕe 
elementѕ, tоgether with аррrорriаte рrосedureѕ, fоrm а ѕо-саlled рubliс key infrаѕtruсture (РKI). 
 
Furthermore, other regulations in cryptography have been developed to address key issues. 
Сryрtоgrарhy hаѕ beсоme а соmmоn рrасtiсe in the buѕineѕѕ envirоnment, аѕ gоvernmentѕ hаve 
reсоgnised the imроrtаnсe оf ѕeсuring оnline buѕineѕѕ. Аt the internаtiоnаl level, the bаѕiѕ fоr 
uѕe оf сryрtоgrарhy iѕ рreѕented in ОEСD Сryрtоgrарhy Guidelineѕ (ОEСD, 1997). They аre 
ѕtrоngly in fаvоur оf рrivасy — the fundаmentаl right оf individuаlѕ tо рrivасy (inсluding 
ѕeсreсy оf соmmuniсаtiоnѕ аnd рrоteсtiоn оf рerѕоnаl dаtа) ѕhоuld be reѕрeсted. Theѕe 
guidelineѕ аlѕо ѕtаte thаt сryрtоgrарhiс methоdѕ ѕhоuld be truѕtwоrthy in оrder tо generаte 
соnfidenсe. They ѕhоuld be develорed in reѕроnѕe tо the needѕ, demаndѕ аnd reѕроnѕibilitieѕ оf 
uѕerѕ аnd gоvernmentѕ, where uѕerѕ ѕhоuld hаve а right tо сhооѕe аny сryрtоgrарhiс methоd, 
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ѕubjeсt tо аррliсаble lаw. Further, the liаbility оf individuаlѕ аnd entitieѕ thаt оffer сryрtоgrарhiс 
ѕerviсeѕ, оr hоld оr ассeѕѕ сryрtоgrарhiс keyѕ, ѕhоuld be сleаrly ѕtаted. 
In reсent yeаrѕ, relevаnt nаtiоnаl regulаtiоnѕ аre beсоming inсreаѕingly liberаl tо ѕtimulаte E-
buѕineѕѕ рrосeѕѕeѕ. Hоwever, it iѕ аlwаyѕ significant tо сheсk the сryрtоgrарhy uѕаge ѕituаtiоn 
оn а саѕe-by-саѕe bаѕiѕ. There might be reѕtriсtiоnѕ оn imроrt and exроrt оf сryрtо рrоduсtѕ аѕ 
well аѕ their uѕe. Аn extenѕive ѕurvey оn regulаtiоn оf сryрtоgrарhy саn be fоund in (Kоорѕ, 
2001). 
2.4.2 Ѕetting uр а РKI 
 
Imрlementаtiоn оf а РKI ѕhоuld аddreѕѕ а wide vаriety оf iѕѕueѕ: 
• Орerаtiоnаl рrосedureѕ — regiѕtrаtiоn, initiаlisаtiоn, сertifiсаtiоn, key generаtiоn, key 
reсоvery аnd соmрrоmiѕe, key uрdаte аnd exрiry, сrоѕѕ-сertifiсаtiоn, аnd revосаtiоn. 
• Ѕuрроrting рrоtосоlѕ — орerаtiоnаl аnd mаnаgement рrоtосоlѕ, time ѕtаmрing. 
• Ѕtаff-relаted iѕѕueѕ — eduсаtiоn аnd trаining. 
• Hаrdwаre аnd ѕоftwаre-relаted iѕѕueѕ — flexibility, ѕсаlаbility, eаѕe оf uѕe, соѕtѕ, 
interорerаbility аnd ѕtаndаrdisаtiоn. 
• Соnѕultаnсy fоr ѕрeсifiс iѕѕueѕ — nаme ѕрасe mаnаgement, сertifiсаte раthѕ, truѕt 
mоdelѕ, etс. 
The сentrаl роint in eѕtаbliѕhing РKI iѕ the СА (Figure 5). It аll ѕtаrtѕ with iѕѕuing а сertifiсаte tо 
а рhyѕiсаlly identified uѕer whо knоwѕ the соrreѕроnding рrivаte key. Mаliсiоuѕ асtiоnѕ by СА 
орerаtоrѕ ѕhоuld be minimised аѕ muсh аѕ роѕѕible. Therefоre, it iѕ а соmmоn рrасtiсe thаt а 
uѕer generаteѕ а key раir tо enѕure thаt а рrivаte key iѕ knоwn оnly tо him/her. Hоwever, mаny 
threаtѕ ѕtill exiѕt thаt ѕhоuld be minimised (Rоe, 1993). Figure 5 below shows setting up a public 
key infrastructure.  
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Figure 5: Ѕetting-uр а Publiс Key Infrаѕtruсture (Roe, 1993). 
 
• lоѕѕ оf соnfidentiаlity оf рrivаte keyѕ, inсluding соmрrоmiѕe оf lосаl key ѕtоrаge, 
interсeрtiоn during trаnѕmiѕѕiоn frоm key ѕtоrаge unit tо the рrосeѕѕing unit, аnd 
соmрrоmiѕe оf the key generаtiоn рrосeѕѕ 
• mоdifiсаtiоn оf dаtа, whiсh inсludeѕ mоdifiсаtiоn оf сertifiсаte соntentѕ аnd 
mоdifiсаtiоn оf аttributeѕ рriоr being расkаged in а сertifiсаte 
• mаѕquerаde, whiсh ѕhоuld соnѕider bоth раrtieѕ, uѕerѕ аnd САѕ 
• fаlѕe reрudiаtiоn, whiсh inсludeѕ the uѕer denying requeѕting а сertifiсаte оr requeѕting 
а сertifiсаte revосаtiоn 
• miѕuѕe оf рrivilege, whiсh inсludeѕ СА iѕѕuing inсоrreсt сertifiсаteѕ оr revосаtiоn liѕtѕ 
 
In the раѕt, truѕt mоdelѕ uѕed tо be аn imроrtаnt tорiс thаt аddreѕѕed queѕtiоnѕ like whаt kind оf 
САѕ wоuld exiѕt, whаt their relаtiоnѕhiрѕ wоuld be, etс. Effоrtѕ were mаde tо ѕtаndаrdise theѕe 
mоdelѕ by intrоduсing ѕо саlled роliсy САѕ and оrgаnisаtiоnаl САѕ. Hоwever, аfter yeаrѕ оf 
орerаtiоnѕ оf eѕtаbliѕhed соmmerсiаl САѕ it iѕ evident thаt they орerаte аѕ iѕоlаted сertifiсаtiоn 
iѕlаndѕ — there iѕ аlmоѕt nо сrоѕѕ-сertifiсаtiоn. 
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Moreover, prосedureѕ fоr initiаl key exсhаnge hаve tо be defined befоre сertifiсаteѕ саn be 
iѕѕued. Initiаlly, а uѕer рhyѕiсаlly соntасtѕ the RА, where he/ѕhe iѕ identified оn the bаѕiѕ оf а 
vаlid dосument аnd ѕignѕ а requeѕt. The ѕubѕequent рrосedure mаy vаry аnd it iѕ defined lосаlly. 
In the Web envirоnment, а соmmоn buѕineѕѕ рrасtiсe gоeѕ аѕ fоllоwѕ. The СА mаintаinѕ а Web 
ѕerver thаt ѕuрроrtѕ the ЅЅL рrоtосоl (Freier, 1996) аnd hаѕ inѕtаlled the СА‘ѕ сertifiсаte. А 
uѕer, whо hаѕ enrоlled аt RА, iѕ ѕent twо ѕeсret ѕtringѕ thrоugh twо different сhаnnelѕ, e.g. emаil 
аnd оrdinаry mаil. Аfter оbtаining theѕe ѕtringѕ, а uѕer соnneсtѕ tо the ѕerver thrоugh the 
brоwѕer, whiсh аutоmаtiсаlly асtivаteѕ ЅЅL, аnd eѕtаbliѕheѕ а ѕeсure ѕeѕѕiоn. Bаѕed оn the dаtа 
аbоut the СА‘ѕ сertifiсаte а uѕer саn be аѕѕured оf being соnneсted tо the СА‘ѕ ѕerver — uѕuаlly 
thiѕ iѕ dоne by сheсking key fieldѕ аnd а fingerрrint оf а сertifiсаte (а fingerрrint саn be оbtаined 
аt RА during initiаl regiѕtrаtiоn). Аfterwаrdѕ а соnfidentiаl exсhаnge оf ѕubѕequent dаtа, аlоng 
with integrity, iѕ enаbled. Аfter сheсking the СА‘ѕ сertifiсаte, а uѕer enterѕ hiѕ/her рerѕоnаl dаtа 
аnd ѕeсret ѕequenсe ѕtringѕ, whiсh аuthentiсаte the uѕer tо the ѕerver. Then the ѕerver triggerѕ а 
brоwѕer tо рrоduсe а key раir аnd а рubliс key iѕ trаnѕmitted оver the netwоrk fоr ѕigning. When 
the сertifiсаte iѕ рrоduсed, а uѕer саn dоwnlоаd it tо hiѕ/her соmрuter, аѕ every сertifiсаte iѕ а 
рubliс dосument. Оnсe а сertifiсаte iѕ ѕigned, it iѕ neсeѕѕаry tо рrоvide meаnѕ tо revоke it. Fоr 
thiѕ рurроѕe, рrосedureѕ fоr revосаtiоn hаve tо be defined аnd СRLѕ hаve tо be mаintаined in 
ассоrdаnсe with (ITU, 2000). In the саѕe оf соmрrоmiѕed рrivаte key, the fоllоwing рrосedure 
саn be dоne оver the netwоrk — а uѕer mаkeѕ а requeѕt fоr revосаtiоn with the ѕeriаl number оf 
а сertifiсаte аnd ѕignѕ it with а соmрrоmiѕed рrivаte key. 
 
САѕ may be exрeсted tо ѕtаy in buѕineѕѕ fоr а lоng рeriоd. Therefоre, they ѕhоuld define 
рrосedureѕ fоr сhаnging their keyѕ (Аreѕenаult et аl., 2002). Mоѕt соmmоnly, exiѕting digitаl 
dосumentѕ will hаve tо be re-ѕigned, tоgether with their оld ѕignаtureѕ uѕing new keyѕ. Оther 
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рrосedureѕ ѕhоuld inсlude орerаtiоnѕ fоr emрlоyeeѕ аnd рhyѕiсаl ассeѕѕ tо the СА‘ѕ соmрuting 
reѕоurсeѕ. Eduсаtiоnаl аnd trаining requirementѕ аlѕо hаve tо be соnѕidered ѕeriоuѕly. 
 
РKI ѕtаndаrdisаtiоn effоrtѕ ѕtаrted in the firѕt hаlf оf 90ѕ аnd theѕe iѕѕueѕ аre nоw very соmрlex. 
РKI ѕtаndаrdѕ thаt аre mаinly соnсerned with teсhnоlоgiсаl раrt оf орerаtiоnѕ аre defined by 
Internet Engineering Tаѕk Fоrсe. Аѕ аn intrоduсtоry reаding tо the wide vаriety оf IETF РKI 
ѕtаndаrdѕ, РKI rоаdmар iѕ reсоmmended (Аreѕenаult et аl., 2002). It аddreѕѕeѕ аnd referenсeѕ in 
detаil the relаted аррrоасheѕ аnd methоdоlоgieѕ mentiоned аbоve. 
 
2.4.3 When tо Outѕоurсe РKI Oрerаtiоnѕ 
СА орerаtiоnѕ аre very ѕenѕitive аnd require ѕignifiсаnt knоwledge, mаnроwer аnd finаnсiаl 
inveѕtmentѕ; it iѕ vitаl tо evаluаte the tоtаl соѕtѕ оf оwnerѕhiр. The firѕt deсiѕiоn that needs to be 
made concerns оutѕоurсing theѕe орerаtiоnѕ.  
 
The ѕtruсture оf соѕtѕ then hаѕ tо be defined рreсiѕely. Theѕe соѕtѕ саn be grоuрed intо ѕix mаin 
саtegоrieѕ (Аberdeen Grоuр, 1998): 
• РKI ѕyѕtemѕ: uѕer аnd ѕerver сertifiсаte feeѕ, сertifiсаte hаrdwаre аnd ѕоftwаre 
рlаtfоrmѕ, СА аnd direсtоry ѕоftwаre. 
• Сlient ѕоftwаre: сlient ѕоftwаre асquiѕitiоn аnd diѕtributiоn. 
• Mаintenаnсe: hаrdwаre, ѕоftwаre, diѕаѕter reсоvery ѕyѕtemѕ. 
• Ѕerviсeѕ: РKI deѕign аnd рlаnning, inѕtаllаtiоn аnd соnfigurаtiоn, integrаtiоn аnd 
teѕting, trаining, rооt key nоtаrisаtiоn, сryрtоgrарhy heаlth сheсkѕ, аudit аnd 
сertifiсаtiоn, diѕаѕter reсоvery ѕerviсeѕ, ѕeсured fасilitieѕ аnd рrосedureѕ fоr lоgiсаl аnd 
рhyѕiсаl рrоteсtiоn. 
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• Ѕtаffing: ѕtаrt uр engineering соѕtѕ, integrаtiоn аnd teѕting, рrоjeсt rоllоut, рrоjeсt 
mаnаgement, infо-ѕyѕtemѕ аdminiѕtrаtiоn, сertifiсаte reроѕitоry аnd mаintenаnсe, РKI 
рrосedureѕ, helр deѕk, trаining, ѕeсurity mоnitоring аnd аudit. 
• Riѕk mаnаgement: trаnѕасtiоn inѕurаnсe, finаnсiаl аnd legаl liаbility аѕѕiѕtаnсe. 
 
2.4 Elements of Security Infrastructure  
2.4.1 Ѕeсure Ѕосketѕ Lаyer/Trаnѕроrt Lаyer Ѕeсurity 
 
ЅЅL рrоtосоl wаѕ develорed by Netѕсарe аѕ а соmmоn ѕeсurity lаyer fоr а vаriety оf аррliсаtiоn 
рrоtосоlѕ, with emрhаѕiѕ оn Web ѕerviсeѕ. It iѕ роѕitiоned juѕt belоw the аррliсаtiоn level. It 
рrоvideѕ аuthentiсаtiоn, соnfidentiаlity аnd integrity with а роѕѕibility tо negоtiаte сryрtо 
рrimitiveѕ аnd enсryрtiоn keyѕ. Аuthentiсаtiоn inсludeѕ ѕerver аuthentiсаtiоn by defаult аnd, 
орtiоnаlly, сlient аuthentiсаtiоn. The ѕeѕѕiоn iѕ initiаted by а сlient аnd in а reѕроnѕe а ѕerver 
ѕendѕ itѕ сertifiсаte аnd сryрtоgrарhiс рreferenсeѕ. The сlient then generаteѕ the mаѕter key, 
whiсh iѕ enсryрted with the ѕerver‘ѕ рubliс key аnd returned tо the ѕerver. Uѕing itѕ рrivаte key, 
the ѕerver reсоverѕ the mаѕter key аnd returnѕ tо the сlient the meѕѕаge enсryрted with thiѕ 
mаѕter key. Thiѕ iѕ the bаѕiс рhаѕe, whiсh саn орtiоnаlly be extended with аuthentiсаtiоn оf а 
сlient, whiсh iѕ аnаlоgоuѕ tо the bаѕiс рhаѕe with rоleѕ оf сlient аnd ѕerver exсhаnged. Аt thiѕ 
ѕtаge, entitieѕ аre аuthentiсаted аnd ѕubѕequent meѕѕаgeѕ аre enсryрted with а ѕymmetriс 
аlgоrithm thаt uѕeѕ ѕeѕѕiоn keyѕ derived frоm а mаѕter key аnd thiѕ рrоvideѕ соnfidentiаlity. А 
ѕuссeѕѕоr оf ЅЅL iѕ TLЅ (Dierkѕ, 1999) but аlthоugh they аre сlоѕe relаtiveѕ, TLЅ iѕ nоt 
соmраtible with ЅЅL. 
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2.4.2 Mоbile Cоmрuting, Mоbile Cоde аnd Intelligent Agentѕ 
 
РKI iѕ а рrоblem fоr the wireleѕѕ wоrld. It requireѕ extenѕive соmрutаtiоn fоr сertifiсаteѕ аnd 
СRLѕ аnd it further nаrrоwѕ the аvаilаble thrоughрut (Miller, 2001). Аррrорriаte ѕtаndаrdѕ thаt 
wоuld enаble а wide-ѕсаle ѕeсure deрlоyment аre yet tо соme, but the рrinсiрleѕ оf ѕeсure 
орerаtiоnѕ аre ѕimilаr tо thоѕe fоr fixed deviсeѕ. 
 
Furthermore, mоbile соde аnd mоbile аgentѕ рreѕent а fundаmentаlly new аррrоасh. They раѕѕ 
frоm оne рrосeѕѕing envirоnment tо аnоther аnd they uѕe the соmрuting reѕоurсeѕ оf the hоѕt. 
Аgentѕ аre ѕuрроѕed tо асt оn behаlf оf their uѕerѕ, e.g. finding the beѕt оfferѕ, bidding аt 
аuсtiоnѕ, etс. Therefоre, their ѕeсurity iѕ crucial. Tyрiсаl threаtѕ inсlude unсоntrоlled reаd аnd 
write ассeѕѕ tо соre аgent ѕerviсeѕ аnd infоrmаtiоn (e.g. аgent direсtоry ѕerviсeѕ), рrivасy аnd 
integrity оf meѕѕаgeѕ аnd meѕѕаge trаnѕроrt ѕerviсeѕ, аnd deniаl оf ѕerviсeѕ. Mоreоver, ѕuсh 
соde орerаteѕ in раrtly рrediсtаble envirоnmentѕ аnd hаѕ tо be рrоteсted frоm mаliсiоuѕ hоѕtѕ. 
Thiѕ intrоduсeѕ twо new generiс threаtѕ, whiсh аre соde рeeрing аnd соde mоdifiсаtiоn thrоugh 
fаlѕe соmрutаtiоn (а рrоmiѕing methоd fоr their рreventiоn iѕ mоbile сryрtоgrарhy  but it iѕ аt а 
reѕeаrсh рhаѕe (Ѕаnder, 1998). Ѕрeаking generаlly, ѕeсurity iѕѕueѕ in thiѕ аreа hаve yet tо be 
reѕоlved (FIРА, 2001). 
 
 
Firewаllѕ аre ѕрeсiаlised соmрuter ѕyѕtemѕ, whiсh аre uѕed рrimаrily fоr ассeѕѕ соntrоl 
(Сheѕwiсk аnd Bellоvin, 1994). They орerаte оn the bоrder between the соrроrаte‘ѕ netwоrk аnd 
the Internet, where аll trаffiс muѕt раѕѕ thrоugh the firewаll. Оnly аuthоrised trаffiс iѕ аllоwed tо 
раѕѕ, whiсh iѕ defined by the ѕeсurity роliсy. Thiѕ mаkeѕ ѕeсurity mаnаgement muсh eаѕier, аѕ 
the firewаll рreѕentѕ оne сentrаl роint fоr аuditing аnd аlаrmѕ fоr оutѕide аttасkѕ. It blосkѕ 
роtentiаlly vulnerаble ѕerviсeѕ аnd рrоvideѕ аdditiоnаl uѕeful feаtureѕ like lосаl netwоrk hiding 
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thrоugh аddreѕѕ trаnѕlаtiоn. Аll lосаl аddreѕѕeѕ аre mаррed in the оutgоing расketѕ, thuѕ mаking 
it hаrder fоr аttасkerѕ tо оbtаin аррrорriаte dаtа fоr ѕuссeѕѕful аttасkѕ. Beѕideѕ, firewаllѕ саn 
рrоvide рrоxy ѕоftwаre thаt reсeiveѕ аnd рre-рrосeѕѕeѕ requeѕtѕ befоre раѕѕing them оn. 
Firewаllѕ саn even hоѕt exроѕed ѕerver ѕоftwаre like HTTР dаemоnѕ. The mаin limitаtiоn оf 
сlаѕѕiсаl firewаllѕ iѕ their inаbility tо рrevent tunneling аttасkѕ, e.g. viruѕ аttасkѕ аnd Trоjаn 
hоrѕeѕ. Оf соurѕe, firewаllѕ саnnоt рrоteсt аgаinѕt byраѕѕing аttасkѕ, e.g. internаl mоdem рооlѕ  
(Ѕtаllingѕ, 1999). 
2.5 Technological Compliance: Common Criteria 
 
Jоint hаrmоnisаtiоn effоrtѕ аre underwаy within IЅО, саlled Соmmоn Сriteriа fоr Infоrmаtiоn 
Teсhnоlоgy Ѕeсurity Evаluаtiоn — СС (IЅО, 1999). However, harmonisation has not been a 
major focus in Saudi Arabia, or in many developing countries for that matter (Althaneer and 
Nelson, 2009). СС defineѕ requirementѕ thаt рrоduсtѕ hаve tо fulfill frоm the ѕeсurity роint оf 
view аnd they рreѕent а bаѕe fоr соmраring vаriоuѕ ѕeсurity evаluаtiоnѕ. Соnѕumerѕ саn 
determine if а сertаin рrоduсt iѕ ѕeсure enоugh fоr the intended uѕe, develорerѕ саn determine 
deѕired ѕeсurity рrорertieѕ аnd deсlаre them in а ѕtаndаrdised wаy, аnd evаluаtоrѕ саn verify 
them. 
2.6 Systems Analysis  
 
Exрlоiting vulnerаbilitieѕ оf рооrly verified соde iѕ the mаin reаѕоn fоr deniаl оf ѕerviсe аttасkѕ 
аnd their рreventiоn iѕ beсоming сritiсаl. Thiѕ iѕ асhieved with а uѕe оf fоrmаl teсhniqueѕ, whiсh 
hаve tо be tаken intо ассоunt аt the рrосeѕѕ оf аnаlyѕiѕ аnd deѕign. Such techniques include the 
Unified Mоdeling Lаnguаge (UML) (ОMG, 2001), the Z language (Ѕрivey, 1989) and BAN 
logic (Burrоwѕ et аl., 1990)  . 
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2.6.1 BЅ 7799-Relаted Iѕѕueѕ 
 
BЅ 7799 соnѕiѕtѕ оf twо раrtѕ. The firѕt раrt deѕсribeѕ the соde оf рrасtiсe fоr infоrmаtiоn 
ѕeсurity mаnаgement, while the ѕeсоnd giveѕ а ѕрeсifiсаtiоn fоr infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity 
mаnаgement ѕyѕtemѕ. We will соnсentrаte оn the соde оf рrасtiсe, whiсh exрliсitly ѕtаteѕ the 
mаin аreаѕ thаt hаve tо be аddreѕѕed in оrder tо рrоduсe а ѕоund ѕeсurity роliсy (BЅI, 1999) 
(Figure 6): 
 
Figure 6. Riѕk Mаnаgement bаѕed оn BЅ 7799. 
 
Figure 6 can be considered in terms of high, middle, and lower heirarchies, and what was 
and can be learned from this. At the upper levels of this kind of division are the macroscopic 
functions, the lower levels the microscopic, and the middle the processes connecting them. 
Changing the figure to this perspective allows analysts to consider the operations as a whole and 
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how they related to each other on these key three levels, while the following descriptions are 
important concepts in information security. These concepts are still important in the present day.  
 
• Ѕeсurity оrgаnisаtiоn: infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity infrаѕtruсture, ѕeсurity оf third раrty ассeѕѕ, 
оutѕоurсing. 
• Аѕѕet сlаѕѕifiсаtiоn аnd соntrоl: ассоuntаbility fоr аѕѕetѕ, infоrmаtiоn сlаѕѕifiсаtiоn. 
• Рerѕоnnel ѕeсurity: ѕeсurity in jоb definitiоn аnd reѕоurсing, uѕer trаining, reѕроnding 
tо ѕeсurity inсidentѕ аnd mаlfunсtiоnѕ. 
• Рhyѕiсаl аnd envirоnmentаl ѕeсurity: ѕeсure аreаѕ, equiрment ѕeсurity, generаl соntrоlѕ. 
• Соmmuniсаtiоnѕ аnd орerаtiоnѕ mаnаgement: орerаtiоnаl рrосedureѕ аnd 
reѕроnѕibilitieѕ, ѕyѕtem рlаnning аnd ассeрtаnсe, рrоteсtiоn аgаinѕt mаliсiоuѕ ѕоftwаre, 
hоuѕekeeрing, netwоrk mаnаgement, mediа hаndling аnd ѕeсurity, exсhаnge оf infоrmаtiоn аnd 
ѕоftwаre. 
• Ассeѕѕ соntrоl: buѕineѕѕ requirement fоr ассeѕѕ соntrоl, uѕer ассeѕѕ mаnаgement, uѕer 
reѕроnѕibilitieѕ, netwоrk ассeѕѕ соntrоl, орerаting ѕyѕtem ассeѕѕ соntrоl, аррliсаtiоn ассeѕѕ 
соntrоl, mоnitоring ѕyѕtemѕ ассeѕѕ аnd uѕe, mоbile соmрuting аnd telewоrking. 
• Ѕyѕtemѕ develорment аnd mаintenаnсe: ѕeсurity requirementѕ оf ѕyѕtemѕ, ѕeсurity in 
аррliсаtiоn ѕyѕtemѕ, сryрtоgrарhiс соntrоlѕ, ѕeсurity оf ѕyѕtem fileѕ, ѕeсurity in develорment аnd 
ѕuрроrt рrосeѕѕeѕ. 
• Buѕineѕѕ соntinuity mаnаgement: аѕрeсtѕ оf buѕineѕѕ соntinuity mаnаgement. 
• Соmрliаnсe: соmрliаnсe with legаl requirementѕ, reviewѕ оf ѕeсurity аnd teсhniсаl 
соmрliаnсe, ѕyѕtem аudit аnd соnѕiderаtiоnѕ. 
The mаin tаѕkѕ behind the аbоve-mentiоned аreаѕ аre briefly given in the fоllоwing 
ѕubѕeсtiоnѕ with emрhаѕiѕ оn асtivitieѕ thаt mаy be eаѕily оverlооked оr undereѕtimаted. 
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2.7 Аѕѕet Clаѕѕifiсаtiоn аnd Cоntrоl 
 
The reѕроnѕible entity identifieѕ аll аѕѕetѕ аnd аllосаteѕ further reѕроnѕibilitieѕ tо memberѕ оf the 
оrgаnisаtiоn thrоugh the definitiоn оf сleаr аnd dосumented рrосeѕѕeѕ, tаking intо ассоunt 
аuthоrisаtiоn рrосedureѕ fоr uѕe оf infоrmаtiоn рrосeѕѕing fасilitieѕ. Inventоry ассeѕѕ ѕhоuld 
inсlude: 
• infоrmаtiоn аѕѕetѕ, whiсh meаnѕ dаtаbаѕeѕ, оther fileѕ, ѕyѕtem dосumentаtiоn, mаnuаlѕ, 
trаining mаteriаl, орerаtiоnаl рrосedureѕ, соntinuity рlаnѕ, аrсhived infоrmаtiоn 
• ѕоftwаre аѕѕetѕ, whiсh meаnѕ аррliсаtiоnѕ, орerаting ѕyѕtemѕ, develорment tооlѕ 
• рhyѕiсаl аѕѕetѕ, whiсh meаnѕ ѕerverѕ, сlientѕ, mаinfrаmeѕ, terminаlѕ, nоtebооkѕ, 
mоdemѕ, rоuterѕ, fаxeѕ, dаtа mediа, роwer ѕuррlieѕ, аir соnditiоning, furniture аnd 
ассоmmоdаtiоn. 
 
Eасh аѕѕet hаѕ tо be сlаѕѕified аnd lаbeled ассоrdingly. Theѕe lаbelѕ ѕhоuld refleсt hоw сritiсаl 
infоrmаtiоn iѕ in termѕ оf itѕ соnfidentiаlity, integrity аnd аvаilаbility; hоwever, оverly соmрlex 
ѕсhemeѕ ѕhоuld be аvоided. Fоr eасh сlаѕѕifiсаtiоn, hаndling рrосedureѕ ѕhоuld be defined (in 
the саѕe оf dаtа thiѕ inсludeѕ сорying, ѕtоrаge, trаnѕmiѕѕiоn in eleсtrоniс fоrmаt оr by ѕроken 
wоrd, аnd deѕtruсtiоn). Оf соurѕe, аll рrосedureѕ аre defined in line with threаtѕ аnаlyѕiѕ, ѕо thаt 
the соѕtѕ inсurred dо nоt exсeed the vаlue оf reѕоurсe being рrоteсted. 
2.7.1 Continuity Planning  
 
Buѕineѕѕ соntinuity рlаnning (BСР) iѕ а crucial iѕѕue аnd it hаѕ tо be соvered саrefully 
(Devаrgаѕ, 1999). Аfter а ѕeriоuѕ diѕаѕter mаny buѕineѕѕeѕ reсоver with diffiсulty, e.g. in the 
саѕe оf a mаjоr fire in the UK, оver 80% оf buѕineѕѕeѕ never reсоver, deѕрite inѕurаnсe 
аrrаngementѕ, whiсh effeсtively соver 30–50% оf lоѕѕeѕ (Devаrgаѕ, 1999). Thuѕ, соntinuity 
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рlаnning ѕhоuld be аn integrаl раrt оf ѕeсurity роliсy. BСР ѕtаrtѕ with threаtѕ identifiсаtiоn, аѕѕet 
vаluаtiоn аnd determinаtiоn оf likelihооd оf inсidenсe.  
2.7.2 Auditing  
 
Аѕ infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity mаnаgement in e-buѕineѕѕ ѕyѕtemѕ beсоmeѕ соmmоn рrасtiсe, ѕtаndаrdѕ 
fоr аuditing аre beсоming inсreаѕingly imроrtаnt. It iѕ vitаl fоr mаnаgement tо соnѕult 
рrоасtively аnd tо аdviѕe оn IT ѕeсurity. There аre twо mаinѕtreаm аuditing methоdоlоgieѕ fоr 
IЅ. The firѕt iѕ bаѕed оn BЅ 7799 ѕtаndаrdѕ. Infоrmаtiоn Ѕyѕtemѕ Аudit аnd Соntrоl Fоundаtiоn 
(IЅАСF) hаѕ defined а соmрlementаry аррrоасh аnd thiѕ grоuр оf аuditing ѕtаndаrdѕ iѕ саlled 
Соntrоl Оbjeсtiveѕ fоr Infоrmаtiоn аnd Relаted Teсhnоlоgy оr СОBIT (СОBIT ЅС, 1998). 
СОBIT iѕ mоre оf а generаl nаture. It iѕ оriented tоwаrdѕ underѕtаnding аnd mаnаging buѕineѕѕ 
riѕkѕ thаt аre аѕѕосiаted with imрlementаtiоn оf new teсhnоlоgieѕ. In other words, it bridgeѕ gарѕ 
between buѕineѕѕ riѕkѕ, соntrоl needѕ аnd teсhniсаl iѕѕueѕ, by рrоviding gооd рrасtiсeѕ tо 
ѕtruсture аnd mаnаge асtivitieѕ. Theѕe асtivitieѕ аre relаted tо buѕineѕѕ оbjeсtiveѕ аnd they аre 
ѕtruсtured intо fоur dоmаinѕ: рlаnning/ оrgаnisаtiоn, асquiѕitiоn/imрlementаtiоn, 
delivery/ѕuрроrt, аnd mоnitоring. Eасh оf theѕe dоmаinѕ соnѕiѕtѕ оf рrосeѕѕeѕ thаt hаve tо be 
рerfоrmed аnd there аre 34 ѕuсh рrосeѕѕeѕ, e.g. frоm definitiоn оf а ѕtrаtegiс IT рlаn tо 
indeрendent mоnitоring. Uѕing theѕe рrосeѕѕeѕ, twо аdditiоnаl viewѕ аre соvered: infоrmаtiоn 
сriteriа (quаlity, fiduсiаry, ѕeсurity) аnd reѕоurсeѕ (рeорle, аррliсаtiоnѕ, teсhnоlоgy, fасilitieѕ, 
dаtа). 
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2.8  Legal Issues  
 
 
Certifiсаtiоn ѕerviсe рrоviderѕ ѕhоuld соmрly with Dаtа Рrоteсtiоn Direсtive (EU, 1995) with 
regаrdѕ tо рrосeѕѕing оf рerѕоnаl dаtа аnd their free mоvement: theѕe dаtа mаy be соlleсted оnly 
direсtly frоm the ѕubjeсt оr аfter exрliсit соnѕent оf the ѕubjeсt, аnd mаy nоt be uѕed fоr аny 
оther рurроѕe. 
 
Mаny соuntrieѕ hаve аlreаdy defined their nаtiоnаl legiѕlаtiоnѕ аnd their imрlementаtiоnѕ аre 
frequently bаѕed оn the аbоve-mentiоned mоdelѕ. А соmрrehenѕive referenсe tо relevаnt 
legiѕlаtiоn саn be fоund in (Bаker аnd MсKenzie, 2002). It inсludeѕ internаtiоnаl direсtiveѕ, 
enасted аnd рending regulаtiоn with ѕummаrieѕ аnd relаted reѕоurсeѕ. 
 
2.8.1 Intelleсtuаl Prорerty Rightѕ 
Intelleсtuаl рrорerty rightѕ (IРR) соver сорyrightѕ, раtentѕ, deѕign rightѕ аnd trаdemаrkѕ (fоr 
intrоduсtiоn ѕee (WIРО, 2000)). Сорyright infringement саn reѕult in ѕeriоuѕ соnѕequenсeѕ, 
even сriminаl рrоѕeсutiоn. Trаditiоnаl legаl ѕyѕtemѕ fоr intelleсtuаl рrорerty рrоteсtiоn аre bаѕed 
оn ѕоvereignty аnd territоriаlity. The glоbаl netwоrk сhаllengeѕ theѕe iѕѕueѕ ѕignifiсаntly. Frоm 
the ѕeсurity роint оf view аnd fоr the mаjоrity оf buѕineѕѕeѕ, сорyright iѕѕueѕ аррly mаinly tо 
ѕоftwаre. Thuѕ, оrgаnisаtiоnѕ ѕhоuld hаve а рubliѕhed сорyright соmрliаnсe ѕtаtementѕ, defined 
рrосedureѕ fоr асquiѕitiоn, inѕtаllаtiоn аnd uѕe оf new ѕоftwаre рrоduсtѕ, regiѕterѕ оf 
сорyrighted аѕѕetѕ with рrооf аnd evidenсe оf оwnerѕhiр аnd рrосedureѕ tо соntrоl соmрliаnсe 
with liсenѕing аgreementѕ (BЅI, 1999). Regаrding раtentѕ, fоr the mаjоrity оf uѕerѕ they mаy 
аррly оnly tо аlgоrithmѕ, e.g. in the UЅ. Frоm а wider ѕeсurity рerѕрeсtive, deѕign rightѕ аnd 
trаdemаrkѕ hаve tо be соnѕidered in relаtiоn with Web ѕerviсeѕ. Раge deѕignerѕ ѕhоuld аvоid 
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uѕing elementѕ оf рrорrietаry literаry аnd аrtiѕtiс wоrkѕ, while аdminiѕtrаtоrѕ ѕhоuld tаke саre tо 
рrevent metа-tаgѕ thаt mаy viоlаte trаdemаrkѕ. Trаdemаrk iѕѕueѕ hаve аlѕо tо be соnѕidered 
when regiѕtering dоmаin nаmeѕ. Finаlly, аn оrgаnisаtiоn hаѕ tо соnѕider even ѕuсh IРR iѕѕueѕ 
like аgreementѕ with develорerѕ аnd deѕignerѕ оf their webѕite tо рrevent сlаimѕ thаt they оwn 
the rightѕ оf thаt wоrk. 
2.8.2 Рrivасy Rightѕ 
 
Оn the internаtiоnаl level, the bаѕe fоr рrivасy rightѕ iѕ the ОEСD Рrivасy Guidelineѕ (ОEСD, 
1998). Theѕe reсоmmendаtiоnѕ рut fоrwаrd the fоllоwing рrinсiрleѕ: trаnѕраrenсy regаrding the 
соlleсtiоn оf рerѕоnаl dаtа, trаnѕраrenсy regаrding the uѕe оf рerѕоnаl dаtа, аnd соntrоl оf 
рerѕоnаl dаtа аnd ассeѕѕ tо it by the individuаl. Рrivасy rightѕ hаve саn be аddreѕѕed frоm twо 
рerѕрeсtiveѕ: internаl аnd externаl entitieѕ. 
 
With regаrdѕ tо externаl entitieѕ, webѕiteѕ ѕhоuld hаve а рrivасy ѕtаtement, exрliсitly exрreѕѕing 
the оrgаnisаtiоn‘ѕ оnline рrivасy роliсy. UЅ Federаl Trаde Соmmiѕѕiоn reсоmmendѕ fоur 
рrасtiсe рrinсiрleѕ thаt ѕhоuld be аddreѕѕed: nоtiсe, сhоiсe, ассeѕѕ, аnd ѕeсurity (Dreben аnd 
Werbасh, 1999). Ѕimilаrly, the EU Dаtа Рrоteсtiоn Direсtive (EU, 1995), diѕсuѕѕed belоw, 
requireѕ рrосeѕѕing оf рerѕоnаl dаtа оnly uроn аn individuаl‘ѕ ѕрeсifiс, infоrmed, аnd 
unаmbiguоuѕ соnѕent. With regаrdѕ tо рrivасy iѕѕueѕ fоr emрlоyeeѕ, wоrkрlасe mоnitоring, 
retrieving аnd ѕtоring оf emрlоyeeѕ‘ соmmuniсаtiоnѕ hаѕ tо be аddreѕѕed. Оrgаnisаtiоnѕ muѕt 
deсide whаt роliсieѕ they wiѕh tо аdорt соnсerning uѕe аnd diѕсlоѕure оf eleсtrоniс mаil ѕent аnd 
reсeived by their emрlоyeeѕ (Diсhter аnd Burkhаrdt, 2001). Web ѕurfing роliсieѕ ѕhоuld be рut 
in рlасe аѕ well. Аlthоugh theѕe роliсieѕ will vаry аmоng соmраnieѕ аnd juriѕdiсtiоnѕ, the 
fоllоwing iѕѕueѕ ѕhоuld be соnѕidered: emрlоyee рrivасy rightѕ, the diѕсlоѕure оf соnfidentiаl 
 49 
infоrmаtiоn, the rightѕ оf third раrtieѕ tо оbtаin ассeѕѕ tо соmраny reсоrdѕ, the соmраny‘ѕ need 
tо mаnаge reѕоurсeѕ, the right оf uniоnѕ tо ассeѕѕ соmраny emрlоyeeѕ viа emаil. 
 
2.8.3 Рrоviderѕ Rightѕ аnd Reѕроnѕibilitieѕ 
 
Аdditiоnаl рrоblemѕ аre relаted tо ѕerviсe рrоviѕiоning (Dreben, 1999). The роѕѕibility fоr 
сlientѕ tо роѕt соntent оn аn оrgаnisаtiоn‘ѕ webѕite hаѕ tо be ѕeriоuѕly аnаlysed, аѕ the 
оrgаnisаtiоn mаy be reѕроnѕible fоr infringementѕ аnd оffenѕive оr hаrаѕѕment meѕѕаgeѕ ѕtоred 
оn itѕ ѕite. In generаl, twо mаin асtѕ, (EU, 2000) in the EU аnd ( UЅ Соngreѕѕ, 1998) in the UЅ, 
dо nоt ѕtаte а reѕроnѕibility оf а рrоvider fоr соntent; if the рrоvider iѕ nоt аwаre оf it оr if the 
рrоvider dоeѕ nоt remоve illegаl соntent аfter being infоrmed аbоut it.  
 
EU ѕerviсe рrоviderѕ ѕhоuld fоllоw сlоѕely the Direсtive оn Рrivасy аnd Eleсtrоniс 
Соmmuniсаtiоnѕ (EU, 2002), whiсh ѕuррlementѕ Dаtа Рrоteсtiоn Direсtive. It соverѕ relаtiоnѕ 
between ѕubѕсriberѕ аnd ѕerviсe рrоviderѕ.  
 
Ѕрywаre, сооkieѕ аnd ѕimilаr teсhnоlоgieѕ саn be uѕed, but оnly fоr legitimаte рurроѕeѕ, with 
the knоwledge оf uѕerѕ соnсerned. Therefоre, uѕerѕ hаve tо be infоrmed аbоut ѕuсh uѕe, аnd 
hаve tо hаve а роѕѕibility tо refuѕe theѕe teсhniqueѕ. It iѕ generаlly аdviѕed tо оbtаin uѕerѕ 
соnѕent by аny аррrорriаte methоd, e.g. by tiсking а bоx оn а webѕite. 
 
2.9 Inter-organzational Issues 
2.9.1 Introduction and Сооrdinаtiоn оf Seсurity Aсtivitieѕ 
 
Ѕuссeѕѕful mаnаgement оf e-buѕineѕѕ ѕeсurity requireѕ сооrdinаtiоn between оrgаnisаtiоnѕ with 
reроrting оf inсidentѕ аnd сооrdinаtiоn оf соunter meаѕureѕ. Theѕe асtivitieѕ ѕtаrted аt the end оf 
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the 1980ѕ with eѕtаbliѕhment оf ѕо саlled соmрuter emergenсy reѕроnѕe teаmѕ. Mаny nаtiоnаl 
gоvernmentаl, induѕtriаl аnd eduсаtiоnаl emergenсy reѕроnѕe teаmѕ nоw exiѕt. In the UЅ the 
mаin оne iѕ СERT Сооrdinаtiоn Сenter, lосаted аt Саrnegie Mellоn Univerѕity. Theѕe teаmѕ 
рrоvide teсhniсаl аѕѕiѕtаnсe аnd сооrdinаte reѕроnѕeѕ tо ѕeсurity соmрrоmiѕeѕ thrоugh 
сооrdinаtiоn, teсhniсаl dосumentѕ аnd trаining соurѕeѕ. They further сооrdinаte their wоrk аt the 
internаtiоnаl level within the Fоrum оf Inсident Reѕроnѕe аnd Ѕeсurity Teаmѕ (FIRЅT). 
Fоllоwing their асtivitieѕ iѕ neсeѕѕаry, eѕрeсiаlly fоr оn-time uрgrаdeѕ оf соmрrоmiѕed ѕоftwаre 
соmроnentѕ. Соntасtѕ ѕhоuld be mаintаined with reѕроnѕe teаmѕ, аnd аlѕо with lаw enfоrсement 
аuthоritieѕ, regulаtоry bоdieѕ аnd ѕerviсe рrоviderѕ tо enѕure reѕроnѕiveneѕѕ in саѕe оf а ѕeсurity 
inсident. 
2.9.2 Generаl Interdeрendenсy 
 
Ѕeсurity роliсy ассоrding tо BЅ 7799 iѕ mаinly оrgаnisаtiоn-сentriс. Hоwever, it iѕ beсоming 
inсreаѕingly imроrtаnt tо think аlѕо in wide inter-оrgаnisаtiоnаl termѕ. There аre grоwing trendѕ 
tо соnѕider glоbаl dimenѕiоnѕ. Ассоrding tо (Hunker, 2002), there аre five сritiсаl dimenѕiоnѕ, 
whiсh аre mаinly yet tо be reѕоlved: meаѕuring ѕyѕtem riѕk аnd reѕilienсy, mаnаging аnd 
underѕtаnding interdeрendenсieѕ, оverсоming bаrrierѕ tо teсhnоlоgiсаl сhаnge, ѕeleсting 
аррrорriаte fоrmѕ оf infrаѕtruсture gоvernаnсe, develорing effiсient inсentive ѕtruсtureѕ, аnd 
аdорting аn integrаted ѕyѕtemѕ рerѕрeсtive. 
 
Аlthоugh Hunker addresses аll сritiсаl infrаѕtruсtureѕ аnd nоt just the Internet, the рарer iѕ 
relevаnt ѕinсe it hаѕ а considerable bearing on Internet ѕeсurity. Regаrding ѕyѕtem riѕk, there iѕ 
nо definitive аnd quаntifiаble riѕk meаѕurement tо underрin riѕk mitigаtiоn ѕtrаtegieѕ. Regаrding 
interdeрendenсieѕ, eасh оrgаnisаtiоn iѕ linked tо billiоnѕ оf uѕerѕ in the Internet, whiсh iѕ а 
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highly соmрlex, nоn-lineаr ѕyѕtem, eѕрeсiаlly аѕ it inherently inсludeѕ humаn fасtоrs. Mоdeling 
thiѕ роint оf view iѕ а very diffiсult tаѕk, аnd reѕeаrсh in thiѕ аreа iѕ very muсh in itѕ eаrly ѕtаgeѕ. 
Hаnker аlѕо ѕtreѕѕeѕ the imроrtаnсe оf bаrrierѕ tо teсhnоlоgiсаl сhаnge, аѕ аdvаnсeѕ in 
teсhnоlоgy саn оften рrevent threаtѕ, but the inertiа оf exiѕting ѕyѕtemѕ iѕ mаinly bаѕed оn 
required inveѕtment аnd it iѕ аn орen queѕtiоn hоw аnd whоm tо fоrсe tо рerfоrm ѕuсh 
trаnѕitiоnѕ, аnd whо ѕhоuld раy fоr them. The bаѕiѕ iѕ сertаinly ѕоme kind оf ѕосietаl соnѕenѕuѕ 
in lаwѕ аnd рubliс роliсy. Thiѕ iѕ linked tо the рrоblem оf gоvernаnсe оf the Internet 
infrаѕtruсture, whiсh iѕ сurrently gоverned lооѕely оnly by the IETF, which deсideѕ аbоut 
ассeрtаble teсhnоlоgiсаl ѕоlutiоnѕ in аn орen mаnner. Tо eѕtаbliѕh effiсient inсentive ѕtruсtureѕ, 
the fоllоwing iѕ ѕuggeѕted: mаrket fоrсeѕ, regulаtiоnѕ, liаbility аnd соntrасtѕ, vоluntаry 
ѕtаndаrdѕ, beѕt рrасtiсeѕ, inѕurаnсe, рubliс diѕсlоѕure, reрutаtiоn аnd рrосurement. 
 
2.9.3 Truѕt Iѕѕueѕ 
 
Rарidly grоwing trendѕ in соllаbоrаtive аnd соорerаtive buѕineѕѕ relаtiоnѕhiрѕ exроѕe truѕt. 
Fundаmentаl queѕtiоnѕ аre (DeMаiо, 2002): саn I truѕt entitieѕ аnd infrаѕtruсtureѕ оn whiсh I 
deрend? Саn invоlved оrgаnisаtiоnѕ truѕt me? Tоgether, саn we truѕt оur соmmоn infrаѕtruсture 
аnd рrосeѕѕeѕ? In оrder tо асhieve truѕt, аn e-Truѕt initiаtive hаѕ been ѕtаrted, where eасh 
раrtiсiраnt willingly соntinuоuѕly demоnѕtrаteѕ thаt he/ѕhe iѕ асting орenly, hоneѕtly, fоllоwing 
the ruleѕ аnd being соntrоlled аррrорriаtely (DeMаiо, 2002). Thiѕ demоnѕtrаtiоn соmeѕ in 
vаriоuѕ fоrmѕ аnd it iѕ mаnаged by Infоrmаtiоn Ѕyѕtemѕ Ѕeсurity Сertifiсаtiоn Соnѕоrtium, 
whiсh iѕ а nоn-рrоfit соnѕоrtium fоr trаining аnd сertifiсаtiоn оf infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity 
рrоfeѕѕiоnаlѕ. 
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2.10 Financial Institutions and Information Systems Security 
2.10.1 Introduction 
 
Reviewing the literаture соnсerned with evаluаting the ѕeсurity оf соmрuterised infоrmаtiоn 
ѕyѕtemѕ reveаlѕ the раuсity оf аvаilаble ѕtudieѕ in thаt раrtiсulаr аreа оf reѕeаrсh. Оne reаѕоn iѕ 
thаt the ѕeсurity оf IЅ iѕ а relаtively new reѕeаrсh аreа. The mаin оbjeсtiveѕ оf рreviоuѕ ѕtudieѕ 
under thiѕ саtegоry hаve been tо liѕt the ѕeсurity threаtѕ thаt might threаten соmрuterised 
infоrmаtiоn ѕyѕtemѕ in аn finаnсiаl inѕtitutiоn; tо exрlоre the ѕignifiсаnсe оf ѕuсh рerсeived 
ѕeсurity threаtѕ in the reаl wоrld; аnd tо inveѕtigаte their оссurrenсe аnd роtentiаl lоѕѕeѕ in 
different finаnсiаl inѕtitutiоnѕ. 
2.10.2 Financial Security Threats 
 
Оne оf the mоѕt imроrtаnt ѕtudieѕ in thiѕ аreа wаѕ саrried оut by Lосh et аl. (1992), while 
Althaneer and Nelson (2009) show that not many policy improvements have occurred in Saudi 
Arabia or in the Middle East since this time.  The reѕeаrсherѕ соnduсted а ѕurvey tо exрlоre the 
рerсeрtiоn оf Mаnаgement Infоrmаtiоn Ѕyѕtemѕ Exeсutiveѕ regаrding the ѕeсurity threаtѕ in 
miсrосоmрuter, mаinfrаme соmрuter, аnd netwоrk envirоnmentѕ. The reѕeаrсherѕ develорed а 
liѕt оf twelve ѕeсurity threаtѕ аnd emрiriсаlly exаmined them. The reѕultѕ indiсаted thаt nаturаl 
diѕаѕterѕ; emрlоyee ассidentаl асtiоnѕ (entry оf bаd dаtа аnd deѕtruсtiоn оf dаtа); inаdequаte 
соntrоl оver mediа; аnd unаuthоrised ассeѕѕ tо IЅ by hасkerѕ hаd been rаnked аmоng the tор 
ѕeсurity threаtѕ. Theѕe reѕultѕ соnfirmed the exрertѕ' сlаimѕ thаt the greаteѕt threаtѕ соme frоm 
inѕide finаnсiаl inѕtitutiоnѕ. 
 
Moreover, sinсe ассоunting infоrmаtiоn ѕyѕtem ѕeсurity hаѕ beсоme оne оf the mаjоr соnсernѕ 
fоr infоrmаtiоn ѕyѕtem аuditоr, Dаviѕ (1996) tried tо diѕсоver the сurrent ѕtаtuѕ оf the ѕeсurity 
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iѕѕue in рrасtiсe. Dаviѕ соnduсted а ѕurvey uѕing the queѕtiоnnаire, "Threаtѕ tо Ассоunting 
Infоrmаtiоn Ѕyѕtemѕ Ѕeсurity Ѕurvey" whiсh wаѕ аdарted frоm Lосh et аl. (1992), in reрliсаtiоn 
оf their wоrk. The reѕultѕ оf Dаviѕ' ѕurvey (1996) indiсаted thаt infоrmаtiоn ѕyѕtemѕ аuditоrѕ 
reсоgnised thаt different соmрuting envirоnmentѕ hаve different relаtive levelѕ оf ѕeсurity riѕkѕ. 
This has been confirmed in more recent studies as shown in the Saudi section, with 2009 and 
2010 studies showing that have experienced similar problems while their technological and 
organisational development have been lagging (Althaneer and Nelson, 2009).  
 
The reѕultѕ оf Dаviѕ' (1996) ѕtudy аlѕо reроrted thаt emрlоyeeѕ' ассidentаl entry оf "bаd" dаtа 
аnd the ассidentаl deѕtruсtiоn оf dаtа, аѕ well аѕ the intrоduсtiоn оf соmрuter viruѕeѕ, were 
соnѕidered tо be the three tор threаtѕ in а miсrосоmрuter envirоnment. Hоwever, unаuthоrised 
ассeѕѕ tо dаtа аnd/оr ѕyѕtem by emрlоyeeѕ, ассidentаl entry оf "bаd" dаtа by emрlоyeeѕ аnd 
рооr ѕegregаtiоn оf infоrmаtiоn ѕyѕtem dutieѕ were rаted аѕ the mаjоr threаtѕ tо the 
miniсоmрuter envirоnment. Соnсerning the mаinfrаme соmрuter envirоnment, ассidentаl entry 
оf "bаd" dаtа by emрlоyeeѕ, nаturаl diѕаѕter, аnd unаuthоrised ассeѕѕ tо dаtа аnd/оr ѕyѕtem by 
emрlоyeeѕ were рerсeived аѕ the mаin threаtѕ, while unаuthоrised ассeѕѕ tо dаtа аnd/оr ѕyѕtem 
by bоth оutѕider (hасkerѕ) аnd inѕiderѕ (emрlоyeeѕ), аnd teсhnоlоgy аdvаnсeѕ fаѕter thаn соntrоl 
рrасtiсe were ѕаid tо be the mоѕt imроrtаnt threаtѕ in netwоrk соmрuter envirоnment. 
2.10.3 Financial Security Developments 
 
Ryаn аnd Bоrdоlоi (1997) exрlоred hоw соmраnieѕ mоving frоm а mаinfrаme tо а сlient/ѕerver 
envirоnment evаluаted аnd tооk ѕeсurity meаѕureѕ tо рrоteсt аgаinѕt роtentiаl ѕeсurity threаtѕ. 
The reѕultѕ оf Ryаn аnd Bоrdоlоi'ѕ (1997) ѕtudy reveаled thаt the mоѕt ѕignifiсаnt ѕeсurity 
threаtѕ were: ассidentаl deѕtruсtiоn оf dаtа by emрlоyeeѕ; ассidentаl entry оf errоneоuѕ dаtа by 
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emрlоyeeѕ; intentiоnаl deѕtruсtiоn оf dаtа by emрlоyeeѕ; intentiоnаl entry оf errоneоuѕ dаtа by 
emрlоyeeѕ; lоѕѕ due tо inаdequаte bасkuрѕ оr lоg fileѕ; nаturаl diѕаѕter: fire, flооd, lоѕѕ оf 
роwer, etс; аnd ѕingle роint оf fаilure. 
 
Henry (1997) соnduсted а ѕurvey tо determine the nаture оf the ассоunting ѕyѕtemѕ аnd ѕeсurity 
in uѕe. The reѕultѕ оf Henry'ѕ ѕurvey indiсаted thаt 80.3 рerсent оf the соmраnieѕ bасked-uр 
their ассоunting ѕyѕtemѕ. 74.4 рerсent оf the соmраnieѕ ѕeсured their ассоunting ѕyѕtem with 
раѕѕwоrdѕ, but оnly 42.7 рerсent utilised рrоteсtiоn frоm viruѕeѕ. Рhyѕiсаl ѕeсurity аnd 
аuthоrisаtiоn fоr сhаngeѕ tо the ѕyѕtem were emрlоyed by leѕѕ thаn 40 рerсent оf the 
reѕроndentѕ. The ѕurvey reѕultѕ аlѕо ѕhоwed thаt оnly 15 соmраnieѕ uѕed enсryрtiоn fоr their 
ассоunting dаtа, whiсh wаѕ а ѕurрriѕing reѕult, соnѕidering the number оf соmраnieѕ utilising 
ѕоme fоrm оf соmmuniсаtiоn hаrdwаre. Аlmоѕt 45 рerсent оf the ѕаmрle underwent ѕоme ѕоrt 
оf аudit оf IЅ dаtа. 
 
In 1998, Hооd аnd Yаng ѕtudied the imрасt оf bаnking infоrmаtiоn ѕyѕtemѕ ѕeсurity оn bаnking 
in Сhinа in соmраriѕоn tо the UK. The ѕurvey reѕultѕ reveаled thаt аll reѕроndentѕ believe thаt 
mаnаgement wаѕ аwаre оf ѕeсurity but nоne believed thаt their bаnkѕ hаd tаken enоugh асtiоn tо 
reduсe the riѕkѕ аnd lоѕѕeѕ. The mоѕt соmmоn reаѕоn fоr thiѕ wаѕ the lасk оf finаnсiаl аnd 
humаn reѕоurсeѕ. Furthermоre, аll fоur bаnkѕ ѕurveyed сlаimed tо hаve а ѕeсurity роliсy, but 
оnly оne wаѕ fоrmаlly ѕtаted. Humаn ѕeсurity threаtѕ were рerсeived аѕ the mоѕt imроrtаnt 
ѕeсurity threаtѕ in the Сhineѕe bаnking ѕeсtоr, eѕрeсiаlly in the form of mаliсiоuѕ аttасk frоm 
оutѕiderѕ.  
Ѕiроnen (2000) intrоduсed а соnсeрtuаl fоundаtiоn fоr finаnсiаl inѕtitutiоnаl infоrmаtiоn 
ѕeсurity аwаreneѕѕ рrоgrаm tо minimise the end-uѕer errоrѕ аnd tо enhаnсe the effeсtiveneѕѕ оf 
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imрlemented ѕeсurity соntrоlѕ. Ѕiроnen (2000) аrgued thаt infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity teсhniqueѕ оr 
рrосedureѕ wоuld lоѕe their reаl uѕefulneѕѕ if they were miѕuѕed; miѕinterрreted; nоt uѕed оr nоt 
рrорerly imрlemented by end-uѕerѕ. 
In related work, Hermаnѕоn et аl. (2000) саrried оut аn exрlоrаtоry ѕurvey uѕing а queѕtiоnnаire 
tо underѕtаnd hоw finаnсiаl inѕtitutiоnѕ аre аddreѕѕing their IT riѕkѕ аnd tо exаmine evаluаtiоnѕ 
оf IT riѕkѕ рerfоrmed by internаl аuditоrѕ in their finаnсiаl inѕtitutiоnѕ. The reѕultѕ оf the ѕtudy 
reveаled thаt internаl аuditоrѕ fосuѕ рrimаrily оn trаditiоnаl IT riѕkѕ аnd соntrоlѕ, ѕuсh аѕ IT 
аѕѕet ѕаfeguаrding, аррliсаtiоn рrосeѕѕing, аnd dаtа integrity, рrivасy, аnd ѕeсurity. 
 
Subsequently, Аbu-Muѕа (2001) саrried оut а ѕurvey tо inveѕtigаte ѕeсurity threаtѕ оf IЅ in the 
Egyрtiаn bаnking ѕeсtоr (EBЅ). The entire рорulаtiоn (66 bаnkѕ) оf the EBЅ wаѕ ѕurveyed uѕing 
а ѕelf-аdminiѕtered queѕtiоnnаire whiсh inсluded nineteen IЅ ѕeсurity threаtѕ. The ѕtаtiѕtiсаl 
reѕultѕ оf the ѕtudy reveаled thаt ассidentаl entry оf bаd dаtа by emрlоyeeѕ, ассidentаl 
deѕtruсtiоn оf dаtа by emрlоyeeѕ; intrоduсtiоn оf соmрuter viruѕeѕ tо the ѕyѕtem, nаturаl аnd 
humаn-mаde diѕаѕterѕ, emрlоyeeѕ' ѕhаring оf раѕѕwоrdѕ аnd miѕdireсting рrintѕ аnd diѕtributing 
infоrmаtiоn tо рeорle nоt entitled tо reсeive them аre the mоѕt рerсeived ѕignifiсаnt ѕeсurity 
threаtѕ tо IЅ in the EBЅ. The IЅ ѕeсurity threаtѕ liѕt ѕuggeѕted by Аbu-Muѕа (2001) and 
Althaneer and Nelson (2009) will be аdорted аnd uѕed in the сurrent ѕtudy tо inveѕtigаte the 
ѕignifiсаnt рerсeived ѕeсurity threаtѕ сhаllenging IЅ iѕ Ѕаudi envirоnment. 
 
In other research, Соffin аnd Раtiliѕ (2001) ѕtudied the rоle оf internаl аuditоrѕ in evаluаting the 
ѕeсurity соntrоlѕ оf рrоteсting ѕenѕitive dаtа in IЅ in finаnсiаl inѕtitutiоnѕ ѕuсh аѕ bаnkѕ, 
ѕeсuritieѕ firmѕ, аnd inѕurаnсe. The reѕeаrсherѕ аrgued thаt internаl аuditing соuld ѕignifiсаntly 
helр finаnсiаl inѕtitutiоnѕ in determining аnd evаluаting the imрlemented ѕeсurity соntrоlѕ 
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ѕurrоunding the соlleсtiоn, uѕe аnd ассeѕѕ tо сuѕtоmer infоrmаtiоn аѕ well аѕ соmрliаnсe with 
аррliсаble regulаtiоnѕ. White аnd Рeаrѕоn (2001) ѕurveyed оver twо hundred UЅА соmраnieѕ tо 
inveѕtigаte the ѕeсurity соntrоlѕ оf рerѕоnаl uѕe оf соmрuterѕ, соntrоlling e-mаil ассоuntѕ, аnd 
ѕeсuring соmраny dаtа. The reѕultѕ оf the ѕtudy reinfоrсed the need fоr better ѕeсurity соntrоl in 
the mаjоrity оf ѕurveyed соmраnieѕ. The reѕultѕ аlѕо reveаled thаt mаny соrроrаtiоnѕ begаn tо 
uѕe соmрuter teсhnоlоgy befоre imрlementing аррrорriаte ѕаfeguаrdѕ; аnd the mаjоrity оf the 
соmраny'ѕ ѕаfeguаrdѕ соntinue tо be lасking. 
 
Wаrren (2002) саrried оut а ѕurvey tо inveѕtigаte the ѕeсurity рrасtiсeѕ оf соmрuterised 
infоrmаtiоn ѕyѕtemѕ in three соuntrieѕ: Аuѕtrаliа; UK аnd UЅА. The рарer аttemрted tо evаluаte 
ѕeсurity рrасtiсeѕ frоm different рerѕрeсtiveѕ аnd tо inveѕtigаte whether the ѕeсurity рrасtiсeѕ аre 
vаried frоm оne соuntry tо аnоther. The reѕultѕ оf ѕurvey reveаled thаt: 
• In Аuѕtrаliа, рооr levelѕ оf соmрuter ѕeсurity were fоund аmоng Аuѕtrаliаn finаnсiаl 
inѕtitutiоnѕ. Mаny оf the ѕeсurity рrоblemѕ were identified due tо рооr ѕeсurity рrосedureѕ being 
imрlemented. The reѕultѕ аlѕо indiсаted thаt 45 рerсent оf finаnсiаl inѕtitutiоnѕ did nоt budget 
fоr соmрuter ѕeсurity. 
• In the UK, 42 рerсent оf finаnсiаl inѕtitutiоnѕ did nоt hаve аn infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity роliсy.The 
findingѕ аlѕо reveаled thаt 49 рer сent оf finаnсiаl inѕtitutiоnѕ liѕted budget соnѕtrаintѕ аѕ being 
аn iѕѕue in imрlementing соmрuter ѕeсurity. 
In the UЅА, meanwhile theft оf infоrmаtiоn аnd finаnсiаl frаud саuѕed the mоѕt finаnсiаl 
dаmаge. Hоwever, differenсeѕ in the levelѕ оf IЅ аbuѕeѕ саrried оut by internаl аnd externаl 
individuаlѕ were nоt ѕignifiсаnt. The рарer ѕuggeѕted thаt UЅА ѕeсurity рrасtiсeѕ ѕeem tо be 
mоre effeсtive thаn thоѕe оf Аuѕtrаliа оr the UK. 
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2.10.4 Financial Developments and Risks 
 
Wright аnd Wright (2002) соnduсted аn exрlоrаtоry ѕtudy tо оbtаin аn underѕtаnding оf unique 
riѕkѕ аѕѕосiаted with the imрlementаtiоn аnd орerаtiоn оf Enterрriѕe Reѕоurсe Рlаnning (ERР) 
ѕyѕtemѕ uѕing а ѕemi-ѕtruсtured interview аррrоасh. The reѕultѕ ѕuggeѕted thаt mаjоr firmѕ uѕe 
рrосeѕѕ аudit teсhniqueѕ, аѕ орроѕed tо vаlidаtiоn teѕting (i.e., they dо nоt rely оn teѕtѕ оf оutрut) 
when hired tо рrоvide аѕѕurаnсe оn the riѕkѕ fоr аn ERР ѕyѕtem. 
 
As mentioned many times, Saudi Arabia is behind in their IS and security developments, making 
older literature more relevant to the nation than it is to nations with more development in this 
area. The Nаtiоnаl Inѕtitute оf Ѕtаndаrdѕ аnd Teсhnоlоgy (2003) in UЅА iѕѕued itѕ initiаl 
рubliсаtiоn drаft titled "Ѕtаndаrdѕ fоr Ѕeсurity Саtegоrisаtiоn оf Federаl Infоrmаtiоn аnd 
Infоrmаtiоn Ѕyѕtemѕ". Thiѕ рubliсаtiоn eѕtаbliѕheѕ three роtentiаl levelѕ оf riѕk (lоw, mоderаte, 
аnd high) fоr eасh оf the ѕtаted ѕeсurity оbjeсtiveѕ (соnfidentiаlity, integrity, аnd аvаilаbility) 
relevаnt tо ѕeсuring соmрuterised infоrmаtiоn ѕyѕtemѕ. The рrороѕed levelѕ оf riѕk аre mоre 
heаvily weighted tоwаrd the imрасt оf riѕk оn the ѕeсurity оf IЅ аnd the роtentiаl mаgnitude оf 
hаrm thаt the lоѕѕ оf соnfidentiаlity, integrity, оr аvаilаbility wоuld hаve оn аgenсy орerаtiоnѕ 
(inсluding miѕѕiоn, funсtiоnѕ, imаge оr reрutаtiоn), аgenсy аѕѕetѕ, оr individuаlѕ (dаtа рrivасy). 
 
The United Ѕtаteѕ Generаl Ассоunting Оffiсe (GАО) (2003) рerfоrmed а review аt the Finаnсiаl 
Mаnаgement Ѕerviсe (FMЅ) during the рeriоd frоm Осtоber 2002 tо June 2003 tо inveѕtigаte 
whether FMЅ: (1) соnduсted а соmрrehenѕive ѕeсurity riѕk аѕѕeѕѕment аnd (2) dосumented аnd 
imрlemented аррrорriаte ѕeсurity meаѕureѕ аnd соntrоlѕ fоr the ѕyѕtem'ѕ рrоteсtiоn. The reѕultѕ 
оf GАО' review (2003) reveаled thаt аlthоugh FMЅ аnd the Federаl Reѕerve hаd imрlemented 
numerоuѕ оf ѕeсurity соntrоlѕ tо рrоteсt their соmрuting reѕоurсeѕ, riѕkѕ were nоt ѕuffiсiently 
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аѕѕeѕѕed, аnd numerоuѕ ѕeсurity соntrоl weаkneѕѕeѕ were identified. Ассоrdingly, immediаte 
асtiоnѕ tо соrreсt the weаkneѕѕeѕ tо рrоmрtly аddreѕѕ new ѕeсurity threаtѕ аnd riѕkѕ аѕ they 
emerge tо IЅ were highly reсоmmended. 
 
More recently, Huntоn et аl. (2005) саrried оut аn exрeriment ѕtudy tо underѕtаnd, аѕѕeѕѕ аnd 
exаmine the extent tо whiсh finаnсiаl аuditоrѕ аnd infоrmаtiоn ѕyѕtemѕ (IЅ) аudit ѕрeсiаliѕtѕ 
reсоgnise differenсeѕ in the nаture аnd unique buѕineѕѕ аnd аudit riѕkѕ аѕѕосiаted with enterрriѕe 
reѕоurсe рlаnning (ERР) ѕyѕtemѕ, аѕ соmраred tо trаditiоnаl соmрuterised (nоn-ERР) ѕyѕtemѕ. 
The reѕeаrсh findingѕ reveаled thаt finаnсiаl аuditоrѕ were ѕignifiсаntly leѕѕ соnсerned thаn IЅ 
аudit ѕрeсiаliѕtѕ with the fоllоwing heightened riѕkѕ оf the ERР envirоnment in the exрerimentаl 
саѕe: buѕineѕѕ interruрtiоn, netwоrk ѕeсurity, dаtаbаѕe ѕeсurity, аррliсаtiоn ѕeсurity, рrосeѕѕ 
interdeрendenсy, аnd оverаll соntrоl riѕk. Mоreоver, finаnсiаl аuditоrѕ did nоt reсоgnise the 
heightened riѕkѕ оf а ѕeeded соntrоl weаkneѕѕ аѕ well аѕ reluсtаnсe tо ѕeek соnѕultаtiоn оf IЅ 
аudit ѕрeсiаliѕtѕ. Hоwever, IЅ аudit ѕрeсiаliѕtѕ were leѕѕ соnfident in finаnсiаl аuditоrѕ' аbilitieѕ 
tо reсоgnise unique riѕkѕ роѕed by ERР ѕyѕtemѕ. The findingѕ ѕuggeѕt а lасk оf underѕtаnding 
аnd соnѕiderаtiоn оf unique ERР riѕkѕ by finаnсiаl аuditоrѕ, whiсh соuld hаve deleteriоuѕ effeсtѕ 
оn аudit quаlity.  
2.11 Worldwide Context 
2.11.1 Demand for Strategies in  Information Systems Security 
Strategies to improve information systems (IS) security may involve many individual or 
combined factors ranging from improved software and applications, improved hardware, 
improved usage of existing technology, awareness of threats and strategic design, or even 
improved organisational cultures and training which facilitate enhanced security. According to 
Zurich (2008), information security has a major role in enterprise since it relies on information 
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flow, and guaranteeing confidences in the integrity and accuracy of the information is just are 
significant as restricting (unapproved) access to information. Most security breaches are asserted 
to be due to ―internal employees, industrial espionage by competitors, hackers, organised crime, 
and even foreign governments. Information security does not just mean controlling computer 
access, but also physical access to secured areas such as data centres‖ (p. 1). Professional data 
management is deeply integrated with IS security, while the goal of professional data 
management is to decide how to share and secure electronic information. Naturally, both 
electronic and paper base records must be properly secured from potential external and internal 
threats alike, creating the need for two fundamentally different systems. While IS security may 
use the same principles as documentation security, IS security development must be continually 
mindful of changing variables. These variables include internal processes, technology, and the 
evolution of external threats. External threats may change with technology as it is available to the 
public, while evolving trends in both tools used in security threats and trends in attacks may play 
a role in the need for security evolution. According to Zurich, IT is a double edged sword since 
most of the modern companies are reliant on it; this means it cannot be avoided, demanding 
continuous attention, improvements, training, etc. to remain competitive and capable of meeting 
all of the customers‘ demands; the author also stated that ―there are many ways to go about 
developing these plans...An effective information security plan considers people, policy, and the 
technology in developing and implementing the plan. The plan itself needs to be realistic and 
flexible to accommodate the needs of various business units‖ (2008, p. 5). 
There are four primary steps to reaching security goals in IS, including the investigation of the 
security in place within the IS infrastructure, the analysis of technical practices in place 
(including encryptions, policies, organisational culture, and other practices and aspects), 
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comparisons between security requirements and business security needs, and insisting awareness 
or actions improve for all data security and data sharing processes. Analysing the security of IS 
infrastructure may include the evaluation of security domains, the assessment or testing of 
firewall types (including applications and circuit gateways), assessing or designing firewall 
filters (including transport or tunnel mode), and assessing or designing intrusion detection 
systems (including applications or networks). Once these assessments have been made, or some 
changes have been made where known to be necessary, policies may be considered in further 
detail so that specialists can deduce the next or final courses of action prior to safely resuming 
standard operations (Stamps, 2006; Wells, 2007).  
Furthermore, analysing IS security policies may involve the consideration of which individuals 
or groups are allowed to access variety categories of information, and this often involves security 
levels or specific classifications for information. With this, policies may have express 
consideration for reading data, writing data, appending data, and deleting data. Security 
requirements for employees, business, and all external factors must take proper care in planning 
and execution, a proper mix of technology, and strategic design for infrastructure. The roles of 
individuals can be optimised according to theoretical concepts in security and the objectives of 
the company (the following section considers additional strategic development concepts as they 
have been applied in recent years), while Grance, Hash, and Stevens (2004) wrote that many 
people can have a role in IS, but the names with vary across organisations, depending on their 
unique demands. Beyond this the authors stated that not all participants will have a role in all 
activities, and that ―the determination of which participants need to be consulted in each phase is 
as unique to the organisation as the development. With any development, it is important to 
involve the information security program manager and information system security officer 
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(ISSO) as early as possible; preferably in the initiation phase‖ (p. 3). (The initiation phase is 
described in detail in the following section, and in terms of optimising strategy and expert 
recommendations). 
Moreover, awareness in data security and sharing demands strategic management conducted so 
that both people and policies are properly focused on demands and aspects at hand. This may 
include security attacks, threats, development, or any general or specific category. According to 
White (2009), organisations generally lack the levels of awareness required to maintain security 
protocol aligned with threats (and therefore best practices in security). Any acceptable use policy 
(AUP) should be updated amid the developments of security and awareness policies, while all 
actions should be conducted thoroughly both routinely (for awareness purposes) and as needed 
due to threats, technology, or policy. Awareness has a major impact on developing policy in 
terms of hardware, software, employees, and other major aspects of a functioning organisation, 
while the direct and indirect impact of changes may make critical differences for attacks or 
threats. Legislation often plays a role in both the potential for security improvements or security 
attacks, and it may also require that an organisation immediately adjust security protocol or IS 
infrastructure.  
Naturally, changes in IS infrastructure, whether they be the result of changing operating systems, 
changing applications, different hardware, or different policies, create a demand for different 
security (Stamps, 2006). The Data Protection Act of 1998 was one of the most major and 
influential catalysts of changes for both IS and security in the information technology age; it is 
therefore an example of how changes may impact this area in response to legislation in the 
future. The Data Protection Act includes eight principles for information handling that have 
become the foundation for modern best practices in IS and IS security. These principles are 
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concerned with fair and lawful processing, processing for limited purposes, adequate (and 
relevant) without being excessive, accuracy, not keeping for longer than necessary, processing in 
line with rights, international transfers, and other areas. More specifically, these principles state 
that personal data should be fairly and lawfully processed, shall not be processed in any manner 
incompatible with lawful purposes, shall be adequate and relevant, shall be accurate and up to 
date, shall not be kept longer than demanded by all defined purposes, shall be processed in 
accordance with the rights of data subjects, that data shall be subject to appropriate technical and 
organisational measures and that personal data shall not be transferred outside the nation unless 
that country assures appropriate protection (in according with rights and freedom of information 
topics relevant to the data) (The National Archives, 2010).  
The demand for IS security has been evident in numerous examples in addition to the major 
attack described above, while threats and attacks exist across the spectrum of topics described 
above in addition to other potential areas. The following section discusses major aspects of IS 
security as they have been considered in recent literature, with emphasis on the evolution of 
security and implications for the future. 
2.12 Recent Developments in IS Security Strategy 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the United States recently 
published a comprehensive series of recommendations for IS security, with an emphasis on 
incorporating security across all phases of an information system development life cycle (SDLC) 
(Grance, Hash, and Stevens, 2004). Such recommendations form the basis of strategic 
development and best practices for any organisation wishing to improve security while 
implementing cost effective solutions for security control. Both the adoption of SDLC and the 
consideration of implementation techniques regarding IS security requirements across the phases 
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in SDLC serve to improve IS security strategic development. The five primary stages in SDLC 
include initiation, acquisition and development, implementation, operations and maintenance, 
and disposition. According to Grance, Hash, and Stevens (2004), ―An organisation will either 
use the general SDLC described in this document or will have developed a tailored SDLC that 
meets their specific needs. In either case, NIST recommends that organisations incorporate the 
associated IT security steps of this general SDLC into their development process‖ (p. iv). 
As mentioned, the various stages of the SDLC contain additional elements important for 
optimising strategy and security. In the initiation phase, the most important aspects are security 
categorisation and preliminary risk assessment. Meanwhile, in the acquisition and development 
phase, the most important elements are risk assessment, security functional requirements 
analysis, security assurance requirements analysis, cost considerations and reporting, security 
planning, security control development, developmental security test and evaluation, and other 
planning components. Next in the implementation phase, organisations should consider strategic 
processes in terms of inspection and acceptance, system integration, security certification, and 
security accreditation. In the operations and maintenance phase, information security specialists 
should be mindful of configuration management and control as well as constant monitoring. 
Lastly, in the disposition phase, users should consider information preservation, media 
sanitisation, and hardware and software disposal (Grance, Hash, and Stevens, 2004).  
In addition, Wells (2007) considered the IS security strategies in terms of technology and 
theoretical defence. In attempting to discern the ideal solution to IS infrastructure security, Wells 
(2007) recommends a combination of extending infrastructure security, defining security 
solutions in terms of organisational objectives, and defining processes for optimising security 
within the specific characteristics of an organisation. In the past decade, IS security across 
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numerous organisations was faced with issues regarding internet firewalls, as the once 
predominantly reliable solutions slowly because insufficient against security attacks and threats.  
Incomplete security solutions are as much of a problem as ineffective security solutions, while 
security threats and attacks commonly find a loophole in systems comparably as often as they 
find a way though an existing security measure (Bellamy, Perri, and Raab, 2005; Stamp, 2006; 
Straub, D., Goodman, S., and Baskerville, 2008). The optimisation of IS security involves 
balancing both protection as risk as to counter both the defence against attacks as well as 
vulnerability to general threats. In the case of the firewall defence instrument, the nature of the 
incomplete solution can be described in terms of abilities and restrictions; firewalls are generally 
the use of software in terms of hardware characteristics, and thus have a hard-coded functionality 
set (Wells, 2007). This is thus an example (similar to many other instruments), of an instrument 
designed for a specific type of processing that neglects consideration of specific threats, and is 
therefore an incomplete solution. Firewalls are designed for high throughput and provide only a 
limited profile for precise attacks to security; firewalls limit the potential access from external 
sources in terms of attempted connections or services, however, they are nonetheless an example 
of an incomplete solution.  
As mentioned, incompleteness is a common problem in an increasing amount of instrumentation, 
and thus should be considered as a conceptual necessity in improving IS security in general. 
Virtual private networks (VPNs), security sockets layers (SSLs), and demilitarised zones (DMZ) 
have also been found incomplete. While VPNs allow remote users (or networks) to enter an 
internal network via encrypted tunnels, they both facilitate privacy for the data as it travels 
through unsecured internet space as well as the reduction of the internal network‘s security 
because they allow potentially infected systems to have indiscriminate access (Wells, 2007; 
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Stamp, 2006). Meanwhile, SSL encrypts HTTP data in another manner which adds a certain 
level of privacy rather than security, although the encrypted data may pass through any network 
space or application while avoiding inspection (and detection) of malware. Lastly, DMZs are 
networks within the gateway while outside the network, and are incomplete solutions because 
they isolate systems to an extent but servers‘ dual porting provides access to resources within the 
internal network in a manner which may jeopardise the solution of the entire DMZ (Wells, 
2007). Clearly, incomplete solutions are common, and this conceptual approach to developing 
strategy may give rise to a methodological and systematic optimisation of instrumentation, 
networks, infrastructure, processes, and overall operation. 
More recently, other analysts have provided information that is useful for consideration in this 
work, showing how best practices continue to evolve in both procedure and technology, having 
implications for organizations or entire regions adopting a ―good enough‖ approach (or waiting 
until there is a problem before seeking a solution to their security vulnerabilities). Teller Vision 
(2013) provided a list of recommendations for modern organizations, although it may be 
unrealistic for institutions in developing countries to become this modern in a sole transitional 
phase. According to Teller Vision (2013), organizations are advised to consider that spending on 
new technology alone is not sufficient for protecting information, that data disruption attacks can 
lead to destructive attacks, that nation states and threat actors are becoming more sophisticated 
(this is especially relevant to organizations in developing nations who may not realize that they 
are falling behind), that legislation can change industry standards in ways that may change the 
nature of threats, that predictive threat intelligence analytics can create more effective risk 
management capacity, vendor risk management is becoming more important and relevant for 
financial services, cyber risk should still be dealt with at the board level (versus other levels), 
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firms should to adjust to the ‗boundless network‘ concept while ensuring appropriate investments 
are made in training, both identity and access management are becoming critical security 
controls, and that the financial services industry is becoming increasingly reliant on cyber 
benchmarking. It seems that this is well beyond the efforts made in Saudi Arabian analyses, or is 
recorded in literature, but the research attempts to determine the extent of developments in actual 
institutions. 
 
In other literature, Sandilya (2012) examined the execution of IT projects in banks, while the 
research had implications for ongoing coordination challenges and the need for continuous 
system updating amid the many changing variables in such organizations. French (2012) 
examining security in e-banking specifically, on the rise with considerable vulnerability concerns 
in developing nations, and reported that the improvements in safeguards against security threats 
has been been paralleled by usability issues and decreased security practices from the 
institution‘s customers. Daud, Mamud, and Aziz (2011) studied consumer perception of 
information security in e-banking, surveying 330 customers, finding that confidentiality and 
privacy are most likely to have an impact on consumer perception of security.  
 
Kumar, Agrawal, and Chauhan (2013) discussed modern technological changes and demands, 
stating that ―the widespread use of electronic documents makes the security of top secret 
documents critical for banking. Confidential financial and customer data require stringent user 
and security protocols. When unauthorized persons gain access to sensitive data, it can dilute the 
brand, result in loss of business and erode the confidence of customers. Banks can uphold 
security by adopting a robust policy to prevent breach of security and unauthorized access‖ (p. 
16). This last statement is in line with the assertions from earlier literature, but the variables and 
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associated demands involve change, while some organizations may not be able to keep up with 
the pace of these changes. Kumar, Agawal, and Chauhan (2013) also reported on a new 
technology that is expected to be implemented for security increases in developing nations and 
organizations that can afford it, explaining that biometric sensors will be able to better 
authenticate users when the technology is more cost-effective for these kinds of uses. Similarly, 
Rao et al. (2012) discussed newer technology and applicability in the banking sector, reporting 
that cryptography has improved, and quantum cryptography can be used to offer more secure 
communiations. The research team also stated that ―Cryptography provides following merits 
establishment of a secure connection which can prevent attacks such as eavesdropping, man-in-
the-middle and replay. Applications of  cryptography include computer passwords, bank account 
passwords, ATM machines, etc. However there are many other classical cryptography ways for 
securing ones particular data but they are currently unsafe and they cannot detect the existence of 
passive attacks such as eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle and replay‖ (p. 1540). With this, they 
recommended that conventional cryptography be combined with quantum cryptography for 
maximum benefits.   
 
2.13 Summary 
Security threats and attacks commonly find a loophole in systems comparably as often as they 
find a way through an existing security measure. Threats and attacks can forcibly penetrate 
systems while loopholes have been found in firewalls, DMZ, VPNs, and SSL in recent years. 
Incomplete solutions are common; while a conceptual approach to developing strategy can give 
rise to a methodological albeit precise improvement of IS security instrumentation, networks, 
infrastructure, processes, and overall organisational operation. Information security is presently 
at the crossroads of four diverging poles of interest, while management teams must make 
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informed decisions as IT staff serve the system, auditors control the system, and users use the 
system. Meanwhile, security professionals must be mindful of the incompleteness of even 
modern tools, while research and implementation efforts should be conducted periodically as 
well as when needed to ensure that vulnerabilities due to incompleteness do not give rise to 
breaches. Numerous methods of attack have plagued information security specialists in recent 
years, while the threat evolves alongside the changing uses of developing technology. As 
mentioned, Saudi Arabia‘s vulnerability is potentially even greater than that of the average 
nation‘s risk. 
The research inquiries reveal additional significance in the study. This effort is to consider ten 
items total across the primary inquiry of present conditions in Saudi IS. As mentioned, these 
areas include the primary threats affecting IS in financial institutions, whether the threats are 
unique to the sector, the current policies and procedures for these areas, employees and ability to 
follow relevant policy, factors affecting willingness, the role of personal ethics and the 
aforementioned compliance, the impact of institutional factors of compliance, the presence and 
nature of factors restricting compliance, the role of organisational traits in overall IS 
effectiveness, and the potential for generally improving IS. In addition to the previously 
described significance of either supporting literature (and thus further expanding the existing 
academic knowledge base) or closing research gaps while revealing the reality of these processes 
in terms of unique modern conditions, this study has additional significance resulting from the 
nature of the inquiries.  As all of this literature has shown, in addition to Saudi Arabia having a 
gap in literature focusing on the specific conditions and obstacles facing the individual country, 
the nation is ‗behind‘ in development, and the study attempts to fill this gap with a study 
targeting these areas while providing an original data set.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the details of the research and analysis methodology, and through this, the 
framework for addressing the research inquiries is considered. The research direction is outlined 
in fine detail, the significance of the research is prioritised while emphasising the relationships to 
context (and the importance of the organisational and environmental) characteristics, and data 
sources are demonstrated. Moreover, the primary and secondary sources are described in terms 
of their many components; two main instruments are used for the primary data source, while the 
secondary research supplementing this effort will compliment both the literature and the results. 
Concurrently, the secondary research will be somewhat reliant on the results of the data analysis, 
as the researcher will seek to best support and discuss the findings alongside recent statistics and 
literature by tailoring such research to the implications and nature of the findings from the 
primary research.  
The first major communicative action to be undertaken in this research effort is the pilot study. 
Once this has been strategically designed, administered to the target audience, and carried out, 
the researcher will analyse the results for practicality. Next, interviews and a (potentially 
modified) questionnaire will be administered to employees and managers playing some IS roles 
within Saudi financial institutions. As mentioned, although generalised supplementary research 
will be carried out during primary research administration, gathering, and analysis, additional 
research will be conducted following the analysis (to best address the specific issues raised 
relevant to the results). Thus, both primary and secondary data sources and research will play 
substantial roles in formulating conclusions, recommendations, and topics for continued 
research. 
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This chapter describes the rationale behind the specific strategic organisation employed in this 
research effort. The areas of methodology considered (in terms of the pilot study, primary data 
sources, and secondary data sources) include sampling techniques, the sample size of the pilot 
study and of the primary data, the design and implementation of questionnaires (including 
organisational theory and distribution techniques), the design and implementation of interviews, 
and the resources to be used and considered for the supplementary secondary data sources. 
Following the description of these areas, which will constitute the bulk of the chapter; additional 
sections will describe the post-compilation stage of data analysis, research ethics, and validity 
and reliability. These sections will further relate theory to strategic design, while also revealing 
the potential and limitations of the analysis and results. The data analysis section will contain a 
description of techniques to be employed in generating useful quantitative figures, explain the 
nature of qualitative elements in analysis, and describe the development of displaying data while 
blending observation (including relationships, correlations, and particularly significant or 
implicative findings) and discussion. The validity and reliability section will explain any 
potential limitations, biases, or other similarly influence factors, while the research ethics section 
will explain important issues such as confidentiality, the awareness and freedom of respondents, 
and academic policies. 
3.2 Significance of Research 
From the literature published across the past recent decades, it can be shown that many studies 
conducted have not commonly made a clear distinction between security threats and the 
inadequacy of security controls (Loch et al., 1992; Davis, 1997; Henry, 1997; Ryan and 
Bordoloi, 1997). These earlier studies treated ineffective security (including inadequate controls) 
as security threats. As an example, the lack of inadequacy of some security controls, such as 
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inadequate control over media, poor control over manual handling on input and output, poor 
segregation of information systems and duties, poor segregation of accounting duties, inadequate 
control over storage media, inadequate audit trial, the inadequacy of log-on procedures, loss of 
data through insufficient backup procedures or logging files, uncontrolled read and update 
access, uncontrolled user privileges, and weak physical controls were all regarded as security 
threats; naturally this is incorrect application as insufficient measures only constitute a threat 
potential from internal action, not the presence of the external threat as it exists. Although the 
potential of existing threats can be amplified in this regard, the threat is not defined by the 
inadequacies of the aforementioned measures. The justification for treating these areas as threats 
was based on specific definitions, while considering the ongoing existence of the financial 
institution. The researchers included these elements in their survey while reporting them as 
substantially relevant to technology and information security best practices (Ryan and Bordoloi, 
1997). More recent analyses have considered these same conceptual areas with regards to newer 
technology, however there has been little research targeted at closing the conceptual gap; a study 
of closing this gap in Saudi Arabia is therefore significant. 
 
Nearly аll of the рreviоuѕ ѕtudieѕ in the IЅ ѕeсurity threаtѕ reѕeаrсh аreа hаve been imрlemented 
in develорed соuntrieѕ; аnd ассоrding tо the аuthоr'ѕ knоwledge, nо emрiriсаl reѕeаrсh hаѕ 
exаmined comprehensive IЅ ѕeсurity threаtѕ in Saudi Arabia. It iѕ believed thаt соnduсting the 
сurrent ѕtudy in а develорing соuntry, Ѕаudi Аrаbiа, соuld thuѕ yield ѕignifiсаnt reѕultѕ аnd 
bridge the gар in thiѕ reѕeаrсh аreа. In the сurrent ѕtudy, ѕeсurity threаtѕ аnd соntrоlѕ hаve been 
саrefully diѕtinguiѕhed. А ѕeleсted number оf рreсiѕe (conceptual) ѕeсurity threаtѕ tо IЅ аre 
derived frоm рreviоuѕ ѕtudieѕ (Lосh et аl., 1992; Dаviѕ, 1996 аnd 1997; FFIEС, 1996; аnd 
Henry, 1997). In аdditiоn, the fоllоwing IЅ ѕeсurity threаtѕ аre inсluded in the рrороѕed ѕeсurity 
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liѕt tо be emрiriсаlly exаmined fоr the firѕt time iѕ Ѕаudi Аrаbiа: humаn-mаde diѕаѕterѕ ѕuсh аѕ 
fire, lоѕѕ оf роwer, ѕuррreѕѕiоn оr deѕtruсtiоn оf оutрut, сreаtiоn оf fiсtitiоuѕ and inсоrreсt 
оutрut, theft оf dаtа and infоrmаtiоn, unаuthоrised сорying оf оutрut, unаuthоrised viѕibility оf 
dосumentѕ, unаuthоrised рrinting аnd diѕtributiоn оf infоrmаtiоn, direсting рrintѕ аnd 
diѕtributing infоrmаtiоn tо рeорle whо аre nоt entitled tо reсeive it, аnd hаndling ѕenѕitive 
dосumentѕ tо nоn-ѕeсurity сleаred рerѕоnnel fоr ѕhredding. Theѕe ѕeсurity threаtѕ аre mаinly 
relаted tо the IЅ оutрut ѕeсurity, and there is little information regarding the application of these 
areas to the most recent conditions present in Saudi Arabia, adding significance to the research. 
It iѕ believed thаt соnduсting the сurrent ѕtudy in а develорing соuntry, Ѕаudi Аrаbiа, соuld thuѕ 
yield ѕignifiсаnt reѕultѕ аnd bridge the gар in thiѕ reѕeаrсh аreа. 
 
Accordingly, the aim оf the research described in thiѕ thesis iѕ tо inveѕtigаte the 
ѕignifiсаnt рerсeived ѕeсurity threаtѕ оf infоrmаtiоn ѕyѕtems in Ѕаudi оrgаnisаtiоnѕ. The aim of 
the research is to assess the current dealings and perspectives related to information security, 
while the research objectives are to: i) present modern perspectives related to information 
security and complications, ii) assess demands for changes in Saudi Arabia, iii) assess the gaps 
between organisational actions and best practices, and iv) present recommendations for research 
and developments.  
The significance of this study is evident in the aims and objectives as well as research inquiries 
and direction. Identifying the specific threats to data security in Saudi financial institutions, as 
well as considering how existing threats are unique to the banking industry, contributes to the 
existing knowledge base to close any remaining gaps in literature; the study further aims to 
identify areas where continued research would be most beneficial, while this is also significant. 
The personal ethics of employees, in terms of relating to abiding by policies and honesty, will 
 73 
further provide a unique perspective for the conditions and environment present in the analysis. 
The current modes of presentation, significance of organisational traits, and role of IS within the 
institution will all further provide significant information which either supports existing studies 
in modern conditions or reveals unique information allowing readers to consider the effects of 
variables or conditions present in the study. 
3.3 Phases of Research  
The following section describes all areas relevant to the primary research and data of this study. 
The initial pilot study is described, the theory and development behind the questionnaires and 
interviews. Sampling techniques, sample sizes, distribution methods, and other areas are also 
described. The analysis of Saudi financial institutions has been designed for qualitative and 
quantitative results to facilitate detailed conclusions and recommendations, while the study also 
has been designed to ensure statistical significance in all areas. 
3.3.1 Phase 1: Selection of Research Direction and Rationale for the Research Design 
The first phase in any research methodology is to select a research direction, rationalizing it 
through existing literature and according to professional best practices. It is the duty of the 
diligent researcher and analyst to be continually aware of new theoretical developments, 
conceptual applications, technology, and other new and improved areas as they arrive. 
Meanwhile, the rapid change of information technology in conjunction with the broader 
application of user-friendly applications, the increasing demand for enhanced organisation, and 
the capacity for financial and accounting tasks to be conducted have simultaneous addressed 
growing needs while creating greater potential risks. Technological improvements can therefore 
affect information security in multiple ways, through facilitating greater detail and an increased 
capacity to process information, and through the increased quantity of information and 
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accounting potentially vulnerable to internal and external threats. Technological enhancements 
are capable of improving security to a level matching the demands in IS, however, technology 
commonly develops more quickly in control practices while not being matched with employee 
awareness, education, skill development, or more general training (Abu-Musa, 2001; Abu-Musa, 
2003). Developing compliance to address technological enhancements and associated protocol is 
also another common issue. As modern accounting and financial publications commonly report 
issues in IS including data errors, inadequate processing, control violation, and malicious crimes, 
even the most developed nations must place a great effort into staying at the forefront of 
information security (Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk, 2010).  
The pressing issues in IS are especially relevant to Saudi Arabia, and while the nation is able to 
keep a decent technological pace, efforts remain generalised and negligent of potential threats; 
demands and consequences typically must be observable prior to actions being physically carried 
out and resources actively distributed (Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn, 2009). This increases the 
vulnerability of IS in financial institutions, as the mere possibility of threats in accordance with 
the most recent publications may be neglected entirely, and the organisations may not take action 
until the threat is considered either ―common knowledge‖ or is observable in the news. 
Additionally, the described gap in the literature reveals conceptual areas which are poorly 
understood and considered within the nation; clearly, the increased efforts which have been 
recommended over the past decade are warranted, while this research is directed at following the 
described developments, becoming aware of threats as they exist within the nation, and 
considering what can be done to address active and potential threats from both internal and 
external sources (Abu-Musa, 2001; Abu-Musa, 2003; Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn, 2009; Аlfаwаz, 
Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk, 2010). 
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Financial institutions have an especial concern to protect information, as customer and 
institutional information can be misused in a number of ways. Theft, fraud, identity theft, 
sabotage, and general invasion of privacy may result; Saudi financial institutions have an 
especially high priority to protect information, compared to other institutions, and thus the 
direction of this research will include Saudi financial institutions and their instrumentation and 
policies for information security (Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn, 2009). The ability of these institutions 
to address present and potential threats and demands, find and amend security breaches as they 
occur, and manage policies and employees while reducing vulnerability will all be considered. 
The efforts of both managers and employees will be considered alongside the structure of 
information technology, organisational policies and culture, systems of procedures, and other 
areas. Information system security may be particularly challenging amid the availability of 
resources and potentially contradictory requirements (typically concerning the necessity to deal 
with open systems however mandating high protection in all areas), and thus this area is also of 
concern to the research.  
Managers and employees must realise that the adequate treatment of IS risks and breaches 
requires a wide spectrum of knоwledge, rаnging frоm teсhnоlоgy аnd оrgаnisаtiоnal structure 
and processes tо legiѕlаtiоn and policies; this naturally demands that managers and employees be 
educated, trained, and aware of new issues and the need for additional training. Assessing an 
organisation can allow its various approaches to be considered and applied to theory, and with 
this, the organisation‘s techniques can be examined for weaknesses and strengths. While 
financial institutions are being examined,the knowledge of evolving financial and accounting 
trends are further relevant to the development of IS protocol. The approaches of Saudi 
institutions, in these areas, will be assessed for effectiveness and weaknesses alongside the other 
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areas of assessment. The various theoretical approaches common in IS attempt to address the 
major issues in different ways: while some are nearly entirely technical (with relatively low 
emphasis on active security), some are more focused on human factors and managerial systems, 
and others place the greatest emphasis on policies, legislation, and compliance (Harmon, 2001; 
Powers, 2001). The research and analysis will consider Saudi financial institutions and their 
ability to effectively apply their chosen approach (while balancing it with other areas). IS 
integration within organisation and operational structures will also be considered, while the aim 
of this area of the research direction is to attempt to describe Saudi employees and organisational 
profiles, with regards to areas requiring improvement and potential development.  
Data protection requires that organisations have some idea of threats while also having a 
fundamental system for addressing risks and threats in IS. Saudi financial institutions will be 
assessed in terms of their active, past, and potential systems as their development and capacity 
are considered alongside the development and capacity of threats and risks. Threats are generally 
assessed through multiple dimensions, while systems addressing them therefore are required to 
have multiple dimensions. One approach to this is to dedicate one dimension to communication 
using IS, while dedicating other dimensions to policies and legislation, organisation, technology, 
and management (Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn, 2009; Аlfаwаz, Nelѕоn, аnd Mоhаnnаk, 2010). While 
designing and implementing these approaches have already occurred in Saudi institutions, the 
present concerns are primarily in terms of their effectiveness, flexibility, and ability for 
employees to be compliant as these systems are maintained by managers. The detailed 
approaches and methodologies of the Saudi financial institution will be outlined, described in 
relation to multiple areas, and fully assessed. The direction of this research, beginning with the 
conveyance of literature and discussion of research methodologies in this chapter, will continue 
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through the background of Saudi institutions and instrumentation, consider processes and 
outputs, describe business activities and compliance, outline management and leadership 
activities, and be supplemented with secondary research as described prior to the final analysis, 
conclusions, and recommendations. Other areas included in this general research direction will 
be encompassed by systems development, maintenance, threats analysis, security infrastructure, 
public key infrastructure, costs and outsources, technology, policy and planning, auditing, 
internal issues, and more. The emphasis of the research direction, in addition to the primary aim 
towards IS, will be on best practices; in this regard, EU and US regulations will be relevant, 
often described, and form the basis of analysis relevant to recommendations and improvement.  
In addition to the direction through organisation and theory, just as the conditions of the financial 
institution in regards to IS will be described, the research will consider the variables and 
reactions unique to the Saudi Arabian environment as it is observed. The Saudi Arabian 
economy is particularly strong for the geographical area, meaning that IS is not particularly 
limited by the availability of technology and knowledgeable human resources in comparison to 
poorer nations. Saudi Arabia has a particularly high level of economic success, and as it 
comprises 25 percent of the Arab region‘s GDP, financial institutions are generally quite 
successful. As mentioned, this simultaneously places a greater strain on information security as 
organisational activities and relationships increase (Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn, 2009). Although 
previous IT plans and aspects of the nation‘s five year plans have taken action to improve both 
resources and access to skill development, little attention has been paid to the IS for some of the 
nation‘s most powerful resources. The need for assessment and improvement reported by 
literature remains despite governmental knowledge and effort, while the research will explore the 
nature of these remaining areas and consider potential governmental actions. 
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In summary, the research direction explores all known factors and applications, while 
considering the present and potential developments, and recommend means to take advantage of 
opportunities while overcoming limitations. The two primary approaches to assessing the 
entirety of these areas include both primary and secondary research, and as the primary research 
is comprised of both questionnaires and interviews, the secondary research includes information 
regarding IS and best practices from other areas while also being tailored to the results of the 
primary research. The direction of the research, through the primary and secondary research 
efforts, continues through the primary threats affecting information security in Saudi Arabian 
financial institutions, the uniqueness of the threats to the sector, the policies and procedures 
currently in place, the compliance of employees in following security policies and procedures, 
and the components influencing willingness for compliance. Additionally, the influence of 
personal ethics on compliance, the influence of institutions on employee willingness and 
compliance, the potential limiting effects of policies and procedures, the effects of organisational 
traits on successful execution of information security, and the possible enhancements that can be 
made to increase the effectiveness of IS functions. 
As mentioned, the research is not technical in nature, and is qualitative in nature. Considering the 
conceptual goals of the research aims, objectives, and questions, qualitative research is deemed 
most fitting according to best practices (Kothari, 2008). Quantitative research does not have the 
same inherent risk of bias, but it also would not yield the same theoretical relationships and 
conceptual results that are targeted through the research; the inherent risk of bias is a concern, 
but it is examined with caution throughout the duration of the study and considered in the 
analysis. Meanwhile, the selection process of the 10 research questions relates to the research 
rationale in that the qualitative approach is most fitting for each of the 10 questions; the 10 
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questions are qualitative questions that explore theory and concepts relevant to the kinds of 
organizational development needed to address security vulnerabilities. A case study could have 
been considered for this study, but the people examined from different organizations effectively 
constitute a case. The sampling methods (see section 3.5.4 for details) were also selected 
considering the qualitative nature of the study and objectives. Meanwhile, 10 organizations were 
selected because this number seems to be the highest that could be reached considering the 
limitations of an academic study conducted by a sole researcher without funding (see section 
3.10 for details on limitations). See section 3.5.5 for details regarding the target audience for the 
instrumentation.  
3.3.2 Phase 2: Creation of Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The second phase in research efforts is the development of research aims, questions, objectives, 
and accompanying hypotheses (Collis and Hussey, 2009). As mentioned in the introduction and 
fully justified in the previous chapter, the aim of the research described in this thesis is to record 
new data about information system threats and security. More specifically, the aim оf the 
research described in thiѕ thesis iѕ tо inveѕtigаte the ѕignifiсаnt рerсeived ѕeсurity threаtѕ оf 
infоrmаtiоn ѕyѕtems in Ѕаudi оrgаnisаtiоnѕ; the aim is to assess the current dealings and 
perspectives related to information security. This aim has spawned the following objectives (list 
them), the investigation of which will be accomplished through ten specific inquiries amid the 
broader category of IS effectiveness in Saudi financial institutions. As mentioned, these were 
selected to address the qualitative research design, as described in the previous section. The 
specific research inquiries are: 
i) what are the primary threats affecting information security in financial institutions within 
Saudi Arabia? 
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ii) how are these threats unique to this sector? 
iii) what policies and procedures are currently in place? 
iv) how well do employees follow information security policies and procedures? 
v) what factors affect the willingness of employees to comply with policies and procedures? 
vi) how do personal ethics affect compliance with policies and procedure? 
vii) how do various institutional factors impact employees‘ willingness to comply with policies 
and procedures? 
viii) are there aspects of the current information security policies of procedures that make it 
difficult for employees to comply? 
ix) how do overall organisational characteristics affect the successful execution of information 
security success? 
x) what improvements can be made to increase effectiveness of information security operations? 
As mentioned, the researcher intends to address these issues though questionnaires, interviews, 
secondary research (including best practices from more developed nations such as the U.S. and 
U.K.) and detailed analysis. While the recommendations and proposals for continued research 
naturally depend on the specific outcomes generated from the study, the researcher holds 
preliminary hypotheses at the earliest stages of developing the study. These are as follows: 
i) The primary threats affecting information security in Saudi Arabian financial institutions are 
remaining up to date with technology, technological threats from outside amid weaker security 
(such as Blackberries, hacking, and more), and otherwise not abiding by best practices and 
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maximising organisational procedures and structure. The financial institutions appear likely to 
have among the highest security of the nation; however it also seems that they will pale in 
comparison to the security measures of more developed nations. Meanwhile, unfortunately, the 
threats from within and outside of the nation remain comparably high, and this ratio naturally 
results in a higher and unsafe risk.  
ii) The threats to the financial institution sector are unique because the information stored within 
these facilities is especially sensitive. As mentioned, financial information poses a greater risk to 
the institution and individuals, and there is a higher level of incentives and motivation for people 
to attempt to violate security. A number of crimes can result from violation including identity 
theft, fraud, theft, embezzlement, and more; while many organisations have funding information 
stored as information, there are typically not such an abundance of accounts and funds stored. 
Online banking poses a particularly unique threat as breaching security may result in distributing 
the funds without the need for additional action. Meanwhile, the gathering of bank card numbers 
can allow violators to commit fraud, theft, or outright identity theft, while there is less potential 
for this to occur in other industries.  
iii) The policies and procedures currently in place require active and passive security through 
supervision and software. While this is effective in a basic level of security, it is inferior to 
policies and procedures in more developed nations while the organisations generally do not use 
the best resources available to them nor implement many aspects of best practices. Policies and 
procedures in place also address compliance; however the motivation, room for innovation, and 
managerial practices are also not in line with best practices. Legislation is somewhat lax 
compared to more developed nations, and this contributes to the reluctance to continually update 
technology and internal systems.  
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iv) Employees do not have any particular issue or problem following security policies and 
procedures, however there is little to no innovation or development in general employees or 
managerial employees. This is because of the lack of pressuring demand and lack of incentive in 
a system which is comfortable with barely adequate systems in the absence of major observable 
threats or a clear imbalance of technology. Although the policies and procedures in place require 
improvements to be made according to the findings of authorities, and authorities are mindful of 
the most pressing issues, employees play little to no role in improvement and development; 
furthermore, employees may be discouraged or even disallowed from playing any role in such 
positive development. This may result in the failure to report potentially useful information 
which has not resulted in a clear violation or continually observable risk. Overall, employees 
follow the procedures in place, however there is inadequacy observed in this area as policies 
generally restrict employees from taking a step further and contributing to development.  
v) The factors affecting the willingness of employees to comply with policies and procedures are 
predominantly related to management and the organisation as a whole. Legislation may also be a 
factor, potentially giving employees little incentive to contribute to any improvement permitted. 
Meanwhile, however, the company policy for punishments is generally sufficient enough to keep 
employees from neglecting the required duties altogether; despite this, the policies are generally 
lax and only ensure that employees follow a protocol which considers the bare minimum of 
active and passive potential security risks and threats. Factors potentially affecting willingness 
may also include severity of punishment from within the institution, closeness of supervision, 
personal ethics, rewarded incentives for flawless or beneficial performance, and government 
requirements.  
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vi) Personal ethics may play a major role with policies and procedure. While the majority of 
compliance is mandated and punishable by legislation, actions which are not directly observable 
or recorded are most likely to be reliant on personal ethics; here, high ethical values would show 
an increased tendency to abide by regulations even when not doing so would go unnoticed. 
Similarly, low ethical values make the employee more prone to taking the quickest or easiest 
route amid policies and procedures if this could be done without the knowledge of any authority 
(or element of the system which could similarly document the occurrence for future viewing by 
authorities). Personal ethics are assumed to be a lesser, albeit clearly present, factor in 
compliance. This area may be one of the most difficult to measure are non-ethical employees 
may be prone to hide such behaviour while providing dishonest answers.  
vii) Institutional factors have a major impact on employee willingness to comply with policies 
and procedures. While personal ethics and work ethic, as well as government regulations, may 
play significant roles in this area, the role of the institution is the greatest. The institution 
determines which areas are considered, the punishment for neglect, the reward for effort and 
compliance, and the nature of the operation. The institution ultimately determines the 
organisational structure and culture, the positions and distribution of employees and information 
technology, the specific job duties of employees, the nature of compliance itself, the policies for 
employees and clients, the relationship of the institution with the nation, and many other areas 
which define the nature of the institution and job alike. Naturally, these affect the nature of the 
position, and therefore play some role in nature of employee willingness for compliance. 
Although personal ethics affect this area as described, the institution is responsible for the 
constructs of the conditions, and thus has a greater influence on both the processes for 
compliance and the nature of compliance (and therefore willingness). Because of this, the 
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institution is therefore capable of altering specific aspects in attempt to increase the willingness 
for compliance as needed. While it is unknown whether compliance is a particular issue (or to 
what extent), the nature of institutional factors and possible recommendations for positive 
change are unknown; it is assumed that this area is low albeit present, and both supervision 
levels and incentives for promotion would serve to improve compliance, as described in detail 
below.  
viii) There are many aspects in current policies and procedures which may hamper an 
employee‘s compliance; however these are generally not significant. A lack of training and 
access to resources is likely the greatest issue, while the organisation of the employees and 
operation facilitates this to some degree. Thus, to reduce these possibilities, the organisation 
should take greater action to monitor employee capacity and employee performance, and ensure 
that employees have both the means and complete ability to be compliant; the presence of 
complexities and the temptation of available shortcuts contribute to non-compliance to some 
level in these areas.  
ix) Similar to the procedures and policies put in place by the organisation and effects on 
compliance, overall organisational characteristics play a major role in affecting the ability of 
employees to successfully execute information security while experiencing success. Aside from 
personal traits and governmental legislation, the traits of the organisation affect the remainder of 
processes in information security. The organisation of processes, the incentives and motivation 
of employees, managerial styles, goals, and allocation of processes and resources all play a major 
role in achieving and sustaining information security success. Information security success is 
achieved by properly applying technology and efficient organisation of skilled individuals and 
resources. Specifically, Saudi financial institution IS success is affected by the organisation‘s 
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willingness to divert attention to IS issues, the prioritisation of IS, and the prerequisites for 
employment. The specific managerial requirements and techniques also have an observable 
effect. 
x)  There are numerous potential improvements which could be made to information security 
operations. These can be made by Saudi financial institution employees, managers, and the 
government. Technology is the most immediately addressable area, as software and hardware 
could be replaced with cutting edge products and programs to minimise active risks. Meanwhile, 
employees could receive additional training on a routine basis regarding addressing attacks and 
new issues relevant to reducing threats. The organisation‘s management is assumed to be the 
only parties within the institution occasionally informing themselves on issues relevant to 
improvement, while the majority of the institution prefers to wait until there is a substantial 
difference in technology (or a publicised risk of threat) to take action. The general needs for 
improvement are in these terms of organisation and action, in addition to the technology. 
 
3.3.3 Phase 3: Selection of Sampling Techniques and Sampling 
After the development of the research questions and hypothesis, the next phase is the selection of 
sampling techniques and the actual sampling (considered part of the same phase but separate 
from the actual instrumentation distribution and data recording). This qualitative work demands 
sampling techniques possible to be conducted in a way that optimizes the potential for the 
research objectives to be met, and can be conducted in an academic nature which can be 
completed within the limitations to the researcher. The primary methods used are ‗convenience 
sampling‘ or accessing the most willing people meeting the research criteria, and the inclusion 
criteria itself. Beyond this, best practices are considered. To best ensure that the respondents 
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participating in the study are proper representatives of the areas assessed in the study, formal 
sampling techniques play a role in selections and samplings. According to fundamental theory 
commonly applied to such research efforts in the academic and professional worlds, there are 
two fundamental varieties of samples, the probability sample and the non-probability sample. In 
this regards, the probability sample is variant from the non-probability sample while the 
probability sample is a representative of the specific population to be assessed (while non-
probability is thus not related) (DeVaus, 1985). Through this, and the aforementioned 
requirement of having at least two years of relevant experience, the target participants will be 
discovered, approached, and assessed. Moreover, the sampling method to be utilised with this 
questionnaire is more ideal for the probability approach to sampling (as opposed to non-
probability). According to theory, the primary advantages of this approach to questionnaire 
surveys are the approach facilitating precise and coherent data representations in terms of an 
active body relevant to a specified area (such as IS security amid financial institutions within a 
nation), and the approach facilitating a clear opportunity for the conditions to be assessed for 
potential biases (Gratton and Jones, 2004). The organisations are to be first contacted in some 
manner (via phone, email, or otherwise) to be informally interviewed regarding participation and 
IS security. If the organisation is found to have an ample number of relevant employees amid the 
condition of being an institution with a full and complex IS in place, the request for participation 
will be given. This will continue until the aforementioned target sample is reached, thereby 
providing the study with an ample quantity of statistics for a significant analysis and conclusions.  
As described at least 10 organisations are assessed, being the largest number felt to be still viable 
for research (being attainable yet significant) and more may be included if participation 
willingness and time permit. Within each organisation, five employees are selected based on 
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relevance and willingness; this quantity is assumed to be sufficiently representative of internal 
organisational trends. Naturally, research and analysis theory assumes that the approach to 
drawing a sample and the size of such samples are highly significant to the accuracy of an 
analysis (as well as its potential to be generalised); moreover, despite the desirability of a 
massive scale research effort encompassing more individuals and organisations, the study is also 
bound in quantity (see limitations section). Therefore, the sample size of the primary data is 
dependent on willingness and limitations. In addition to the minimum 50 key respondents 
assessed in the study, others may be selected if the time is permitting and more still may be 
interviewed. Should this occur, all aforementioned techniques and structure will hold while these 
individuals will only serve to support the aim of the study and the statistical significance of 
responses. The probability method chosen for the questionnaire as described above, in 
combination with the requirements for participants amid a specific subject area, reduces the 
likelihood of generalisability (and thus increases precision and meaning) in the study (Marshall 
and Rossman, 2006; DeVaus, 1985). 
3.3.4 Phase 4a: Questionnaire Survey Development 
Following the third phase of selecting sampling techniques, the fourth phase involved selecting 
and developing the questionnaire instrumentation to use in the data recording. As described, the 
questionnaire survey was selected as an effective data collection instrument for this research 
effort. While common, the questionnaire is not ideal for all types of primary research efforts, 
however is assumed sufficient for this analysis of IS security and the organisational improvement 
of financial institutions. This survey is formulated based on the literature of IS and the current 
conditions and issues in Saudi Arabia, while it is to be tailored to the specific nature of the 
inquiries outlined in other sections. The questionnaire survey is tested by the pilot study for 
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feasibility and practicality as mentioned, amended based on the findings of the pilot study, and 
distributed on a full scale to numerous institutions and IS-associated employees across Saudi 
Arabia. The design of this instrument forms the foundation for the presentation of analysis and 
results, all averages and statistics compiled and displayed, all qualitative observations revealed 
and discussed, and all trends so that recommendations for improvement and continued research 
can be made.  
Many researchers have outlined the significance and potential of questionnaire surveys in formal 
academic and professional field research efforts. The primary objective of the questionnaire is to 
extract a massive amount of specific information in an efficient manner, and furthermore across 
a sizeable quantity of respondents. The use of this instrument has also been referred to as a 
method or technique (i.e. questionnaire method) and strategy is involved in applying formulated 
and pre-tested questions. While the questionnaire can include a series of yes or no, multiple 
choice, ratings (i.e. ―on a scale of 1-10, how effective would you rate your company‘s approach 
to IS security), and short answer questions, the use of this instrument and method is one of the 
most commonly applied approaches to data collection (Saunders et al., 2007).  
This type of surveying is highly efficient in terms of combining data and in reaching a range of 
people. When considering the nature of financial institutions and IS security, the questionnaire is 
also capable of addressing fine details and extracting both simple and complex data. The 
questionnaire can also be designed to track the traits of those being observed so that these factors 
can be taken into account during the analysis. For example, if a questionnaire has been designed 
to rate the effectiveness of IS security and compliance amid specific organisational traits, a series 
of ratings questions can be combined with short answer and yes or no questions; meanwhile, in 
order for the spectrum of relevant variables to be most effectively considered and properly 
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applied to theory, the questionnaire can begin with requesting that the respondent list their job 
position, company name, computer operating system, number of managers, or other information 
deemed relevant to a given area. While interviews can be designed in a similar way, with all 
desired information conceived written down in preparing for inquiries, this method lacks the 
efficiency of questionnaires (Saunders et al., 2007). Thus, all relevant facts and needs initially 
conceived may be addressed through this instrumentation as the researcher continues through the 
process of data collection in attempt to meet the study‘s aims and objectives.  
In this study, the target audience will have been informed of the nature of the study prior to 
participating, however the questionnaire will further list the nature of the study, reveal the 
confidentiality and other relevant areas of the research methodology, and provide clear directions 
for the survey‘s various types of inquiries. This will serve to reduce the level of confusion, while 
the respondents will also be able to contact the researcher for any questions they may have in 
completing the survey. Lastly, the researcher will ensure that all respondents will have the proper 
amount of time to complete the questionnaire with the highest accuracy and to the best of their 
ability, established through communications regarding timelines and plans for the data collection 
and research.  
Many theories, definitions, and classifications of research methodologies have considered the 
role of the questionnaire amid primary research while deducing that the optimally effective 
implementation ensues from a key balance of rigor versus time and restrictions, the 
appropriateness of assumptions in methodological as opposed to substantive issues, treating the 
development as an art as well as a science, and emphasising accuracy while eliminating the 
potential for confusion and error wherever possible (DeVaus, 1985; Presser et al., 2004; Gratton 
and Jones, 2004; Saunders et al., 2007). Moreover, additional conceptual developments have 
 90 
claimed that the diligence in both development and application amid the topic and target 
audience may be even less influential than the aforementioned areas, depending on the nature of 
the primary research (and assuming general accuracy); meanwhile, the questionnaire can be 
formulated according to three basic categories, while it is the researchers responsibility to select 
the categories having the highest potential for facilitating optimal data collection for their topic 
and research design. From here, the researcher can apply the theory of this design as a template 
to begin the development of their instrumentation, while using a combination of theory, logic, 
and application of circumstances to strategically design a highly effective research tool capable 
of both effective communication and collecting significant data. Naturally, a hybrid of these 
categories can be selected as most desirable, while the research then has the ability to manipulate 
multiple schools of thought together in a custom methodology which best meets the needs of 
research inquiries for the topic at hand. 
The three fundamental varieties of questionnaires, according to Saunders et al. (2007), are the 
open-question, closed-question, and multiple choice varieties of questionnaires. Each of these 
areas has a unique set of advantages and disadvantages, and naturally these traits may have 
varying effectiveness according to the topic and design of the research inquiries. The open 
question surveys are typically most effective in detailed and highly organised research 
methodologies; with these, the researcher assumes the respondents to supply especially detailed 
and complex information, while the distribution and administration is therefore particularly slow 
with this variety. Although the researcher can afford to invest some time in ensuring the answers 
are detailed in this study, the responses desired are known to be only moderate in detail while 
open questions may only be applied in a few areas of information system security in financial 
institutions. Open questions may allow managers to describe problems, solutions, and 
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occurrences as they experience them in the nation, however they are not best for the compilation 
of responses to directly address the specific research inquiries listed. Meanwhile, closed 
questions allow the respondent to quickly select specific results, allowing the researcher to 
implement the relevant topics and issues and covering multiple areas based on known conditions 
or hypotheses. The selection of predetermined answers can be used to compile statistics, address 
a hypothesis, or face the respondent with predetermined alternatives to subjects which they are 
already familiar with (Collis and Hussey, 2003). Moreover, closed questions may be more 
desirable in the consideration of information system security in specific contexts as the spectrum 
of possibly influential factors can each be similarly addressed; also, such questions are assumed 
to be most desirable in the event that the researcher has clear and highly defined theories and 
hypotheses (and more so in the event that there are multiple clear and highly defined theories and 
hypotheses as they are present in this study) (Collis and Hussey, 2003). According to Saunders et 
al. (2007), closed questions have become particularly common in the furthering development of 
theory and the research into areas which have been extensively considered in literature. Lastly, 
the multiple choice questionnaire design allows for categorical questions to be selected, and are 
particularly used when the researcher desires collecting data regarding specific contexts, 
occurrences, behaviour, and traits.  
The researcher has weighed the advantages and disadvantages of the various approaches to 
questionnaires, and has opted for a slight hybrid which predominantly consists of closed 
questions. Multiple choice questions are included in the survey, to quickly cover areas which can 
be summed up with such short responses, while the majority of questions are either closed or 
requesting the respondent to rate an element according to some scale. Open ended questions are 
included so that the respondent may address some areas of pure opinion or to otherwise inquire 
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into areas where the potential answers are either unknown or not easily described in a range of 
components. Thus, after full and detailed consideration regarding the order of achieving the 
highest level of precision amid both the scope and limitations of the research to be carried out, 
the questionnaire attempts to make most of multiple elements of theory (although making 
especial use of the advantages of closed questioning). Only one set of questions will be prepared, 
and this same series of inquiries will be administered to all members of all organisations. While 
the pilot study may define the final form of this instrumentation, the basis of its development is 
IS and research theory; and this will be deemed sufficient for all organisations assessed (and all 
employees within).  
The questionnaire is to include 30 items in all, so as to be comprehensive of all areas of IS theory 
while appropriately addressing all elements of research inquiries, with the first set of questions 
addressing the first five objectives, and the rest of the objectives addressing different questions 
for each (as described in the discussion chapter, see Chapter 5 for further details regarding 
relations to questions and outcomes for the objectives). As mentioned, many responses will be 
pre-created while requesting that employees rate levels of effectiveness, compliance, or other 
areas. The presence of elements may be answered in multiple choice or yes or no questions. 
Meanwhile, inquiries into other described areas may be best addressed by the employee‘s 
description of the area, and responses to be selected may include choices such as ―always,‖ 
―seldom,‖ and ―never,‖ or ―excellent,‖ ―good,‖ ―average,‖ or ―poor.‖ As this research is to 
include interviews in addition to questionnaires, only a small amount of the survey will include 
open ended questions (regarding the improvement of the IS and roles of security,) while the 
remainder of open ended issues will be addressed with the interviews.  
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3.3.5 Phase 4b: Interviews 
The interviews were developed following the questionnaires, considering a separate ―sub phase‖ 
of the same basic phase of instrumentation development. The interviews conducted to complete 
the primary research are strategically organised to consider theoretical elements of IS security 
and research. Researchers commonly assert that this technique is used to collect information 
from specific people through inquiries. These have been found to be particularly effective when 
applied to feelings of one‘s job, beliefs, or feelings, while these can be geared towards the 
research inquiries and aims as they become a powerful research instrument (Collis and Hussey, 
2003; Saunders et al., 2007). Interviews in general are valuable in extracting information specific 
to any area, and as they can be applied to address or even formulate research objectives and 
questions, theoretical developments have categorised and analysed methodologies for creating 
and administering interviews. According to Gratton and Jones (2004), the interview may be more 
highly regarded across specific institutions and research efforts because they better facilitate 
confidentiality; companies may be more willing to participate in a short interview with the 
personal effort applied than to fill out a questionnaire simply sent to them.  
Similar to the categorisation of questionnaires based on fundamental traits and theory applicable 
to research, interviews have been categorised by experts to be used as research templates when 
selected by the researcher. With this, there are three main types of interviews: the structured 
interview, the non-structured interview, and the semi-structured interview (Gratton and Jones, 
2004; Saunders et al., 2007). The structured interview has been developed by the researcher prior 
to the administration, and during the interview this structured interview is followed to the fine 
detail; the structured interview is neither amended nor supplemented during the interview 
process. Although structured interviews have the advantage of direction, they have the 
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disadvantage of inflexibility. Non-structured interviews, meanwhile, are entirely flexible while 
having little direction as the researcher arrives without a formal interview; non-structured 
interviews allow the researcher to pry into various areas as needed. While both the non-
structured interview and structured interview have traits which are commonly undesirable in 
research settings, many research efforts (including this particular effort) choose to employ the 
semi-structured interview. This hybrid of the aforementioned types involves a strategically 
designed interview while permitting the researcher to change direction between individuals 
interviewed as desired. While this may provoke additional variation in results, it may also 
provide unique output from elite employees while allowing researchers to pursue unexpected 
topics of interest if they should arise.  
The researcher will be interviewing one or two employees from each organisation regarding IS 
security, organisational traits, and compliance; while the interviews will be carried out using the 
strategically formulated template created by the researcher, the researcher will attempt to gain 
additional information by requesting that the interviewee elaborate on specific information given 
(or by supplementing with follow-up questions). 
3.3.6 Phase 5: Pilot Study  
Testing the instrumentation was the next phase in the methodology. Prior to the administration of 
the questionnaire to the entirety of the audience, a pilot study will be conducted to test the 
feasibility and practicality of the draft questionnaire. To accomplish this test, the survey 
questionnaire will be distributed to a small sample size of approximately 10 to 15 individuals 
across two or three organisations (the attempt will involve five members of each organisation, 
and address two or three organisations). Once these results have been collected, the researcher 
will examine the responses for any possible need to make final amendments prior to the full-
 95 
scale distribution. It is assumed that testing the survey on a small portion of the target audience 
will reveal if there are any issues which need to be addressed, such as questions which are 
difficult to answer due to clarity (or otherwise), the inappropriateness of a question, questions 
which are misunderstood and mistaken, or otherwise. If the pilot study reveals any issues which 
demand attention, the questionnaire will be adjusted accordingly and redistributed as a full scale 
initiative. If the pilot study does not reveal such issues, the results will be stored for the final 
compilation while the remainder of the surveys will be administered to the remainder of the 
target audience selected. As mentioned, the overall intention of this study is to test the 
questionnaire; meanwhile, two additional assumptions will be tested, that financial institutions 
do not routinely update their IS security measures and that information technology (IT) products 
are substantially outdated.  
 
3.3.7 Phase 6: Primary Data Recording and Instrumentation Distribution 
Following the testing of the instrumentation, the next phase is to actually distribute the 
instrumentation and record the data. While the full-scale distribution of the questionnaire surveys 
initiates the framework for the final compilation and analysis, the beginning of the pool of 
information for statistics and qualitative observations will begin following the results (and 
amendments where needed) of the pilot study. With this, while the search for relevant 
information is underway, numerous elements must be considered to ensure proper collection and 
compilation prior to the analysis. According to Gratton and Jones (2004), research is 
characterised as a systematic investigation tailored to obtain and organise data relevant to some 
inquiry and theoretical direction. In this case, the systematic design includes the questionnaire 
survey, the interviews (together as the primary data sources), and the supplementary secondary 
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data sources. A total of 15 financial institutions are to be assessed to ensure that any observed 
trends are typical across the nation; meanwhile, five employees (potentially more if deemed 
useful as an additional supplement) from each institution are surveyed and interviewed. These 
employees include either managers or operators of some aspect of the IS security, and while 
specific positions are not required for eligibility for participation, at least two years of direct 
experience with IS security in any position within the organisation will be required. Meanwhile, 
the researcher must consider the potential drawbacks of interviewing and surveying even 
knowledgeable and experienced employees, in accordance with the theoretical descriptions and 
applications of primary research as outlined by Gratton and Jones (2004); the authors emphasise 
that possible drawbacks to such an approach to an analysis, conclusion, and recommendations 
include limitations relevant to the data collection processes (which may require communication 
or even travel efforts on the behalf of the researcher), time restrictions (of particular concern in 
the time limited academic context), cost and resource requirements, and ensuring participants are 
true members of the target audience selected (and that this selection has been made correctly).  
While there are many similarities in primary research and data collection through the described 
mediums, the role of the subject and theories of this study impacts the nature of the research 
carried out. The pre-dominant line of questioning in the research is in regards to the effectiveness 
of IS security, environmental conditions and impact, and compliance, and thus the research 
efforts are most mindful of influence, conditions, and potential. The financial institution was 
chosen to be included in the target audience as the financial institution has among the greatest 
needs for information systems security; moreover, the information systems in these institutions 
are particularly large, and there are a great quantity of institutions which increases the potential 
for the researcher to access a statistically significant quantity of participants. While the 
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government has a comparable need for information systems security, its information system is 
not as easily analysed in terms of security; moreover, researching would be more difficult as the 
abundance of locations and accessibility is less than with financial institutions. Meanwhile, as 
mentioned, the primary members of the target audience will include any member of a financial 
institution with at least two years of experience with IS security.  
The primary data is gathered from at least 50 knowledgeable employees of financial institutions 
within Saudi Arabia, describing the trends of at least 10 financial institutions and IS security. 
With this, the study attempts to supplement the findings with additional secondary data in an 
attempt to discover the causes of such trends. Interviews also look into this area, while the 
interviews will be strategically designed to be open to the findings of the questionnaire (but still 
structured to address specific relevant issues, see interviews section for specific details). Thus, 
the consideration of the financial institutions, through the primary research, will encompass a 
substantial proportion of the financial industry across Saudi Arabia, reveal the explanations of 
experienced and knowledgeable members, provide the basis for interview development and 
application, and will be further addressed with the direction of the secondary research.  
While there are many ways of distributing questionnaires, and some have a set of advantages and 
disadvantages to the researcher which are more desirable in certain ways than the method 
selected, it is important to describe these methods and their traits as they assist research. 
The two most fundamental distribution methods are face to face and group distributions. 
Meanwhile, a number of mediums could be used in conjunction with these, as personal surveys 
could be conducted over the telephone, surveys could be mailed using email or postal mail, 
personal appearances could be used to pass the surveys out to a large group of people, surveys 
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can be faxed, etc. Naturally, the face to face method is the most demanding in terms of time (or 
travel expenses); however minimises confusion and practically ensures that the researcher leaves 
with useful information from willing participants. Meanwhile, group distribution is more 
efficient; however has the potential for confusion and miscommunication (Collis and Hussey, 
2003). While the researcher attempts to strategically target people, and not reach a maximised 
audience, initially face-to-face distribution seemed more desirable; however, given the nature of 
the demands of the study, the ability to be especially clear within the survey by providing 
directions as needed, the ability to schedule time and explain the nature of the study personally 
over the telephone, and other factors, the researcher has decided to distribute the questionnaires 
in small groups and electronically. With this, the researcher will first contact the institution and 
attempt to arrange participation, then the nature of the study and participation instructions will be 
administered, a time will be scheduled, and finally the surveys will be administered. The 
researcher is to review the results and examine for possible errors, re-contacting parties if 
miscommunication seems evident. Based on the number of institutions desired compared to 
those available, the questionnaire goal seemed entirely attainable at the time of the decision for 
this structure; naturally, this ensures sufficient effort can be placed within the analysis, 
interviews, secondary research, and other supplemental yet crucial areas of the study. 
3.3.8 Phase 7: Data Analysis 
Aside from some of the secondary data analysis issues considered in the secondary data section, 
the final encompassing phase of the methodology is data analysis. Once the entirety of the data 
has been collected, it is first properly organised and compiled according to the specific research 
inquiries. Following this, quantitative information is averaged and used in graphical 
representations to reveal percentages and numerical comparisons between institutions or other 
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areas. Cross-sectional and descriptive statistics are displayed to accompany discussion. 
Similarly, ratings and observed traits are totalled and assessed, while interviews and secondary 
research may serve to supplement and facilitate a complete analysis of data. All information 
collected, unless deemed unfit for analysis due to bias, incorrectness, or otherwise, is used in the 
analysis of data. The qualitative data will be described in terms of the inquiries, interviews, and 
secondary research, and any correlations observed will be subject to further analysis prior to 
presentation and discussion; qualitative data will be discussed in terms of relevant subject matter, 
with the emphasis given to the topics and concepts most frequently expressed by respondents. 
The Cronbach alpha statistic will be used for internal consistency and reliability of surveys. Once 
all totals, average, percentages, comparative tables, traits, statistics, and relationships have been 
observed, the remainder of the data is described and applied to either the most relevant data, a 
conclusion or recommendation, or an explanation of why the data is not particularly fitting.  
 
3.4 Secondary Research and Data  
The researcher supplements the findings from the primary research and data with additional 
literature and statistics in a secondary research effort. These serve to supplement the analysis, as 
well as provide additional reference for the researcher to refer to in describing theory in 
discussion, conclusion, and recommendation sections. As mentioned, some secondary research is 
conducted as a direct extension of literature to ensure the most recent and relevant literature is 
available for integrating with the primary research results, while other areas of the secondary 
research effort are reliant on the results from the primary data. With this, the nature of the 
primary research results and data guide the secondary research as it seeks to supplement these 
findings and implications. 
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The resources demanded in the secondary research effort are publicly accessible while much less 
demanding of the researcher‘s time; therefore, the researcher can undoubtedly carry out this 
research to every desired detail, unlike the limitations of expenses, accessibility, and time 
restricting the nature of the primary research. The resources to be used include company profiles 
and annual reports, government statistics, financial and business statistics, academic literature, 
scholarly journals, and other reputable and relevant sources. 
3.5 Validity and Reliability 
Naturally, the researcher must abide by academic policy while asserting that all information is 
correct, and to achieve this feat, reliable sources must be sought. A quality scholarly research 
effort best contributes to the current knowledge base when it reveals an abundance of new or 
supporting data, uses reliable sources, and maintains accuracy; this requires that the research and 
analysis not only seek valid and reliable topics and resources, but are free from accidental error 
in mathematical calculations or qualitative relationships. The fundamental theoretical 
applications of validity and reliability in a research effort such as this, according to Merriam 
(1988) require checks and balances, supervision, and consideration of potential researcher bias.  
The researcher asserts that the information provided in this study is true to the best of their 
knowledge, and seeks to abide by the principles of validity and reliability; furthermore, the 
researcher asserts mindfulness of potential bias, while mathematical calculations and qualitative 
relationships have been closely considered for existing error. With this, the data analysis and 
discussion will encompass supervision, checks and balances, and adequate consideration of bias. 
3.6 Research Ethics 
Similar to the consideration of validity and bias, additional ethics apply to the development of 
this research and analysis. The researcher is well aware of the academic policies regarding 
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research and analysis, as well as the conventional literature calling for ethical issues to be 
considered when conducting any formal research, such as those commonly referred to as outlined 
by Collis and Hussey (2003). In order to satisfy the demands of this effort, while abiding by the 
regulation obligated unto the researcher in this process, the researcher confirms that: 
i) all participants will have taken part voluntarily, and not as the result of neither threat nor bribe 
ii) the researcher takes care not to disrupt essential business functions while soliciting or 
conducting the research 
iii) the researcher did not support any general opinion while approaching the study with full 
objectivity 
iv) no facts provided by participants have been eliminated for the sake of maintaining theme or 
hypotheses  
v) sources quoted, paraphrased, or otherwise used to aid the researcher beyond common 
knowledge will be appropriated cited and referenced as demanded by law and academics 
vi) confidentiality will be respected under all circumstances 
3.7 Limitations of Study 
The primary limitations of this study will be the accessibility, funds, and time associated with 
such a project. Ideally, all financial institutions could be included while all employees with 
sufficient experience could contribute information. Naturally, this is not possible, and the 
researcher had attempted to optimise available resources in a practical manner. Meanwhile, the 
study is further bound by the ability of the questionnaire to extract data, and the ability for the 
employee to respond with complete accuracy, while both areas are assumed to contribute to the 
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slight degradation of the research results and analysis. Moreover, while the researcher has taken 
effort to ensure no bias exists while remaining objective, additional biases and limitations may 
nonetheless exist unbeknownst to the development of this study. However, as described in 
section 3.7-3.8, the researcher maintains that validity and reliability have been sought throughout 
all points of this study. 
3.8 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the details of the research and analysis methodology. The primary and 
secondary sources have been described in terms of their many components. The two primary 
approaches to assessing the entirety of these areas will include both primary and secondary 
research, and as the primary research will be comprised of both questionnaires and interviews, 
the secondary research will include information regarding IS and best practices from other areas 
while also being tailored to the results of the primary research. With this, the secondary research 
will be somewhat reliant on the results of the data analysis, as the researcher will seek to best 
support and discuss the findings alongside recent statistics and literature by tailoring such 
research to the implications and nature of the findings from the primary research. The first action 
to be undertaken in any research effort is the pilot study. Next, interviews and a (potentially 
modified) questionnaire will be administered to employees and managers playing some role in IS 
within Saudi financial institutions. Both primary and secondary data sources and research will 
play substantial roles in formulating conclusions, recommendations, and topics for continued 
research.  
This chapter has also described the rationale behind the specific strategic organisation employed. 
The areas of methodology considered (in terms of the pilot study, primary data sources, and 
secondary data sources) include sampling techniques, the sample size of the pilot study and of 
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the primary data, the design and implementation of questionnaires (including organisational 
theory and distribution techniques), the design and implementation of interviews, and the 
resources to be used and considered for the supplementary secondary data sources. The 
significance of this study is evident in the aims and objectives as well as research inquiries and 
direction. Moreover, by identifying the specific threats to data security in Saudi financial 
institutions, as well as considering how existing threats are unique to the banking industry, it 
contributes to the existing knowledge base to close any remaining gaps in literature. The study 
further aims to identify areas where continued research would be most beneficial, while this is 
also significant. Lastly, the research inquiries reveal additional significance in the study.  
Chapter 4: Description of Context/Case  
4.1 Saudi Arabian Context  
4.1.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines and analyses the context of information systems security as it exists in 
relation to the case. As the location of the research is Saudi Arabia, the context of the case is 
concerned with information system security concepts which are relevant to the nation in present 
times. 
4.1.2 Key Saudi Arabian Conditions 
Ѕаudi Аrаbiа iѕ а develорing соuntry, and while it is not a global leader in overall development, 
it has strong economic components, considerable resources and exports, and potential for 
improving information security. According to recent analyses of the strong components of the 
Saudi economy, the country is the largest in the Middle East, with 25% of the GDP in the Arab 
world, while prior ICT plans had attempted to improve eduation, finances, and the influx of legal 
and technical skills needed to develop more opportunity in the private sector (Аlthаneer аnd 
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Nelѕоn, 2009). Clearly, the nation has the potential for development and improvement, but many 
obstacles have impeded progress. The government has realised the demand for improved 
information security, both for organisations and the overall economy, but sufficient action 
remains to be taken.  
 
Nаtiоnаl сulturаl fасtоrѕ in Ѕаudi Аrаbiа have been found to be obstacles to improving 
information security in themselves. According to research, Saudi Arabian conditions are known 
tо hаve а tendenсy tо be barriers to adopting cultural practices in organisations, such as new 
policies, modes of operation, attitudes, and spreading awareness (Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn, 2009). 
4.1.3 Present Demand for Improved Strategies in Saudi  Information Systems Security 
The demand for improved IT and IS in Saudi Arabia has existed alongside its use of technology, 
and, despite making considerable efforts (any many being partially successful) to meet the 
demands, the demand and clear rationale for the demand remains. Many research analyses, 
governmental analyses, and independent organisations have confirmed this (Saudi Gazette, 2007; 
Althaneer and Nelson, 2009). Considering one of the most large-scale surveys documenting the 
demand in the past five years, the Saudi Gazette (2007) reported on a global survey conducting a 
comparative analysis of 1,200 organisations across 48 countries, with a statistically substantial 
portion of Saudi Arabian organisations. Based on the findings of the study and the report of the 
Saudi Gazette, Saudi companies must keep improving their security to address the rising 
challenges related to information risks; meanwhile, participants in the study were found to be 
non-compliant with best practices, as less than half stated that they use formal information 
security approaches or a formal technique in general risk management.  
Strategies to improve information systems (IS) security may involve many individual or 
combined factors ranging from improved software and applications, improved hardware, 
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improved usage of existing technology, awareness of threats and strategic design, or even 
improved organisational cultures and training which facilitate enhanced security. According to 
the Zurich insurance company (2008), information security plays a major role in enterprise since 
it relies on information flow, and meanwhile ―confidence in the integrity and accuracy of the 
information is just as important as preventing unauthorised access and uninterrupted access to 
data. Many information security breaches and losses come from internal employees, industrial 
espionage by competitors, hackers, organised crime, and even foreign governments. Information 
security does not just mean controlling computer access, but also physical access to secured 
areas such as data centres‖ (p. 1). This is especially applicable to Saudi Arabia, as the nation 
must improve IS to safeguard its businesses and entire economy; according to Althaneer and 
Nelson (2009), infоrmаtiоn ѕeсurity аnd IЅ mаnаgement аre eѕѕentiаl раrtѕ оf the information 
communications technology infrаѕtruсture required tо ѕuрроrt the develорment оf the Ѕаudi 
Аrаbiа eсоnоmy. The current conditions in Saudi Arabia thus demand improved technology as 
well as protocol, and in addition to a demand from financial institutions and businesses, the 
Saudi economy itself demands improvements (Abu-Musa, 2003). 
In addition to this basic demand, the event that no action is taken could result in detrimental 
effects leading national organisations to lower levels (Saudi Gazette, 2007; Althaneer and 
Nelson, 2009; Abu-Musa, 2010; Muhaya, 2010). With this, a lасk оf а competent and thorough 
аррrоасh tо research and improvements соuld саuѕe ѕignifiсаnt dаmаge tо Ѕаudi оrgаnisаtiоnѕ 
аnd the nаtiоnаl eсоnоmy; realising this, the Ѕаudi gоvernment hаѕ enсоurаged the eѕtаbliѕhment 
оf ѕeсure envirоnmentѕ in bоth рubliс аnd рrivаte sectors. Muhuya (2010) reports that the 
security in ‗cyberspace‘ is a natinal and international issue concerned with different types of 
business; moreover, it is associated with economics and politics, meaning policy development 
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has been of rising interest‖ (p. 1). Governmental concern has been growing in the past five years, 
including initiatives as early as 2005, with Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud‘s presentation 
of a plan to integrate technological development and processes, and collaborating with the 
United States to improve procedures (Muhaya, 2010). Despite this concern and the efforts made, 
the demand remains in financial institutions, organisations within the private and public sector 
alike, and the government (to improve the economy) (Althaneer and Nelson, 2009; Muhaya, 
2010).  
4.1.4 Developments Contributing to or Affecting Present Context in Saudi Arabia 
The Data Protection Act of 1998 from the UK was one of the most major and influential 
catalysts of change for both IS and security in the information technology age, including Saudi 
Arabia (The National Archives, 2010). The Data Protection Act of 1998 is therefore an example 
of how changes may impact this area in response to legislation in the future. The Data Protection 
Act includes eight principles for information handling that has become the foundation for 
modern best practices in IS and IS security. These principles are concerned with fair and lawful 
processing, processing for limited purposes, adequate (and relevant) without being excessive, 
accuracy, not keeping for longer than necessary, processing in line with rights, international 
transfers, and other areas (The National Archives, 2010). More specifically, these principles state 
that personal data should be fairly and lawfully processed, shall not be processed in any manner 
incompatible with lawful purposes, shall be adequate and relevant, shall be accurate and up to 
date, shall not be kept longer than demanded by all defined purposes, shall be processed in 
accordance with the rights of data subjects, that data shall be subject to appropriate technical and 
organisational measures and that personal data shall not be transferred outside the nation unless 
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that country assures appropriate protection (in according with rights and freedom of information 
topics relevant to the data) (The National Archives, 2010).  
The CTIC (2005) states that the first portion of the new millenium, particularly the first four 
years, involved much growth for major elements of information communications technology in 
Saudi Arabia. These elements of growth are reported to include ―mobile subscribers with 
cumulative annual growth rate (CAGR) of 58.6% (more than twice the world CAGR of 23.4%), 
with subscribers approaching 12 million as of October 2005 (over 50% penetration). Internet 
users grew by over 430% in four years, amounting to CAGR of 44.4%, (vs. world growth rate of 
27.4%); internet users are exceeding 2.5 million. Personal computers (PC) penetration has also 
grown 40% annually (vs. world PC growth rate of 9%) to around 16% penetration. Fixed 
mainland telephones are approaching 4 million lines (a tele-density of 17%). Internet 
international bandwidth capacity has increased by nearly 7 fold in 4 years to over 1800 Mbit per 
second‖ (CTIC, 2005, p. 1). Althought these changes were great for the nation, they were not 
always accompanied by the proper improvements of security, and the overall infrastructure and 
its security were still deemed to be insufficient.  
 
Fortunately, Saudi Arabia is at least used to ongoing changes in these areas, and is thus less 
likely to be resistant to continuing change towards adequate IT and IS; by 2004, Saudi Arabia 
had experienced substantial reforms in its Telecom sector, in IT, and in legislation. The 
following years also gave rise to many changes which have created the current IS context. 
Further contributing to the vulnerability amid these changes in the early millenium are the major 
rises in e-commerce and online banking (CIST, 2005). The rise in such technology in the 
absence of proportional rises in IS (compounded by the fact that the IS prior to these changes 
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was already inadequate) created great vulnerabilities in many areas, and especially within 
financial instituions offering electronic services. 
 
In 2005, a Nаtiоnаl Соmmuniсаtiоnѕ аnd IT Рlаn (NСITР) wаѕ develорed. This included a five-
yeаr рlаn fоr Соmmuniсаtiоnѕ аnd IT in the соuntry, аnd a lоng-term рerѕрeсtive fоr 
Соmmuniсаtiоnѕ аnd IT in the соuntry (Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn, 2009). More recently, the Saudi 
government has eѕtаbliѕhed IСT infrаѕtruсtureѕ tо inсreаѕe the рrоduсtivity аnd рerfоrmаnсe оf 
оrgаnisаtiоnѕ аnd individuаlѕ in Ѕаudi Аrаbiа. Although this was intended to facilitate 
improvements, aѕ а reѕult, аdорting some рrасtiсeѕ within Ѕаudi оrgаnisаtiоnѕ iѕ а mаjоr 
сhаllenge tо be deаlt with; now it can be more difficult for financial instituions tо рrоteсt their 
eсоnоmiс аѕѕetѕ frоm аttасkѕ аnd intruderѕ amid these increased productivity requirements 
(Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn, 2009). Additional improvements in specific security protocols, to at least 
match the established policies, are thus now also in demand. 
 
In 2007, the United Nations described a complex plan which Saudi Arabia had considered for 
redesigning its ICT sector with the intentions of improving the economy through the resultant 
increased competition, increased local and foreign investment, and the additional protection of 
consumer and stakeholder rights (United Nations, 2007). In 2003, Saudi Arabia‘s 
governmentally operated telecommunications organisation was partly privatised, affecting the 
nature of the largest communication entity, and compounded the results of the Communications 
and Information Technology Commission‘s (CITC) establishment in 2001. While these areas 
were acquiring power to develop protocol for any aspect of information technology and 
information security in major Saudi Arabian communications, while further achieving a higher 
level of financial and administrative independence. According to the United Nations (2007), the 
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government has attempted to liberalise the market to create a positive framework to invest in the 
ICT, and by 2004, there was competition in the mobile and telecom areas; competition also led to 
fixed serves and market liberalisation was created to issue licenses in 2007 (p. 5). As mentioned, 
such improvements have done little to change the overall situation in Saudi Arabia. 
Also, as mentioned, e-commerce has grown greatly in the past decade, and this has increased 
internet usage and a general demand for other convenient online services and internet 
technology. Saudi Arabians have been able to use the internet since 1998 (when domestic servers 
were implemented), and the number of users rose from 350,000 in 2001 to 2.2 million (roughly 
10 percent of the population) in 2008; this rate continues to grow along with the falling prices of 
technology and the growing population, and this alone creates a greater security risk overall 
(Alfuraih, 2008). Meanwhile, the overall population is limited by the price of service, the limited 
ISPs available to non-university organisations. 
In 2010, the conditions for IT infrastructure and IS had not improved; while new developments 
and initiatives for improvements continue to be considerable in number and continually mindful 
of the problem, the overall solution eludes the country while all existing aspects are incomplete 
(Abu-Musa, 2010; Muhaya, 2010).  
4.1.5 Incomplete Elements of Implementation in Saudi Arabia 
Incomplete security solutions are as much of a problem as ineffective security solutions in Saudi 
Arabia, while security threats and attacks commonly find a loophole in systems comparably as 
often as they find a way though an existing security measure (Bellamy, Perri, and Raab, 2005; 
Stamp, 2006). Saudi Arabia has many examples of incomplete solutions, as the combination of 
existing technology and policies have addressed the issues but failed to offer a complete solution. 
The optimisation of IS security in Saudi Arabia should therefore involve balancing both 
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protection as risk as to counter both the defence against attacks as well as vulnerability to general 
threats. In the case of the firewall defence instrument, a common element offered amid the 
present incomplete solutions, defence is generally the use of software in terms of hardware 
characteristics, and thus has a hard-coded functionality set (Wells, 2007). However, the 
aforementioned improvement of the overall ICT infrastructure is required for adequate IS.  
In a recently analysis of the effectiveness of IS, Abu-Musa (2010) found a general lack of 
completeness and effectiveness, reporting that most Saudi companies do not have any plans for 
disaster recovery to management information security complications or even emergencies. 
Moreover, the information security roles and responsibilities are not explicitly defined or 
communicated with the employees or even amongst the managers. Their analysis determined that 
the relationship between IS and the companies‘ business strategies are ineffective, 
recommending improvements in all areas. Clearly, there is an unfortunate lack of effective 
implementation and success in current procedures despite all described actions from the 
government, in response to awareness, or through other changes. Abu-Musa (2010) also found 
that all risk management processes for IS are neither integrated or maintained at a level capable 
of meeting demands, that IS is rarely an aspect routinely considered in operation by key 
authorities of organisations, and that there are no sufficient management systems for IS in the 
majority of organisations across the nation. Abu-Musa (2010) concluded that, despite all efforts 
in the past years, there was a clear and present need to improve IS and IS management for the 
good of the entire nation. Incomplete solutions are common, and a conceptual approach to 
developing strategy in Saudi Arabia may give rise to a methodological and systematic 
optimisation of instrumentation, networks, infrastructure, processes, and overall operation. 
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Generally, incomplete solutions are a common problem, and nations behind the developed 
nations are vulnerable to IS threats much greater than developed nations which have discovered 
areas of incompleteness and risk. While a conceptual approach to developing strategy can give 
rise to a methodological albeit precise improvement of IS security instrumentation, networks, 
infrastructure, processes, and overall organisational operation.  
4.1.6 Other Aspects of Existing Threats 
The nature and potential of threats has proven to be a continual concern in Saudi Arabia over the 
past decade. Recent research and formal analyses of examples have examined the nature of 
existing threats to reach conclusions, and have revealed the nature of development in the country 
as it examined the attempts to improve overall results. In Saudi Arabia, the fundamental threats 
of hacking, information theft, and sabotage remain potent in the present as they were in the past 
decades, making information system security comparably important on a conceptual level despite 
the advances in technology (Mahaya, 2010). Meanwhile, numerous methods of attack continued 
to challenge existing Saudi Arabian information security specialists, and the threat evolves 
alongside the changing uses of developing technology.  
Analysing Saudi Arabian IS security policies may involve individuals or groups that are allowed 
to access variety categories of information, and this often involves security levels or specific 
classifications for information. Threats and attacks exist across the spectrum of topics described 
above in addition to other potential areas, and incomplete security solutions are as much of a 
problem as ineffective security solutions. Security threats and attacks commonly find a loophole 
in systems comparably as often as they find a way though an existing security measure in any 
nation, and Saudi Arabia‘s conditions amplify the severity of this trend (United Nations, 2007). 
Threats and attacks can potentially forcibly penetrate even the more advanced systems in 
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developed nations because loopholes have been discovered in firewalls, DMZ, VPNs, and SSL in 
recent years; any nation behind on implementing technology are all the more vulnerable to the 
risks discovered in the most advanced technology, and clearly the initiative in place in Saudi 
Arabia are unable to adequately address these concerns (Abu-Musa, 2010). 
4.1.7 ISO 27000 Compliance 
The ISO 27000 series (also known as IS027k) of standards is a recent set of information system 
security standards which have been observed around the world, however most commonly within 
more developed nations such as the U.K. and U.S. According to the IsecT Ltd (2011) webpage, 
―the ―ISO27k‖ (ISO/IEC 27000-series) standards provide good practice guidance on designing, 
implementing and auditing Information Security Management Systems to protect the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of  the information on which we all depend. Ten 
ISO27k standards are published so far.‖ Although Saudi Arabia has shown interest in becoming 
ISO27k compliant, the available information shows that they are among nations with markedly 
lesser progress and concern. While the information regarding compliance is scarce, the majority 
of available statistics reveal standards purchasing trends, and often times these are depicted only 
by nation (and not in breakdown of organisation as sales and data processing organisations have 
refused to provide such breakdowns); journals and published research have avoided this topic, 
and sales records in the past five years generally show that less than 30 Saudi organisations have 
purchased the standards, compared to the 300-500 organisations (each) in the U.S. and U.K. 
(NSI Ltd, 2006; ISO Directory, 2007; Issociate, 2007; Compliances Forum, 2008). The lack of 
data on even this level in recent years shows both a gap in focus and concern from both the 
nation‘s organisations and researchers alike.  
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Although no studies have targeted the precise nature of the lack of participation regarding the 
ISO 27000 adoption, the low purchase rates are clear examples of the trends observed and 
explained by the aforementioned literature. Abu-Musa (2010) recently observed a lack of efforts 
in completing security plans, developing security policy statements, or even developing and 
integrating concrete strategies. He also found that these areas and a lack of disaster recovery 
plans were commonplace in the majority of Saudi organisations. Muhaya (2010) observed a 
similar incompleteness and lack of motivation for formalities and improvements, and Althaneer 
and Nelson (2009) observed apathy or resistance towards adopting new policies, modes of 
operation, or even spreading awareness. As ISO 27000 are fairly new standards, and Saudi 
organisations seem to have a trend of avoiding exerting time and resources unless it is required, 
the (comparatively) low participation in ISO 27000 is another example of this trend. 
4.1.8 Final Remarks Regarding Saudi Context 
As the above has shown, Saudi Arabia, like many other fast-developing countries, faces IS 
problems that are specific and, in some respects, of greater magnitude than developed nations of 
the world. While certain organisations may choose to ignore the risk and operate with little 
concern for improvement, Saudi financial institutions are in an extraordinarily vulnerable 
position. Despite efforts to improve IS and IT infrastructure in general, the Saudi government has 
been unable to strategise and implement a sufficiently complete solution. Generally, IS is 
presently at the crossroads of four diverging poles of interest, and management teams must make 
informed decisions as Saudi IT staff serve the system, Saudi auditors attempt to control the 
system, and Saudi users use the system according to legislation developed and implemented by 
the Saudi government. Meanwhile, Saudi security professionals must be mindful of the 
incompleteness of even modern tools, while research and implementation efforts should be 
 114 
conducted periodically as well as when needed to ensure that vulnerabilities due to 
incompleteness do not give rise to breaches. Numerous methods for improving IS have been 
proposed from and to information security specialists in recent years, and while the threat 
evolves alongside the changing uses of developing technology, continuous analysis and strategic 
implementation is in high demand across the entire Saudi economy. 
 
4.2 Saudi Banking Industry and Significance of Sampled Organisations 
Justifying the statement that 10 banks is a statistically significant portion of the banking sector, 
this section briefly introduces the banks. The 10 institutions used were the National Commercial 
Bank (the bank with the most Arab assets, owning 90.4% of the NCB‘s Capital, the premier 
Investment bank in the nation, also having SAR 345.3 billion (US$ 92.08 billion) in assets), the 
Arab National Bank (with 178 national branches, 183 total and ~3500 employees), the Al-Rajhi 
Banking & Investment Corp. (the largest Islamic bank in the nation, with 7,600 employees), the 
Riyadh Bank (a larger and therefore ‗significant‘ bank with SR 3.030 million annually and total 
assets of SR 176 billion), the Saudi American Bank (now referred to as the Samba Financial 
Group, with 66 local branches and a few dozen international facilities), the Saudi British Bank (a 
larger joint stock company with over 5,000 employees), the Albilad Bank (a joint stock company 
with ~3200 employees and capital of 3,000,000,000 Saudi Riyals), the Saudi French Bank (the 
first private bank opened in nearly 40 years in 2004), the Saudi Hollandi Bank (the oldest 
operating Saudi bank, opened in 1926, currently with approximately 1400 employees, and the 
first to introduce many aspects of banking technology), and the Saudi Investment Bank ( having 
full range services including Islamic banking, medium market cap size) (Gulfbase.com, 2012). 
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4.3 Conclusion 
As mentioned, Ѕаudi Аrаbiа iѕ а develорing соuntry, and while it is not a global leader in overall 
development, it has strong economic components, considerable resources and exports, and 
potential for improving information security. The local context is one in need of improvement, 
even in the larger banks; also as mentioned, Abu-Musa (2010) recently observed a lack of efforts 
in completing security plans, developing security policy statements, or even developing and 
integrating concrete strategies. He also found that these areas and a lack of disaster recovery 
plans were commonplace in the majority of Saudi organisations. Muhaya (2010) had observed a 
similar incompleteness and lack of motivation for formalities and improvements, while 
Althaneer and Nelson (2009) also observed apathy or resistance towards adopting new policies, 
modes of operation, or even spreading awareness. Numerous methods of attack have continued 
to challenge information security specialists in recent years, while the threat evolves alongside 
the changing uses of developing technology. Clearly, the potentials of threats and attacks have 
been found to be a continual concern in recent examples; they have the potential to match or 
exceed the potential safety provided by information systems security. This has led to experts and 
analysts questioning current security levels, and forms the basis of recent and on-going research. 
Analysing IS security policies may involve individuals or groups are allowed to access variety 
categories of information, and this often involves security levels or specific classifications for 
information. Threats and attacks exist across the spectrum of topics described above in addition 
to other potential areas, and incomplete security solutions are as much of a problem as 
ineffective security solutions.  
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Chapter 5: Results and Analysis 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the primary research, revealing the responses of the survey 
questionnaire and interviews. While a minimum of 50 survey respondents across 10 
organisations were considered in the development of the research methods, a total of 100 
respondents were willing and able to participate in the study within its time constraints; the 
initial 50 were able to participate quickly within the time constraints (using email), and once 
another 50 were able to participate, the researcher felt that this was a sufficiently statistically 
significant number (considering literature) and ideal ‗stopping point‘ for surveying. Meanwhile, 
the minimum of 10 interview respondents mentioned in the research methods would be exceeded 
by six within the available time.   
 
5.2 Pilot Study and Distribution 
As mentioned in previous chapters, a small pilot study was planned prior to full scale 
distribution. This study used the entirety of the questionnaire, distributed to only a small 
percentage of the target audience. A total of five respondents, representing 10 per cent of the 
minimum sample size, completed the survey questionnaire. After reviewing the results, their 
completion of the questionnaire was deemed suitable as the questionnaire items were deemed 
viable for full scale distribution. The results of the pilot study were therefore included as a 
portion of the net results, and became part of the totals used for the results and analysis below. 
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5.2.1 Demographic and Misc. Information 
 
The demographic information section was a brief segment of the questionnaire which was placed 
between the completion instructions and the first questionnaire item. This section requested that 
respondents list their age, gender, organisation, position, and time employed with the 
organisation. The average age of respondents was 34 years (SD=7.2), with the lowest age at 18 
while the highest age was 62. The majority of the respondents were male, as the total was 
comprised of 65.4 per cent men and 34.6 per cent women; although this is not a completely 
representative sample of gender or age in the financial sector, it is nonetheless indicative of the 
observable trend of men dominating the workforce in Islamic nations. The percentages of 
employees serving in the aforementioned list of organisations was also calculated from provided 
totals, with approximately 18 per cent from Al-Jazira Bank, 14 per cent from Arab National 
Bank, 11 per cent from Al-Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp., 14 per cent from Riyadh Bank, 6 
per cent from Saudi American Bank, 11 per cent from Saudi British Bank, 6 per cent from 
Albilad Bank, 6 per cent from Saudi French Bank, 8 per cent from Saudi Hollandi Bank, and 6 
per cent from Saudi Investment Bank.  
 
The leading position among the respondents was a variation of a computer technician (such as 
―technical supervisor,‖ ―systems operator,‖ and similar titles), while approximately 59 per cent 
of respondents reported being employed in this position. All employees confirmed having a 
substantial role in information security prior to participation. Following this, a lower-level 
management position was most common, with 24 per cent of employees having some sort of 
team leader position (while titles included ―department supervisor,‖ ―assistant manager,‖ 
―technical supervisor,‖ and others). The remaining portion of employees (17 per cent) were 
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members of middle or upper management.  The average time spent at the organisation listed was 
7.6 years (SD=4.3), with the minimum time being 6 months, and the greatest amount of time 
being 22 years. Figures 5.1-5.3 below (graphically) display the age, gender, and position 
statistics. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Average age and time at organisation 
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Figure 5.2: Gender Percentage 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Positions 
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This portion of the questionnaire shows that the majority of employees work directly with IS 
operation, while a substantial portion of the employees monitor and manage these operations. 
The employees also have, on average, an amount of experience with the company which is more 
than substantial for the purposes of this study.  
 
The pilot study, seeming to the benefit of the study, did not inform of anything except the 
acceptability of the instrumentation and introduce the feedback. Nothing else substantial was 
learned from the few completed instruments, but the researcher expected this. The following 
section presents the hypotheses, followed by questionnaire results provided by this blend of 
employees.  
 
5.3 Hypotheses  
 
As stated in the research methods, 30 questionnaire items were designed to address 10 subareas 
within the overall inquiry. Restating these subareas prior to discussing the hypotheses, the 
inquiries are: i) what are the primary threats affecting information security in financial 
institutions within Saudi Arabia? ii) how are these threats unique to this sector? iii) what policies 
and procedures are currently in place? iv) how well do employees follow information security 
policies and procedures? v) what factors affect the willingness of employees to comply with 
policies and procedures? vi) how do personal ethics affect compliance with policies and 
procedures? vii) how do various institutional factors impact employees‘ willingness to comply 
with policies and procedures? viii) are there aspects of the current information security policies 
of procedures that make it difficult for employees to comply? ix) how do overall organisational 
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characteristics affect the successful execution of information security success? and x) what 
improvements can be made to increase effectiveness of information security operations? 
 
5.4 Questionnaire Results  
 
This section presents the results of the questionnaire, considering the 100 total respondents. 
Totals, averages, and percentage comparisons are provided where relevant. Standard deviations 
are provided in parenthesis, denoted by ‗SD‘ and a subsequent value. T-tests, providing values 
for t, are also provided for responses involving ratings (i.e. responses considerate of a scale of 
10), and are denoted alongside standard deviations as ‗t.‘ T-tests are calculated using the one-
sample method for middle values (i.e. 5 on a scale of 10 to represent no bias in response). P-
values were calculated using the degrees of freedom (sample size-1=99) and t-values, while 
values less than .05 were assumed significant; the results reveal most areas have comparable 
significance.  
 
The 10 institutions used for these questionnaires (as well as the interviews) were the National 
Commercial Bank, the Arab National Bank, the Al-Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp., the 
Riyadh Bank, the Saudi American Bank, the Saudi British Bank, the Albilad Bank, the Saudi 
French Bank, the Saudi Hollandi Bank, and the Saudi Investment Bank. The discussion in this 
section is divided across multiple subsections, including the presentation of demographic 
information (preceding the results), multiple subsections covering portions of the questionnaire, 
and an additional section (completed by the researcher) regarding additional information 
regarding the nature of the organisation. 
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5.4.1 Questions 1-6: Threats and IS Development 
 
The first questionnaire item requested that employees rate the level of current threats perceived 
to information systems, using a scale of 1-10 (with 10 representing the highest level of threat). 
The average response to this item was a rating of 6.9 (SD=1.2, t=15.83, p=0), denoting a clearly 
substantial threat. This also shows that while a substantial portion of the respondents viewed the 
threat levels as moderate, a comparable level of employees felt that the threat level was quite 
high (or even near the maximum level). In any case, this clearly suggests that information system 
security is an issue across the organisations, and across Saudi Arabian financial institutions, and 
is therefore an issue worth pursuing. This is further supported by the second item, asking 
respondents whether this level was typical of information security threats at the organisations; 83 
per cent of the respondents stated that the level was typical. Following this, the third item asked 
respondents to rate the average level of threat severity, and the average level received here was 
6.7 (SD=1.8, t=9.4, p=0). This shows that the respondents which stated that the levels of threat 
were unusual experienced a combination of threat levels above and below average. Overall, the 
questionnaire results highlight that employees feel the security levels have been substantially 
compromised, under a range of conditions. 
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Figure 5.4: Threat level 
 
The fourth, fifth, and sixth questionnaire items addressed information security as addressed by 
management, the prevalence of system upgrades, and the prevalence of policy and procedure 
updates (respectively). Responding to the inquiry, ―how often is information system security 
addressed by management in the facility,‖ while choosing between the selectable responses 
―never,‖ ―seldom,‖ ―when needed,‖ ―fairly often (routinely),‖ or ―often (routinely),‖ the majority 
of respondents stated ―when needed.‖ More specifically, 1 per cent of respondents chose 
―never,‖ 28 per cent chose ―seldom,‖ 44 per cent chose ―when needed,‖ 22 per cent chose ―fairly 
often (routinely),‖ and the remaining 5 per cent chose ―often (routinely). Figure 5.5 below 
displays the frequency IS was reported to be addressed by management. 
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Figure 5.5: Frequency of IS addressed by management 
 
Responding the question ―are routine upgrades made to hardware and software,‖ only 27 per 
cent of respondents answered ―yes.‖ While the possible time intervals defining ‗routine‘ were not 
mentioned in this inquiry, over 70 per cent (73 per cent) of respondents claimed that there was no 
program in place for routine maintenance and upgrades to hardware and software. The sixth 
question then asked respondents to state whether policies and procedures were routinely updated, 
and 64 per cent of respondents stated that their company did not have a system for routine 
upgrades in this area either. While this figure is less than the figure for hardware and software 
routine upgrades, the percentage is relatively large, implying that there is a lack of organisation 
for addressing development.   
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5.4.2 Questions 7-13: Policies and Procedures 
 
The seventh through twelfth questionnaire items each asked respondents to address some aspect 
of policies and procedures. The seventh item asked, ―how effective do you rate the policies and 
procedures, on a scale of 1-10?‖ To this question, respondents rated the elements somewhat 
higher than is implied by the other responses, with an average rating of 6.3 (SD=2.2, t=5.91, 
p=0).  
Next, for the eighth item, respondents were to state whether the prevalence of information 
system security examination and testing is best defined by ‗routinely,‘ ‗occasionally,‘ or ‗never.‘ 
The majority of respondents selected ‗occasionally‘ (68 per cent), with the substantially lesser 
remainder selecting routinely (19 per cent) and never (13 per cent) (see Figure 5.7). This 
question, similar to the item in the previous section which did not have a clear definition, could 
have been more valuable if the nature of occasionally was provided from respondents having 
selected it. Meanwhile, it is clear that the majority of respondents do not see routine maintenance 
of physical or organisational elements. The occasional nature of examination and testing may 
also play a role in the lack of action, or action considered ‗as needed‘ being rare, as a lack of 
examination and testing may leave company authorities unaware while the systems remain 
vulnerable.  
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Figure 5.6: Prevalence of IS Review and Examination 
 
The ninth item requested that respondents provide details regarding the nature of training. 
Specifically, the respondents were asked to select from the possible answers ―routinely,‖ 
―occasionally,‖ or ―never‖ in regards to the prevalence of employee training or work-related 
education. The overwhelming majority (81 per cent) selected ―occasionally,‖ while only a 
fraction (15 per cent) selected ―routinely,‖ with the remaining 4 per cent selecting ―never.‖ The 
impact of this finding demands further research and while it implies that employees are not 
properly trained while these statistics contribute to vulnerability, details regarding the demand 
for training are unknown. The following and tenth item asked respondents to rate their managers‘ 
compliance with information security policies and procedures. In response, the bulk of 
employees (44 per cent) rated their managers as ―average‖ in this area, the next largest amount 
(24 per cent) rated the compliance as ―poor,‖ with a comparable amount (23 per cent) rating it as 
―good‖ alongside the meagre 9 per cent rating managerial compliance as ―excellent.‖ Aside from 
a larger portion of employees rating managerial compliance as ‗poor‘ than ‗good,‘ the amount of 
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employees rating it as ‗average‘ is nearly five times the amount rating ‗excellent.‘ This implies 
there is a need for improvement in managerial compliance of information security policies. 
Considering this to be a scale of 1-4, the mean response was at 2.17 (SD=.9, t=1.88, p=.316), and 
thus slightly above the ‗average‘ rating. The eleventh item asked respondents to rate employee 
compliance in this area using the same range of adjectives, and the results show a comparable 
but lesser level of employee compliance; fortunately, however, these results show that managers 
are examples for employees in spite of less than ideal percentages. The ‗excellent‘ choice was 
selected by 7 per cent of respondents, the ‗good‘ choice selected by 18 per cent, ‗average‘ 
selected by 56 per cent, while the remaining 19 per cent selected the ‗poor‘ option. Considering 
this question to also be based on a scale of 1-4, the mean response was 2.13, (SD=.8, t=1.625, 
p=.054) comparable to the previous response and slightly higher than a 2.0 average (carrying out 
a two-sample t-test with the previous two questionnaire items, t=.03). See Figure 5.8 for detailed 
comparisons of employee and managerial compliance). 
 
Figure 5.7: Results to items 10 and 11- compliance ratings (managers vs. employees) 
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The twelfth item on the survey questionnaire was open-ended, and asked respondents ―what is 
the primary reason that managers may not follow policy?‖ Respondents provided a range of 
responses, while many of them were effectively different versions of the same responses. The 
majority of respondents (nearly 50 per cent of the total offered a response of this type) stated that 
the primary reason was a lack of organisation and seriousness in the organisation, entailing that 
managers effectively make their own rules. This also implies that it is acceptable to bend or 
break rules for reasons understood within the organisational culture, and that policies are not 
sufficiently updated to address issues as they arise, leading to an acceptance that policies are 
simply formalities and not governing elements within the organisation. This was not, however, 
confirmed by any follow-up questions within the survey questionnaire, while the previously 
mentioned implications have a stronger possibility of being the primary motivating factors, 
although the interviews were able to extract some supplemental information regarding this 
observation. Other prominent responses to the twelfth questionnaire item included a lack of 
sufficient knowledge, a lack of incentive, and attempts to increase efficiency. Similar to the 
previous two questionnaire items, the thirteenth item attempted to discern the nature of employee 
actions, allowing for a comparison between employees and managers in the same area. When 
asked about the primary reason employees are not compliant with policy, a greater amount 
(compared to responses considering managers) stated that ignorance of policy was the cause 
(these are also reflected in the interviews, see the following section and Appendix B for details). 
Clearly, this shows a demand for increased awareness or training. Other responses included 
attempts to be efficient, attempts to operate more effectively, and general carelessness; with this, 
meanwhile, there was a substantially lower percentage of employees stating that employees were 
careless compared to managers. This suggests the power of authority facilitates employee 
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compliance, while managers may feel their position of power makes them ‗above the law‘ and 
freer to ignore policies as they see fit.  
 
5.4.3 Questions 14-17: Security Threats 
 
The fourteenth questionnaire item asked respondents if they are aware of any threats which are 
unique to their institution (with the potential to select either ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘ as a response). Only 12 
per cent of the respondents selected ‗yes,‘ in agreement with the studies reviewed in the literature 
section implying that threats common in Saudi Arabia generally apply to organisations in a 
comparable manner (Abu-Musa, 2009; Muhaya, 2010). Figure 5.9 demonstrates the unbalanced 
proportion of responses to this question. 
 
Figure 5.8: Awareness of threats unique to organisation 
 
It was assumed that even employees aware of the details of security threats may not have the 
experience or perspective to compare threats with other organisations in such a manner that they 
could confidently state that they are unique, but this item was nonetheless included in the 
questionnaire as an attempt to gain potential insights into the matter. (It was also assumed that 
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the combination of the responses and the data extracted from the interviews had a higher 
potential to generate meaningful information.) The subsequent question, item fifteen, asked 
respondents to state the nature of this threat (this item was an open-ended question). Of the mere 
12 per cent of respondents for which this item was applicable, these respondents stated that the 
unique threats were due to their computer hardware, software, and network infrastructure. A 
larger number of individuals claimed they were aware of threats unique to their sector (via the 
sixteenth item), implying that the low number of responses claiming unique threats to the 
institution was a partially a result of perspective (and not due to such a low level of unique 
threats). The 31 per cent of respondents claiming they observed threats unique to their sector 
described the nature of threats through the following question (item seventeen); this revealed that 
the majority of these threats were also in the form of hardware, software, and network 
infrastructure vulnerabilities. Figure 5.10 shows the awareness of unique threats. 
 
Figure 5.9: Awareness of threats unique to sector 
 
Although the information from this group of questions implies that security threats are either 
more easily recognised between sectors, or that security vulnerabilities are more similar between 
organisations than sectors, there are too many possibilities for misinterpretation for these items to 
 131 
contribute to solid conclusions in the discussions included in the following chapter. Mention 
must be made that, despite the potential for unviable information to be generated from these 
questions having been considered following the pilot study, the researcher nonetheless allowed 
them to stay while assuming that the combination of these items with the semi-structured 
interviews would generate data worthy of consideration. 
 
5.4.4 Questions 18-23: Ethics, Focus, and Improvements 
 
The following six items of the survey questionnaire requested that respondents share their 
perspective and opinions regarding ethics, focus, and improvements within their organisation‘s 
information system security. Item eighteen asked respondents ―do you feel personal ethics play a 
role in managers‘ compliance,‖ while respondents had the opportunity to select either ―yes‖ or 
―no.‖ The overwhelming majority of respondents claimed that ethics do play a role in managerial 
compliance, with 72 per cent of the employees stating that ethics is a considerable cause of non-
compliance. Despite the strategic design and emphasis of the questionnaire, as well as its pilot 
study, this question may have benefitted from a restructuring while using the rating scale for 
possible responses; employees were unable to state the degree by which ethics impacted 
managers, while the previous tenth item allowed employees to rate levels of compliance on four 
different levels ranging from ―poor‖ to ―excellent.‖ As stated above, 68 per cent of employees 
claimed that managerial compliance was ―average‖ or ―poor,‖ with only 23 per cent rating their 
compliance as ―good‖ alongside the mere 9 per cent rating it as ―excellent.‖ Naturally, the extent 
by which these respondents felt that ethics impacted managerial compliance would have ranged a 
considerable amount if known. Meanwhile, only 34 per cent of respondents chose to list some 
reason explaining why they felt that ethics played a role in managerial compliance, with listed 
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reasons including managers‘ feelings that the ends justify the means, managers simply having a 
general disregard for policy, and managers‘ feelings that policies are only (partially successful) 
attempts at generating desired responses.  
 
The following item (number nineteen) also allowed ethics to be considered amid a comparison to 
the previous item regarding employee compliance. When asked whether personal ethics play a 
role in employee compliance, 80 per cent of respondents stated that personal ethics plays a role 
in employee compliance. Citing the previous responses to the eleventh item, 75 per cent of 
respondents stated that employee compliance was average or poor, with the remaining 25 per 
cent selected good (18 per cent) or excellent (7 per cent). The definition of ―average‖ had not 
been discussed, but even if ―average‖ could be equated to acceptable within the company, nearly 
one fifth of employees and nearly one quarter of managers were rated to be outside of this range 
of acceptability; meanwhile, assuming that only ―good‖ or ―excellent‖ levels of compliance are 
expected from either managers or employees, only one quarter of employees and approximately 
one third of managers were rated as being within this acceptable range. Reasons as to why ethics 
are assumed to play a role in employee compliance included low work ethic and motivation, 
carelessness and a lack of obedience, and the feeling that they better address needs through their 
own action.  
 
The twentieth item (see Figure 5.11) requested that respondents state whether or not information 
system security requires more attention within their institution (with potential answers simply 
being ―yes‖ or ―no.‖) Respondents clearly revealed that further attention is required, as the 
overwhelming majority and 83 per cent chose ‗yes‘ on their surveys.  
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Figure 5.10: Support for additional attention given to IS at the organisational level 
 
Only 22 per cent of respondents provided a follow-up response, listing a reason they feel more 
attention is needed; these responses were mostly variations of assertions that the potential for 
improvement had not been achieved while an improper amount of resources and dedication had 
been given to the area. The following item, question twenty-one, asked respondents if they felt 
that further attention should be given to information system security within their particular sector 
(as opposed to the institution). Here, a comparable (although lesser) amount of employees stated 
that further attention should be given to their specific sector, as 72 per cent of respondents 
selected ‗yes.‘ More respondents chose to list reasons for this response (compared to respondents 
choosing to list reasons security across the institution required more attention), as 36 per cent 
listed some reason; many of the reasons listed here were also related to unreached potential and 
inadequate resource allocation, while some respondents also stated that known new threats to 
their particular sector had yet to be addressed. 
 
Survey items twenty-two and twenty-three requested that respondents name improvements they 
feel should be made in the areas of managerial functions and compliance policy. The twenty-
second item asked respondents to ―name the improvements you feel should be made to 
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managerial functions regarding information security.‖ The majority of responses were very 
general, and the study may have benefitted from a short note requesting that respondents be more 
specific; most participants simply stated that managers should put forth more effort, be more 
considerate and innovative, and (somehow) improve the information systems. Other respondents 
stated that managers should be required to undergo additional training to be sure they are aware 
of new threats (and ways to address them) as they become realised. Still others recommended 
that managers spend more time requesting their employees to share information, although the 
nature of this information was not specified (nor the level of access managers may already have 
to such information). Following item twenty-two, item twenty-three requested that respondents 
name the improvements that they ―feel should be made to compliance policy regarding 
information security.‖ Here, the clear majority of respondents stated that compliance policies 
should undergo major updates while further being scheduled for routine updates in the future; it 
was further suggested that an underlying cause of low compliance is a low level of trust that 
compliance policies are as aware and considerate of details as employees. Meanwhile, others 
stated that compliance policies should be more ‗open‘ in certain areas, allowing employees to 
use judgement in areas which are difficult to encompass and develop protocol for within the 
policies.  
 
5.4.5 Questions 24-27: Training, Devotion of Efforts, and Adequacy of Technology 
 
Questionnaire item twenty-four asked respondents their feelings regarding training; specifically, 
they were asked if they ―feel employees should be required to undergo additional training 
regarding information system security,‖ with the ability to select either ‗yes‘ or ‗no.‘ The 
majority and 69 per cent of employees selected ‗yes,‘ effectively recommending such a change 
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to take place in their institution. This result is unsurprising given the participants‘ responses to 
previous questions (see Figure 5.12). 
 
Figure 5.11: Should IS employees undergo additional training? 
 
The following and twenty-fifth item asked respondents about their feelings regarding company 
representative devotion to information system security and threat awareness. In response, 82 per 
cent of respondents felt more devotion and effort should be placed in these areas, in agreement 
with the responses regarding managerial and employee attention to general security. Threat 
awareness was also a common theme mentioned in the responses regarding training and 
development, and thus appears to be an element needed in many areas for organisations to 
improve while reaching their potential.  
  
Survey items twenty-six and twenty-seven requested that respondents provide their opinions 
regarding the adequacy of the security technology installed within their employing institution. 
Firstly, via item twenty-six, respondents were asked if they feel that the technology installed in 
the institution should be defined as ‗adequate,‘ with the potential to simply confirm or refute by 
marking ‗yes‘ or ‗no.‘ Secondly, item twenty-seven then requested that respondents rate the level 
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of adequacy more specifically, using a number to represent adequacy across the previously used 
scale of 1-10. The slight majority of respondents expressed feelings that the technology in their 
institution was not adequate, as 61 per cent chose ‗no‘ as their response to item twenty-six. 
Figure 5.13 shows the unbalance of opinions regarding the perceived adequacy of technology. 
 
Figure 5.12: Is the IS technology adequate? 
 
Next, it was revealed that the average rating for the adequacy of technology was 5.2 (SD=1.7, 
t=1.18, p=.120), suggesting that the technology is only accomplishing the bare minimum 
requirements for information system security (for most institutions and sectors). Considering that 
the majority of respondents stated that the technology was inadequate, the majority of institutions 
and sectors have a need to improve the technology itself; with this, it may be impossible for 
some information security measures to sufficiently address security threats and issues, as 
technology is the foundation of these developments.  
 
Many institutions and sectors thereby require improvements on multiple levels: the technology 
itself, application, organisation, employee training and compliance, and actions to maintain 
sufficient awareness of growing or changing threats.   
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5.4.6 Questions 28-30: The Importance of Information Systems, Information System Security, 
and Information System Security Policy 
 
The final three items of the survey questionnaire had identical designs, as respondents were 
simply asked to rate the importance (in relation to their institution) of a following list of three 
topics; these topics were information systems (item twenty-eight), information system security 
(item twenty-nine), and information system security policy (item thirty). The same scale of 1-10 
was used for these final items. Addressing information systems, the respondents rated the 
importance of this area at 7.9 (on average; SD=1.6, t=18.13, p=0). This shows that the 
respondents feel that information systems are a central and vital element of the institutions, while 
showing that they are not considered a singularly all-important component. Meanwhile, 
information system security was given an average rating of 6.2 (SD=1.8, t=6.67, p=0). This 
number was expected to be lower than the statistic generated for information systems in general, 
despite the theoretical importance, but proved to be even lower than expected. This low rating is 
likely an underlying cause of the lack of adequacy, development, training, attention, and all other 
areas considered; naturally, if an area is not considered to be critical or even significantly 
important, it will likely be given a proportional prioritisation within an organisation. Because of 
this fact, increased prioritisation and the needed courses of actions suggested by the previous 
responses may not be possible without significantly altered perceptions in this area. Awareness 
regarding the importance of effective and improved security may thereby be a key issue, while 
the questionnaire could have benefitted from items elaborating on this topic.  
 
The average rating for information system security policy was 5.3 (SD=1.4, t=2.14, p=.017). 
Despite the high number of responses supporting the additional actions and reform measures 
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addressing policy and compliance in the previously discussed items, information system security 
policy was given an especially low importance rating when respondents considered the whole of 
their institution. Similar to the analysis of the previous item and response, this low level also 
implies that such opinions are underlying causes of a need to reform generated from low 
prioritisation, and thereby may require increased prioritisation amid the overall effort for 
improvement. Figure 5.15 shows the comparative perceived importance of these three areas. 
 
Figure 5.13: Significance ratings in IS (using scale of 10) 
 
5.4.7 Supplemental Data: Organisations, Employee Quantities, and Size of IT/IS Departments 
(completed by researcher) 
 
A brief section following the 30 items was completed by the researcher, in attempt to study and 
understand possible connections between responses and traits within the organisation. As the 
overall study was an analysis of occurrences across major institutions within the nation, the 
results were presented as totals (rather than by organisation), in accordance with best practices 
for random sampling with a specified category. Meanwhile, however, the researcher wished to 
record the organisation name, employee quantities, and department sizes to see if any further 
useful information could be generated while supplementing the main findings. (The turnover 
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rates of each organisation were to also be researched and displayed by the researcher, but this 
was later deemed insufficiently relevant for analysis and discussion.)  
 
As mentioned, the 10 institutions used for this study included the National Commercial Bank, the 
Arab National Bank, the Al-Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp., the Riyadh Bank, the Saudi 
American Bank, the Saudi British Bank, the Albilad Bank, the Saudi French Bank, the Saudi 
Hollandi Bank, and the Saudi Investment Bank. While the study aimed to collect a random 
sample across Saudi Arabia, it was not assumed that each institution was proportionally 
representative of some aspect of information security, and it was therefore deemed unnecessary 
for the number of respondents to be precisely equal across each organisation. By the time the 
researcher deemed data collection could cease with a statistically significant quantity gathered, 
and an appropriate amount of available time had been used, 12 individuals from the Riyad Bank, 
11 from Al-Rajhi, 12 from National Commercial Bank, 11 from Arab National Bank, 10 from 
Saudi American Bank, 11 from Saudi British Bank, 8 from Albilad Bank, 9 from Saudi French 
Bank, 8 from Saudi Hollandi Bank, and 8 from Saudi Investment Bank provided responses for 
the questionnaire. This information could be used, perhaps using additional participants and 
further expansion, to conduct a comparative analysis of security capacity and demands across the 
organisations. Meanwhile, as mentioned, this information was considered only to supplement the 
main findings regarding occurrences across the nation; moreover, considering this information 
provided the researcher with the potential to point out organisations which were (comparatively) 
grossly unrepresentative of what were found to otherwise be usual trends. No institution was 
deemed to be grossly unrepresentative in such a manner, as participants across the organisations 
offered similar responses, supporting the existence of similar trends across the nation reported in 
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literature. The only major difference occurring which stood out was a difference in technologies 
within the larger organisations (National Commercial Bank, Arab National Bank, Al-Rajhi Bank, 
and Riyad Bank), as members of these organisations showed a level an average level of 
satisfaction with technology generally on an order of two points higher than members of other 
organisations. This is likely due to increased purchases within these institutions, resulting from 
the higher revenue, greater power, and an overall greater capacity for technological 
improvements.  
 
The number of employees in the observed organisations range from hundreds to thousands, 
although all institutions have a substantial clientele base within the nation. There did not appear 
to be any trends stemming from the number of employees, aside from the tendency for more 
employees within the larger organisations (and thus the increased satisfaction with technologies 
described in the previous paragraph). The size of the information technology and information 
security departments also ranged considerably, but here too the only relationship with notable 
potential is the relationship between size, potential, and technology. Considering these 
observations together, it appears that the more powerful Saudi institutions have a slight albeit 
observable advantage over other organisations. However in agreement with the literature, 
organisations generally face similar challenges in information systems security (Muhaya, 2010). 
 
5.4.8 Basic Implications of Results in Relation to Literature 
 
Although the discussion chapter is to serve as the primary relation between research results and 
literature, the basic implications of the results in this way provides a valuable supplement to the 
presented results and initial analysis. Althaneer and Nelson (2009) and Muhaya (2010) provided 
 141 
evidence that technological demands remained across the private and public sectors, despite 
plans for improvements (and actual improvements). Essentially, an overall solution was found to 
elude the country, while existing aspects of IS were deemed incomplete (Abu-Musa, 2010; 
Muhaya, 2010). The questionnaire results support this finding, although employees appeared to 
be more optimistic of their situation, and tended to have more confidence in IS than authors cited 
in the literature provided. 
 
Incomplete security solutions have been found to be (comparably) as much of a problem as 
ineffective security solutions in Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, security threats and attacks have 
found loopholes in systems comparably as often as they find a way through active security 
measures in place within certain systems (Bellamy, Perri, and Raab, 2005; Stamp, 2006). While 
this literature has asserted that the country has many examples of incomplete security measures 
within information systems, solutions, the questionnaire results show that the prominent bank 
organisations are mostly only faced with the problem of only having a ―bare minimum‖ required 
to defend against threats. Although the questionnaire results did not investigate the completeness 
(and thereby potential incompleteness) of security systems and policies (i.e. disaster recovery), 
the interviews allowed more room for these less commonly considered areas to be explored. 
Considering the most fundamental results generated from the questionnaire, despite the resources 
and satisfaction within the successful institutions, the optimisation of IS security was nonetheless 
in need of improvements in the areas emphasised in literature.  
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5.5 Interview Results and Analyses 
 
A total of 16 individuals were interviewed for this study; the researcher found the appropriate 
time to interview six individuals in addition to the minimum 10 proposed. Also as proposed, a 
semi-structured interview was developed and administered to the participants, allowing the 
researcher to address strategically determined ideals while reserving the freedom to pursue topics 
however deemed beneficial. While the same 10 questions were used as a template for all 
interviews, follow-up questions accompanied some of these questions, which differed across the 
interviews and were dependent on the nature of the subject‘s response. The template questions 
used are listed below (see Appendices for completed transcripts, and see the following 
paragraphs for details regarding the responses).  
 
Question 1: ―What do you feel is the biggest concern for information system security in Saudi 
Arabia?‖ 
 
Question 2: ―What do you feel is the biggest concern for information system security in your 
organisation, and do you see variations in concerns between departments?‖ 
 
Question 3: ―How do you think concerns can be addressed within the nation, and do you feel 
your organisation could address the concerns differently?‖  
 
Question 4: ―Do you feel that employees and managers need to improve their levels of 
compliance, and if so, do you see greater compliance in either employees or managers?‖ 
 
Question 5: ―Does it appear that major reforms are needed within any policies concerned with 
information security threats?‖ 
 
Question 6: ―Are ethics an issue in managers and employees, and if so, what can be done?‖ 
 143 
 
Question 7: ―Should there be a greater strive to improve technology within the organisation, and 
assuming this is always desired, what seems to be the best course of action?‖ 
 
Question 8: ―If resources and time were no object, what changes would be most viable and 
effective?‖ 
 
Question 9: ―How do you feel that security-related training should be approached in the future?‖ 
 
Question 10: ―Are there any other changes you feel are required to minimise threats to 
information systems?‖ 
 
As anonymity was promised to all participants, as well as having a role in the ethical guidelines 
of this study (confidentiality and the potential risk that truly honest responses regarding practices 
is not well received), the names of interviewees are not listed. The following interview responses 
are organised in accordance to the observations and occurrences across the range of institutions. 
Responses are written using the interview responses, but are not verbatim, due to the differences 
in context between question responses and presentation. Verbatim (to the best of the researcher‘s 
ability) responses are provided in the Appendices. Deviations (sub-questions) from the semi-
structured interview are included in the following collection of observations, and are listed 
explicitly in the Appendices. The responses to the questions are analytical in nature, while an 
additional analytical section follows the observations from each institution; this is further related 
to the context of some of the literature, further supplementing the analysis and providing a 
precursor for the discussion chapter. Employees were informed that their responses would be 
presented in this manner, and anonymously, under the confidentiality agreement.  
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The following sections are categorised according to the areas where the bank management 
provided the most comparable or contrastable responses to the interview questions: security 
concerns, compliance and policy issues (including impact and potential reforms), and overall 
progressive development.  
 
5.5.1 Security Concerns 
 
At Riyad Bank, one of the most noticeable concerns experienced in this institution are viruses 
and internet security. Their biggest concern overall is hacking, because breaching the system can 
cause a great amount of damage. The potential for private technology to exceed internal 
technology is the most relevant concern. The biggest nation-wide concern is the growth and use, 
or misuse, of technology. Mobile technology is a particular concern, and is known to be a threat 
to bank security in Saudi Arabia. The bank feels very secure compared to the rest of the nation, 
but the organisation has experienced the most problems with firewall breaches and acquiring 
viruses. There are problems on networks more often than projected, and this is evident across all 
departments. The biggest concern for information system security is always protecting the 
network, and at this point in time, the most vulnerable technology is the firewall and security 
software. Employees hope that both improvements in available software take place at a rate 
faster than those would wish to break into the network can develop hacking methods, and that we 
continue to have access to defence technology within a fair amount of time once it becomes 
available.  There is not much that can be done to address concerns in the nation, organisations 
can only attempt to access security technology through their own investments. 
 
Al-Rajhi Bank managers expressed similar concerns. Their biggest IS concern is the possibility 
for threats from commercially available technology. It is assumed that people have equal or even 
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greater access to technology that is capable of breaching security, and if it were capable of doing 
so undetected, there would already be a serious problem. Another concern is the rates of 
development; development continues while threats develop at a rate more comparable to 
developed nations, but internal technology is slightly behind. The biggest concern within the 
organisation is the availability and use of software. Ensuring that the best software is found, 
updated to address new threats, and otherwise used properly seems to be the greatest concern 
within the organisation. Maintaining and improving the software is also important, while threats 
can develop outside the organisation, unknown to the information security specialists. This is a 
concern to all departments. The nation itself is considered to be more concerned with the 
economy, finance, and development. There is concern for banks, but in terms of development 
rather than information security.  
 
The Saudi French Bank, similar to the two previous banks, had strong concerns in technology. 
Their biggest IS concern in this organisation is keeping up with the technology and practices, 
which continue to change at fast rates. Firewalls and SSL have the most security-related issues 
here. These issues generally affect the company equally. There does not seem like there is 
anything that could be done on a national level, but people here could generally try to improve 
standards and practices for security. This applies to the technology as much as strategic 
development. Many employees need better plans for how to react to certain threats, because no 
planning in these areas leaves them especially vulnerable. 
 
The Arab National Bank emphasised language more than any other bank. Their biggest security 
concern is the developed technology outside of the country, which the company has a hard time 
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‗keeping up with,‘ and then using with the employees and customers. This is mostly in terms of 
software, as it is easier to ensure that the company has some of the best hardware available. 
Software and the English technology is undoubtedly a concern in the organisation, and the acts 
of convincing those with greater power that improvements are needed is difficult. This is less of 
a problem for security or online banking, but is a concern nonetheless. There is little that can be 
done on a national level, aside from national improvements. The Saudi British Bank also 
considered language amid technology. Major concerns include the availability of software and 
materials that can be approached with the language barriers. Another concern is the lack of 
concern itself, it seems, because some people don‘t seem to realise the potential of existing 
threats. Yet another concern is developing security for an information system that assists such a 
wide range of customers with a wide range of services. The IS system is complex in itself, and 
building security that is considered both effective and versatile is challenging to the company. IS 
concerns cannot really be addressed within the nation, at least not directly. The best thing that 
can happen on a nation-wide level is economic improvement, but even this would affect the 
organisations differently. The organisation‘s actions being different from the rate of the 
development of the nation is the only real way to gain a competitive advantage, and this 
organisation has the benefit of being one of the more successful companies of its kind. Beyond 
that there is no planned way of acting differently to get ahead with concerns. 
 
According to the Saudi American Bank, Saudi Arabia has to worry about technology developing 
at different rates, and there are a lot of travellers in the country, and technology capable of 
breaching security can be brought in rather easily. Currently, most actions that are capable of 
violating information security can be detected, but improving technology (especially some of the 
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mobile technology) seems to have potential for hacking without the same kind of detection, so it 
is a concern. There are no real differences in security concerns between departments. The biggest 
concern at the present is meeting customer concerns with technology which can be secured. The 
concerns for the organisation are the same mentioned for Saudi Arabia. The threat of improving 
private technology threatens this organisation as well as others. The organisation can attempt to 
invest in improvements, or even pursue research and development; although there is more 
incentive for the nation to do this, it is generally not deemed practical by the company.  
 
Meanwhile, the National Commercial Bank seemed to acknowledge concerns similar to Sauid 
American Bank while being more apathetic. Their biggest IS concern is a combination of 
technological development outside of institutions needing security, and a lack of awareness of 
general technology within the institutions. Another concern is the size of the data and funds 
stored, compared to the nature of upgrades and organisation. The bank attempts to address 
departments as needed, so there does not appear to be critical variations between departments. 
The network and some technological components are not always improved at the same rate of 
the bank‘s development, which can produce changes to threats. There is little that can be done on 
a national level, so the organisation could address concerns differently by applying change how 
it is needed and as changes become available. The Saudi Hollandi Bank had a similar level of 
focus and apathy; according to them, technology, practices, and planning are the biggest IS 
concerns. The organisation has had problems with dedicating the time and resources suggested 
from threat implications, and may be more vulnerable than is realised. The fact that many 
employees simply are not aware of the threat potential in certain areas is something that should 
be considered. There does not seem to be much that people can do in the national in terms of 
 148 
strategy, each organisation should simply invest in improvements as they become available. No 
superior strategy has been realised. 
 
Albilad Bank best described the motivational impacts of ranging concerns with their responses. 
Acquiring and improving defensive software at a rate which is ahead of the potential for threats 
seems to be their main concern, both inside the company and protecting the services offered to 
clients. The same basic threat to the nation is observable in the organisation, but the organisation 
faces more of a struggle with upgrading technology as needed, because that requires private 
funding. The government could help itself improve security for information systems in the public 
sector, but that would not have much of an impact on concerns within financial institutions. This 
organisation could simply choose to improve security to the highest level, investing considerable 
money in the process, but that would not cater to the competitive advantage. The competitive 
advantage takes the greatest priority within most decisions regarding those kinds of investments.  
 
The Saudi Investment Bank simply supported basic assertions. They are concerned that 
competition and demand are major issues, because security must always accompany changes. 
Growing technology without the security to match is basically ‗asking for trouble.‘ Firewall 
problems, or ‗loopholes,‘ are another concern, as are high levels of encryption. Those two areas 
are common topics in recent concerns. Experts could cooperate in attempt to improve 
information security as a field, but it does not seem like there will be enough of an incentive for 
that any time soon, either within the nation or within the organisation. 
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5.5.2 Compliance, Policies, and Potential Reform 
 
The Riyad Bank had a great deal to report regarding ethics, compliance, policy, and reform, but 
(like many banks) was not convinced that there was a genuine need for major reforms in these 
areas. According to their perspective, employee and managerial compliance are the biggest 
correctable problems that can be seen, but unfortunately concern is also low, so little has been 
done. The best way to make improvements is assumed to be through awareness and change 
management processes. Managers have seemed to be more compliant overall in recent years, but 
instances of non-compliance have more commonly been greater deviations from what is 
expected. The nature of management positions involves greater power, so non-compliance is 
more likely to be more serious in nature. Non-management or ‗normal‘ employees are more 
commonly non-compliant, but these instances are also more likely less serious. Undoubtedly, 
compliance has been and continues to be an issue of concern and focus. Managers and 
employees alike should make sure they are following procedures, but when a manager chooses to 
be non-compliant in areas related to information systems and security, the results have a greater 
tendency to be more serious. Managers generally feel that they are ‗above‘ policies and 
obligation, while employees seem to think they have a greater chance of avoiding detection if 
they choose to take shortcuts. Reforms are needed in many areas, but the level of reform needed 
is normal and changes are always needed; no ‗major‘ reforms appear to be needed. Change and 
change management must be emphasised so the organisation can change as needed, and as the 
company has been successful in security and operation. Ethics is always an issue, and in that 
sense, there is little that can be done in the organisation. Greater incentives and greater 
consequences can help to insure compliance and ethics remain in all parts of information, 
security, and operation, but it seems as if it will always still be an issue. Ethics are of course 
 150 
responsible for many non-compliant actions, as well as general actions at work, but it does not 
seem like much more can be done. Information systems and security should have the greatest 
strive to upgrade technology virtually wherever possible in the organisation. There does not seem 
to be any real strategy to this, aside from gaining the profits required while ensuring that profits 
dedicated to technological improvement do not negatively affect other areas. Without the strive, 
the threats from those outside that do strive for technology would be incredibly great, thereby 
putting the organisation at great risk. 
 
Perspectives of compliance and potential reform are similarly apathetic at Al-Rahji Bank, while 
these areas would prove to generate the most common ground out of the categories in the 
interviews. According to this institution, compliance is somewhat of an issue, but not a major 
one. Compliance doesn‘t usually lead to improved threat. Managers seem to feel ‗above the law,‘ 
but employees feel that there is less risk for the policies that apply to them. Both managers and 
employees should be advised regarding improved compliance, although the importance of this 
has not changed much over the past years. The company might benefit from policies requiring 
changes. Ethics are always an issue, and the only feasible changes which can be conducted 
involve stricter policies and consequences. New changes are assumed to bring new opportunities 
for ethics to become an issue elsewhere. Ethics are something that managers should be more 
mindful of, observing and ensuring proper employee conduct. Being selective when choosing 
authorities, and being mindful of their actions (and allowances) as they grow with the company, 
appears to be a potential solution. Similarly, the Saudi American Bank feels compliance is not 
considered perfect, but it is not a major issue either; compliance could always be better in a 
conceptual sense, but it is generally not perceived to be ‗a problem.‘ Managers are usually more 
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compliant (compared to employees). Meanwhile, there could be stricter requirements to improve 
technology, but there are also times where this policy may seem to ‗get in the way‘ and need 
discretion anyhow. Ethics are an issue, but they are not considered to be the cause of any major 
failures or problems.  Ethical issues in managers are more serious on a higher level, while ethical 
issues in employees are more serious on the lower levels; both result in problems, and though 
ethics has seemed to play a role in some problems, other aspects of the company are prioritised 
in development. Most of them are actually not related to security, and are part of normal business 
development, but security is considered as the company continues to improve technology and 
electronic services. For example, according to one interview, ―The biggest nation-wide concern 
is the growth and use, or misuse, of technology. Mobile technology is a particular concern, and is 
known to be a threat to bank security in Saudi Arabia.‖  
 
The Arab National Bank had the common apathy regarding compliance and ethics, but saw more 
potential in some areas of reform. At this location, compliance is always a concern, but is always 
considered, so no major improvements seem to be needed. A neglect of compliance or reviews 
would be bad, though. Employees seem to be more compliant, because they are more likely to 
lose their jobs and remain unemployed for such actions. Both managers and employees should 
improve in this area, but managers should strive for flawless compliance. Threats become part of 
awareness issues and discussion when they become apparent, and actions are taken if it is 
determined that this is needed. Policies regarding training and software or network upgrades 
could be more demanding, but especially as discretion would be required, the changes would not 
really be ‗major.‘ Ethics could improve information security defences as well as any other areas, 
but compliance and ethics generally do not directly affect the defence itself. 
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According to the National Commercial Bank, managers have set examples for employees here in 
most relevant areas, including compliance with policies. In information security-related positions 
compliance is generally not a problem, neither within manager-based positions or normal 
employee positions. Major reforms could better protect against threats, but policies alone do not 
need ‗major‘ changes at this time. Policies requiring updates and development, including 
technological development, could better ensure that the organisation‘s security develops on a 
level more comparable with the development of the technology itself, but it then would likely not 
be able to make decisions or have discretion. Discretion seems to be the best approach at this 
point, despite the possible issues with motivation and freedom stemming from it. Ethics are 
always an issue. They do not seem to be responsible for any increased threat or critical issues 
here, however. The only realistic approach that can bet taken to address ethical problems is to 
examine each instance of ethical violation on a case by case basis. In information security, this 
seems to be less of a problem than within other areas of the bank. 
 
The Saudi British Bank continued with the trends of similar opinions regarding ethics and 
compliance. Compliance is not much of a concern within the company in past years, but 
employees have had more violations. There are more employees than managers of course, but 
they also seem to be more prone to violating security and other protocol. Compliance does not 
seem to be an unusual concern anyway, and it seems to be comparable across the company as 
well as in comparison to other companies. It has been hard to create policies that are both 
detailed and not in need of discretion as variables change. Security and the nature of the system 
could be reformed for the clear benefit, such as through network restructuring, advanced 
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software use, and other ways, but there does not seem to be a good way to improve security 
through major policy reform. Policies regarding training, researching and upgrading technology, 
and improving the nature of organisation (such as through increased dedication and staff) could 
reduce threats, but unfortunately there does not seem to be a definite path to ‗major‘ 
improvements with any practical investment. Ethics, like compliance, are not a major concern 
with the company. The company has no major plans for change in this area. Ethical issues seem 
to be an underlying cause with some concerns, such as compliance and basic employee conduct, 
but it is one of the least prioritised areas within the company‘s plans for development. The 
company could stand to invest a little more funding and effort into improving technology, 
especially in terms of researching the market for possible improvements, but the current 
processes seem to be good enough to create a considerable competitive advantage.  
Albilad Bank management had some of the strongest opinions regarding compliance and 
effective reform. For example, according to one interview, ―The government could help itself 
improve security for information systems in the public sector, but that would not have much of 
an impact on concerns within financial institutions. This organisation could simply choose to 
improve security to the highest level, investing considerable money in the process, but that 
would not cater to the competitive advantage. The competitive advantage takes the greatest 
priority within most decisions regarding those kinds of investments.‖ There, employee non-
compliance is handled by managers on a regular basis, but less action is taken for managers in 
similar situations. Some improvement is needed in both areas, but it is hard to measure the extent 
or develop a strategy to achieve perfect compliance. The systems and security could benefit from 
major reform, but the policies themselves cannot have the discretion required for technological 
improvements as technology changes. The only developments in policy which would have the 
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greatest influence would be improvements for crisis plans or disaster recovery, which is given 
little consideration in existing policy. Ethics do not seem to be much of an issue outside of 
compliance. There should be a major strive to improve technology wherever possible, but it 
already exists. The emphasis on competitive advantage through services will always remain, and 
technological improvements outside of this area do not seem to be practical. If resources were no 
object, the continuing optimisation of technology would be effective. Expanding the quantity of 
staff would also be effective. 
 
At the Saudi Hollandi Bank, compliance always needs improvement because it is almost always 
less than perfect, especially over a given time. There should be greater incentives for developing 
security and greater consequences for breaching policy. Changes to policy are recommended in 
terms of backup and recovery planning, but aside from that no ‗major‘ reforms seem to be 
needed. Ethics are something that we value, but we mostly emphasise compliance with policy 
and procedure. Ethics could be improved with greater incentives, or consequences, but the 
emphasis will remain in other areas. At the Saudi French Bank, compliance will always be a 
minor issue with any policy, so it will always be a concern but will not likely have any increased 
emphasis.  There are no ‗major‘ reforms that are needed for policy, but slight improvements 
could be made in most departments. For example, there is little protocol for emergency plans, if 
something were to go wrong with the network or services, much time would likely be lost since 
there are none of these plans. Ethics are an issue, and policies and new strategies often try to 
improve ethics in many ways. It is not considered a serious issue, even though ethics could be a 
lot higher; it takes major problems in ethics for ethics to gain great attention. Similarly, at the 
Saudi Hollandi Bank, employees and managers both need to improve levels of compliance do, 
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technically, since it is less than perfect. Compliance is rarely a serious concern. Some reforms for 
improvement and protocol for emergency procedures could help, but no major reforms appear 
necessary in routine operations. Ethics, like compliance, are rarely a serious issue. Employees 
have different ideas about what it means to be ethical, and the company is only demanding in 
certain areas. 
 
5.5.3 Progressive Development 
 
Most banks emphasised technology in their responses, but there was more uniqueness in the 
approaches or realistic justifications of many areas of progressive development. Training was 
also commonly emphasised. According to the Arab National Bank, There is already a strong 
desire to improve technology wherever possible. Network connections and the main software 
used could be improved, and more employees could be used to improve the network for security 
effectiveness. General information system effectiveness could be improved by hiring a team of 
more qualified (in technology) expert professionals to choose technology best-fit for the 
organisation and remodelling it accordingly. Firewalls, anti-virus software, and better 
encryptions would be the most effective security upgrades, but decent versions of this technology 
exist already. According to Riyad Bank, improving hardware and software to top-of-the-line 
products, then giving the network the best design and security measurable known, would be ideal 
changes. Replacing all of the current technology, and then ensuring it is properly supervised, 
maintained, and upgraded by employees would also be ideal. Meanwhile, training sessions 
should be more involved and given more often, with more consideration given to available 
technological improvements, outside of the nation as well as within it. Improved organisation 
and leadership may help to minimise threats, but no paths to such major improvements have been 
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successfully implemented in the past nor appear to be realistically possible now. Aside from this, 
employees do not feel there to be any real critical threats at the present time.  
 
The desire for technology is usually present at the Saudi American Bank, but changes in research 
and strategy for acquisition could be improved. The company could benefit from charging some 
employees with researching security elements more vigorously, and this is something that is 
discussed from time to time. There is usually an extremely competitive strive to improve 
technology in terms of services to customers, and changes to security technology change in 
response to this as well as to changes to internal technology. The strive to improve service-
related to technology will always be the greatest, because it is competitive. If resources and time 
were no object, the changes that would be most effective would be rebuilding the internal 
network for internal processes and services with the best technology available. There is some 
technology that could be changed to help security a little bit, but most changes that would be 
effective in that situation are related to information systems (alone) and general business. 
Training should be more technical in nature, having more emphasis on the best tools and best 
practices. Literature could also have more of a part in training development. 
 
Al-Rajhi Bank asserted that security should continue to seek the best technology available, so 
long as the money is invested in truly beneficial improvements. Elsewhere in the organisation, 
this was more debatable. The best perceived course of action is to simply increase profits while 
researching the technology on the market. The nation in general has access to effective 
technology, but it is slightly different than the technology available in developed nations; there is 
no known practical path to improving technology so that is identical. If resources and time were 
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no object, the bank‘s network infrastructure would be remodelled using the best technology 
available. An expansion of facilities and the placement of new facilities in new locations could 
increase profits well enough to have an investment for the future, and this could then be used to 
address the areas we have discussed. Training should be more in-depth, and carried out more 
often, so that employees are aware of what is available, in terms of both threats and defences. It 
should be more technical in nature, so that employees are more aware of the tools and features 
available to them.  
 
At the Arab National Commercial Bank, the existing level of striving for technology is assumed 
appropriate and that it should simply continue. The current course of action seems effective, 
despite the issues in technology described in existing articles and publications, the company has 
not experienced major breaches or threats that would jeopardise the company‘s integrity in any 
major way. Security breaches a concern but not on a level near crises. The most viable change 
perceived would be to ensure employees have a higher level of education and training in the 
future. Additional paid employees providing additional labour and ideas would certainly benefit 
the organisation if money and wages were no object, but this is not ‗viable‘ under normal 
circumstances (although it is assumed to be effective). Training should be more considerate of 
technical aspects and technological potential, it seems to be too general. Training for managers is 
assumed to be an area that should improve, while employees have more resources and could ask 
managers for assistance at any time. The requirements for hiring employees could be improved, 
though, and help to minimise these issues. Training should be conducted formally more often, 
most training is not in-depth or detailed on the level that it should be. Both resources and time 
have been challenging (as training in this way removes employees from work), so this would 
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need to be considered in the future. Restricting tools which are generally used for breaching 
security may be more helpful. 
 
At the Saudi British Bank, the best course of action appears to be to approach technology 
mindful of potential, without making unnecessary upgrades (upgrading before a new line of 
products comes onto the market). Here, educating employees, improving the network structure, 
and improving software would be effective actions. The security system could be best improved 
using new firewalls, and plans should be created for things like disaster recovery. Training 
should be revised completely, many parts of it have just been put together without the effort 
required, often times with important information not realised until later.  It should place more 
emphasis on the concerned realised by experts, rather than considering mostly corporate 
concerns. Lastly, firewall protection should have more effort devoted to it, to make sure there are 
no loopholes and that it is updated as needed.  A general investment of human and material 
resources in security would be an ideal first start, allowing the other areas discussed to be more 
possible. Albilad Bank had less to state in these areas, claiming that training needs to be 
improved all around, specifically in terms of technical applications and upgrades, but it could use 
improvement in just about every area. Some employee should be charged with the task of 
improved continual research in terms of threats, developing defences, and developed best 
practices. 
 
The opinions of the other banks reveal a similar emphasis on training, technology, and business 
development. At the Saudi French Bank, managers felt that the organisation should acquire the 
best technology, and in this sense there is a ‗strive,‘ but the lack of progress is due to resources, 
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strategy, policy, etc. Recommended actions include improvements in firewalls and protection 
software, while the networks are sufficient and the service technology has evolved at a decent 
rate. Restructuring technology and organisation seem to have the most potential, aside from 
expanding. It should be more thorough, especially in terms of development beyond systems and 
procedures in place. Meanwhile, at the Saudi Hollandi Bank, the need to alter the existing strive 
for improved technology is debated. A new network with new services, thereby improving 
competitive advantage and potential for future development, is deemed the most desirable 
improvement (in the event sufficient resources are readily available). Training should be 
carefully planned, and not just ‗dealt with,‘ as the present mentality seems to be. A greater 
emphasis on security as a field might lead to new improvements, but outside of that, it seems to 
already be a developing topic of emphasis. Lastly, at the Saudi Investment Bank, the strive for 
greater technology already exists, and the company implies it cannot afford to divert efforts any 
farther. Expansion could help quite a bit, and so could remodelling all information technology 
and networks; they would both be practical for their own reasons. Here, training should become 
more of an educational process and less of a quick attempt to change bare-minimum processes as 
they are realised. It is assumed that there will always be threats, and only the most innovative 
people can conceive defences to threats that have yet to exist. This chapter has examined shared 
themes, specific interview responses, and implications; the following section begins to relate this 
back to literature, while the following chapter provides further thematic analysis, relation to 
literature, and recommendations. Chapter 7 provides further analysis and relation to stakeholders, 
while Chapter 8 then provides still further thematic analysis and relation to literature.  
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5.5.11 Summary of Interviews, Immediate Implications, and Initial Relations to Literature 
The interviews revealed perspective and trends partially in agreement with literature and the 
questionnaires. The interviews did not reflect opinions as strong as those in the questionnaires 
regarding the need for improvement, although a considerable amount of employees did mention 
issues listed in the literature, such as firewall and SSL complications. Responses regarding ethics 
and compliance were also substantially less critical than ratings provided in questionnaires. 
Many of the interview respondents seemed to feel that the companies were developing at a 
decent rate, and information security was not a real concern. In spite of the findings described in 
the literature (i.e. Saudi Gazette, 2007 Abu-Musa, 2009 and Muhaya, 2010), company 
representatives may feel that competitive advantage should remain an area of focus, and 
significant investments in information security need only occur if the potential threats are even 
more serious than described by expert analysts.  
 
As shown in the previous discussion relating questionnaire results to literature, despite the 
developmental potential of these successful institutions (coupled with employee confidence), 
results nonetheless revealed needs for improvement in alignment with literature. The interview 
results differed from questionnaire results in that there was more confidence expressed in the 
interviews. Although the driving factors behind this are somewhat unknown (potentially being 
due to the varying nature of the positions, the impersonal nature of questionnaire participation 
facilitating criticism, or personal obligations for interview participants to express optimism), 
interview results nonetheless showed a need for improvement in other areas. Abu-Musa (2010), 
among others noted in the questionnaire section, reported demands for improvement amid 
incomplete or ineffective security measures in a range of systems. Abu-Musa (2010) further 
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reported that the majority of Saudi organisations have no disaster recovery or emergency plans. 
This was noted in multiple interviews, and no satisfaction of these elements was mentioned. 
Findings here also imply that organisations have been approaching IS in such a way so as to 
achieve the ―bare minimum‖ defence to known threats, with little emphasis on pre-emptive 
optimisation or development. Wells (2007) noted frequent complications in Saudi firewalls, also 
confirmed in the interviews. 
 
5.6 Chapter Summary and Closing Remarks 
 
The findings generally support the theoretical framework, and they show evidence of a demand 
for change and manifestations of the vulnerabilities from the Saudi research. Meanwhile, there 
was no evidence of the newer strategies, best practices, or technologies implemented in the 
organizations. The results confirmed the findings in literature, although the interview responses 
were less critical while implying there is a lesser need for improving security. Even the more 
prominent organisations may feel their emphasis on improving their competitive traits should 
take the highest priority, while security measures and planned development is far from 
ambitious. The following chapter moves beyond the presentation and analyses of these results, 
relating the findings to previous mentioned and additional secondary literature, across a more in 
depth discussion. 
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Chapter 6: Recommendations 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The results and analysis reveals a clear need for change, the presence of restricting factors, and 
unacceptable levels of apathy and ignorance; these are thus the key issues in recommendations 
for improvement and analysis. The review of literature demonstrated numerous potential 
influences that are affecting portions (if not the whole) of the country, and there may be 
resistance to change within companies as well. Considering this, the organisations, managers, 
and perhaps the government, are in need of recommendations for progressive development most 
conducive to security and operational objectives. However, any recommendations simply 
considerate of these goals are not likely to be effective, as the challenges and restrictions may 
halt these attempts entirely. Effective recommendations must consider resistance to change, the 
range of factors mentioned in the results, and the general theoretical needs, objectives, and 
challenges outlined in literature. This chapter provides recommendations, suggestions, and a 
framework for improved information security policy and governance.  
 
6.2 Fundamental Areas of Recommendation 
 
As mentioned, the initial literature review presented provided a solid demand and array of areas 
of concern in the Saudi context, while the hypotheses reflected (and would be generally proven) 
the relation of these recommendations to the organisational levels. However, the context, 
particularly the nature of demands and restrictions regarding improvement at this level, was 
unknown prior to this study; as such, the fundamental recommendations could only serve as 
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guidelines, with the results being required to develop the finer points of policy and framework, 
governance, etc.  
 
The elements of the hypotheses proven correct form the foundation of the majority of the 
recommendations outlined throughout this chapter. The ten areas considered the primary threats 
to Saudi Arabian financial institutions, threats from external technologies, an array of demands 
for developing policies and procedures (although this reality proved to be less demanding than 
initially anticipated, compliance, personal ethics, institutional factors and employee willingness, 
training and access to resources, and organisational characteristics; with this, it is recommended 
that optimised IS policies and governance make improvements in each of these areas.  
 
The primary threats to IS in Saudi Arabia in the general context are known to involve the threats 
from external technology developing at a rate comparable or greater than the development of 
security technologies, demanding that IS policies evolve to better compete against the resultant 
threats. As this has not happened, it seems that the problem could lie in either the demands of 
investing in this development, the prioritisation compared to developments in other areas, a lack 
of awareness, or a lack of technological potential; the research has shown that the true reason is a 
combination of each of these areas, and thus each area should be addressed in an optimised 
reformation effort. Meanwhile, organisations must address the known challenges in organisation 
and maintaining a structure which facilitates the implementation of best practices, using 
discretion to note which practices apply to the circumstances of the organisation and its 
variables.  
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Another vital area which demands attention is the lack of disaster recovery and emergency 
management. This should be a required element of all Saudi organisations, especially financial 
organisations, and no IS policy should be considered complete without this. Additionally, 
organisations could be penalised by the government for not having an effective solution to 
address finances and other factors which affect customers in the event of a crisis, while the 
government is recommended to improve its policies to include requirements and reprimands for 
incomplete IS policies relevant to consumer property. Giving further consideration to the 
government, although it has established a dynamic system of laws and punishments for 
breaching protected databases, a re-examination of policies and increased deterrence would 
naturally serve to reduce the risk of violation. Additional developments, such as required logging 
or tracking procedures, could also assist security, although additional studies are recommended 
in these areas prior to strategic development.  
 
Policies and procedures related to employees demand a combination of active and passive 
security measures, while the observed limited effectiveness and apathy regarding many 
employee policies can be perceived as both a small concern for the negative impacts of these 
policies and a resistance to change in any attempts for improvements from this angle. It is clear 
that employees view the finer points of compliance with apathy, that work ethic is moderate at 
best, and motivation to do more than what is necessary is minimal. Meanwhile, the value of 
innovation in information security is also low to nearly the point of counter-productiveness, as 
the organisations observed were found to be lost in a mentality where the absence of crises has 
served as a false sense of security; knowingly out-dated security systems were generally 
accepted, with improvements bringing them to basic standards evolved in recent years were 
discussed almost as if they were a luxury rather than a basic requirement. This would be 
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understandable if the organisations participating were small businesses, but both the prestige and 
success of financial institutions suggest that these organisations should not adopt such attitudes. 
The resources for development are available, they are just not prioritised, and the most important 
change to policies should involve a redistribution of invested funds (or a greater percentage of 
profit invested in resources) for continually upgrading information security systems. Additional 
foundational elements of policies related to management employees that should be addressed are 
in compliance. There should be some developments which integrate both incentives and 
reprimand for compliance and ethics, serving to remove the apathy in these areas. This should 
apply to both managers and employees as managers are assumed to be a major cause of this 
apathy; managers required to implement or maintain the policies for incentive and reprimand 
should be subject to similar terms. Managers should also conduct individual studies of 
organisational factors influencing personal ethics, so that they have a better understanding of 
employee perspective of information security, and how to motivate employees to facilitate 
optimal security. Members of upper management should continue setting the groundwork for 
continuing improvement by assessing the most influential institutional factors and their 
relationship with managers and employees. 
The next most significant foundational element of IS improvement is training. Training has the 
potential to improve the nature of existing conditions, awareness, and skill, or it can efficiently 
and effectively assist developmental initiatives, overhauled systems and technology, or 
restructured policies. Despite this, it was found to be rarely used as such a tool in the 
organisations observed, although a full perspective of the underlying causes here was not 
provided. Similar to the state of resources and developmental initiatives, this could be due to 
apathy, a lack of awareness, a lack of prioritisation, or a lack of desire to invest (or any 
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combination). Thus, training should be prioritised in multiple ways, including time and funds 
invested, development and customisation, and assurance that all areas of concern are effective 
covered in training administered. Lower and upper management should respectively track the 
employees in demand of training and areas of operation which could benefit from the integration 
of a new training program.  
The role of organisational traits in information security, such as the nature of managerial styles, 
development of and reaching company goals, resource allocations, and organisation of databases 
or processes should also be the subject of some type of routine analysis. The results of this 
analysis may or may not lead to areas of concern warranting restructuring managerial techniques 
or the formation of organisational goals, but there should be mechanisms available for operation 
should these concerns manifest in this manner.  
This introduction of foundational elements recommended for improvements is not intended to be 
exhaustive; while they effectively serve as the basis of the majority of topics and processes 
proposed and discussed below, additional and indirectly related areas are also outlined and 
recommended. 
6.3 Addressing Saudi Arabia’s Developing Need for Security 
The actions the observed Saudi financial institutions need to take to properly address the security 
risks and related concerns in IS policies are exemplary of common problems across the nation 
listed by literature, although the power of the financial institutions implies that they have a 
greater potential to address security concerns plaguing the country in their areas. In any case, the 
institutions can be exemplary to other sectors and organisations through their developments, 
while the literature reveals the similar nature (and thereby potential relevance of financial 
 167 
institution solutions) of the challenges. Considering this, the financial institutions can be pioneers 
in addressing Saudi Arabia‘s compiling need for improved information security, ideally playing 
a role in ensuring that the developments of threats cannot so rapidly exceed the ‗counter 
development‘ of solutions and security. The recommendations of literature should serve as 
guidelines to organisational development. These are sparse, as shown in Chapter 2, but provide a 
consensus and details adequate for developmental guidelines. Alnatheer and Nelson‘s (2009) 
assessment of security culture and practices should be used in examining the nature of 
organisational culture and how conducive it is to information security, how flexible it is to 
development and change, the role of monitoring, how it facilitates communication, and how 
compliance and ethics are promoted. These authors‘ warning that apathy towards ambition or 
major developments in IS management could ultimately affect the national economy is highly 
relevant to the sector, as the role of financial institutions in the economy is especially great (in 
addition to the power of the institutions for development and the example they may set). The 
Saudi government could play a further role in promoting these developments, for the sake of 
safeguarding the economy, although a joint effort promoting information security awareness or 
development could go a long way towards removing the apathy towards seemingly unnecessary 
technological developments or policy restructuring.  
 
Alnatheer and Nelson (2009) also provided guidelines for establishing or improving prevention 
and recovery plans, elements of which were found to be minimal or non-existent in the present 
and other studies. As mentioned, these should be essential elements of information security, with 
the critical elements potentially affecting customer property mandated by law. Regarding 
direction in development, aside from the specific objectives of safeguarding against known 
potential threats, the authors recommended the prioritisation of three concepts: i) cоnfidentiаlity 
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оf ѕenѕitive infоrmаtiоn (соnсerned with рreventing diѕсlоѕure оf infоrmаtiоn tо unаuthоrised 
uѕerѕ), ii) integrity (соnсerned with enѕuring dаtа саnnоt be mоdified withоut аuthоrisаtiоnѕ), 
and iii) avаilаbility (соnсerned with enѕuring infоrmаtiоn muѕt be аvаilаble tо аuthоrised uѕerѕ 
when they require them) (Аlthаneer аnd Nelѕоn, 2009). The findings of Muhaya (2010) and 
Abu-Musa (2010) determined that this focus was generally absent, and although the present 
study did not place a great emphasis on the concepts, it was determined that there was a general 
apathy towards any emphasis which aimed to achieve more than what is needed to maintain what 
is perceived in everyday operations; in the absense of complaint or breached integrity, the 
improvement of confidentiality and integrity should be a primary direction of future 
developments, while innovation in availability should be examined and considered alongside the 
relevant potential vulnerabilities.  
 
The findings of the Saudi Gazette (2007) and Zurich (2008) also serve as guidelines to 
recommended improvements in the targeted institutions. The Saudi Gazette‘s (2007) findings 
should be an emphasis of awareness initiatives in the companies as well as across the nation, and 
Zurich‘s (2008) prioritisation of information security should be modelled in strategic 
developments and implementation.  
 
The development of technology on local and global scales has been a primary factor in the 
increasing gap between information security and potential for threats, as both have caught 
information security programs ‗off guard‘ with many potential threats either unseen, not fully 
understood, or not considered sufficient to warrant the restructuring of systems. Meanwhile, the 
rapid technological developments occurring in other nations such as the United States and United 
Kingdom have increasingly been integrated within the nation, or the connectivity (and thereby 
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accessibility) in national networks has increased with globalisation and general network 
expansion. Many institutions may still have not come to terms with this reality, and even those 
that have must come to terms with the significance to information security. Mobile phones 
should be a key area of focus in awareness and improving security systems, and the rising 
number of mobile phone users, internet users, and the increasing capacity of mobile technology 
to be integrated with online technology should be at the forefront of information system 
education and development for years to come.  
For example, each bank observed could inform employees of statements such as the mobile 
subscribers with cumulative annual growth rate (CAGR) of 58.6% (more than twice the world 
CAGR of 23.4%), with subscribers approaching 12 million as of October 2005 (over 50% 
penetration) (CITC, 2005). Internet users grew by over 430% in four years, amounting to CAGR 
of 44.4%, (vs. world growth rate of 27.4%); internet users are exceeding 2.5 million. Personal 
computers (PC) penetration has also grown 40% annually (vs. world PC growth rate of 9%) to 
around 16% penetration. Fixed mainland telephones are approaching 4 million lines (a tele-
density of 17%). Internet international bandwidth capacity has increased by nearly 7 fold in 4 
years to over 1800 Mbit per second‖ (CITC, 2005, p. 1); additionally, all managers should be 
required to attend periodic meetings where this type of information is presented on a three month 
basis, with subsequent local meetings informing information security staff of the implications of 
these facts.  
 
Previous developments in Saudi Arabia provide guidelines for both desirable and undesirable 
developments in the future. For example, the described 2004 reforms of Telecom were ideal in 
that the technology was improved through a substantial overhaul of systems, but it was 
determined that little to no security developments were implemented alongside these changes. 
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This is exemplary of how development should not take place for policy, but is exemplary for 
hardware. Meanwhile, the 2005 development of the National Communications and IT Plan 
(NCITP) is a guideline for structure which should be continually modelled and related to 
important areas of information security. Also, in 2007, the United Nations (UN) outlined a plan 
which Saudi Arabia had considered for redesigning its ICT sector.  
 
This was created with the intentions of improving the economy through the resultant increased 
competition, increased local and foreign investment, and the additional protection of consumer 
and stakeholder rights (United Nations, 2007). In 2003, Saudi Arabia‘s government-operated 
telecommunications had been partially privatised, affecting the nature of the largest 
communication entity; this had also compounded the results of the Communications and 
Information Technology Commission‘s (CITC) establishment in 2001. These areas had acquired 
the power to develop protocol for any aspect of information technology and information security 
in major Saudi Arabian communications,  contributing to  increased levels of financial and 
administrative independence. According to the United Nations (2007), ―the Government has 
taken a number of steps to liberalise the market, and create a positive regulatory framework to 
encourage investment and promote growth of the ICT market.‖ (p. 5). As mentioned, this and 
other chains of events were unable to change the overall information security situation in Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
6.4 Policy Recommendations Regarding Employees and Questionnaire Topics 
The rated effectiveness of the company policies and procedures implies that changes should be 
made based on the opinions alone, both in terms of developing employee perspective and in 
terms of making changes to the nature of the policies. The average rating of policies being only 
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6.3 on a scale of 10, combined with the fact that the employees generally felt that all areas were 
sufficiently functional, implies that even the ‗effective‘ policies do little more than safeguard 
against the most basic threats. The information security policies should be formally structured, 
printed in detail, provided to each employee, and routinely reviewed. The employees and 
managers should be polled on a routine basis regarding the perceived effectiveness and potential 
for change, and then managers should petition for changes to policy or relevant factors (i.e. 
software) based on this feedback. The prevalence of information security examination is also too 
low on average, with the overwhelming majority being less than routinely. This should be a 
routine examination; even if the examination is only brief, it should be thorough and occur at a 
three month minimum. As mentioned, the occasional nature of examination and testing may also 
play a role in the lack of action, or action considered ‗as needed‘ being rare, as a lack of 
examination and testing may leave company authorities unaware while the systems remain 
vulnerable.  
The average ratings of training in effect gives rise to the recommendations for major changes in 
these areas, with this also being along the lines of the non-routine occasional occurrence 
mentioned for examining policy. Training does not necessarily need to be lengthy when all areas 
relevant have been taught or outlined in detail, but brief training sessions should be scheduled on 
at least an annual basis to update the employees on changes to technology, policy, or threats; 
additional training need not be periodic, but should be sufficient to parallel the implementations 
of new elements in any area of IS.  
The average ratings regarding compliance and ethics across the questionnaire sample agreed with 
the managerial sample regarding apathy, but these results were unique in that a larger number of 
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employees provided perspective from their level. Naturally, developments in IS must be 
considerate of both employee and managerial perspective. Meanwhile, a difference between 
managerial and employee compliance was noted, with a similar difference noted in ethics; this 
implies that greater efforts must be made in motivating employees versus managers, but also 
implied that managers are vulnerable to the authority of their position. With this, some managers 
appear to feel that they create rules and norms which are actually above their authority, while 
they are effectively ‗above the law‘ in terms of many aspects of policy. This must be avoided at 
all costs, as it reflects on the employees as well as the immediate implications for information 
security integrity, awareness, and development. Lower level managers should be examined by 
upper management on a routine basis, reviewing their efforts in information security alongside 
their performance reviews. Managers determined to be ignoring the developed policies should be 
subject to punishment. The primary reason suggested for managers not following policy 
generated a range of responses, but a common response was lack of organisation and seriousness 
in the organisation. This confirmed the implications from other items that many managers are 
prone to making their own rules which are a conflict of interest to information security. The 
other suggestions (lack of knowledge, experience, or incentive) should be investigated in each 
branch, and addressed through increased strictness, reprimands, or an adjustment to policy as 
needed.  
Ignorance to policy must be addressed through awareness initiatives, although it may be difficult 
to gauge the required knowledge of changing policies without actually ‗quizzing‘ the employees 
regarding policy. However, as ignorance to policy was reported to be a major cause of non-
compliance, it must be addressed through more thorough awareness initiatives, training, or 
another method deemed effective by the organisation. Other responses included attempts to be 
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efficient, attempts to operate more effectively, and general carelessness, and these should be 
monitored by a more aware upper management and dealt with.    
Managers must also be provided with resources, time, authority, and incentive to address IS 
issues which may not be foreseen by upper management in developmental initiatives. The 
frequency management was reported to address issues in IS varied widely; only a small 
percentage stated that this frequency was either ―fairly often‖ or ―often.‖ Although many 
managers may have been involved in situations where they were capable of addressing the 
circumstances for an effective solution, there are almost certainly many instances where they 
were powerless to act while assuming the issues would be eventually noticed and addressed. This 
mentality cannot be allowed to exist, and the reviews and discussions related to improvements 
may very well be too infrequent to properly address the threats. Managers should be liable to 
report any potential threat to security, and be provided with further means to handle threats 
should the present themselves. For example, should a new virus be reported in the news months 
prior to the scheduled meeting and assessment, the manager should request to update or upgrade 
the existing firewalls and anti-viral programs. The manager should then either have a means of 
performing these actions solely, or should have access to someone who can perform this action 
immediately.  
 
The comparative differences between employee and managerial compliance show that more 
managers are ‗excellent,‘ ‗poor,‘ or ‗good,‘ with more employees being in the ‗average‘ range 
(see reproduced figure below). In addition to managers feeling above the policies, this 
relationship also suggests the apathy of employees, more prone to doing only what is required of 
them to maintain their position. This in combination with the opinions of the emphasis on 
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information systems supports the demand to increase its prioritisation from both an internal 
perspective as well as the literature findings, demonstrating that even apathetic employees feel 
the emphasis should be increased. Information security systems and policies which lack the 
emergency management, assessments, and other areas mentioned should be restructured entirely, 
while all organisations should consider a similar method to appropriately encompass and 
integrate an information security policy which meets the array of generally unaddressed demands 
reported in literature and the present study.  
 
 
Figure 6.1: Compliance Ratings, Managers vs. Employees 
 
 
The reproduced figure below shows the strong feelings of employees whom were prone to be 
apathetic to the range of information security issues. If this is the perspective of apathetic 
employees, it can rather safely be assumed that the reality of the literature findings apply wholly 
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to even the advanced (compared to the average Saudi institution) and powerful financial 
institutions. 
 
Figure 6.2: Recommending additional Emphasis in IS (at the Organisational Level) 
 
The recommendations offered from employees provide some insight into the required 
recommendations for optimising IS, but have limited local perspective which generally do not 
consider the large issues which only lower or upper managers may be aware of. As such, these 
issues should at least be reviewed, and then filtered or refined as needed for development and 
implementation. These developmental areas include greater effort from managers (including 
innovation and consideration, as well as greater involvement in the company‘s information 
systems), additional training for managers, additional IS training for all employees, improved 
facilitation for employees sharing information, improvement of policy to ensure that the 
technological potential is optimised (as the majority of employees asserted that the technology 
alone is not sufficient for meeting IS demands), and an improvement of technology. These 
generally support the recommendations outlined, and should entirely justify the development of 
initiatives aimed at addressing the areas for improved IS; meanwhile, areas such as improved 
employee communication should be considered by including employees in a short portion of the 
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meetings (or separate routine meetings) to discuss concerns, experiences, or suggestions for 
general improvement.  
 
Summarizing significant recommendations in brief, these include: 
 the recommendations from Althaneer and Nelson (2009) should be followed, including: i)  
increased cоnfidentiаlity оf ѕenѕitive infоrmаtiоn (соnсerned with рreventing diѕсlоѕure 
оf infоrmаtiоn tо unаuthоrised uѕerѕ), ii) integrity (соnсerned with enѕuring dаtа саnnоt 
be mоdified withоut аuthоrisаtiоnѕ), and iii) avаilаbility (соnсerned with enѕuring 
infоrmаtiоn muѕt be аvаilаble tо аuthоrised uѕerѕ when they require them)  
 mobile phones should be a key area of focus in awareness and improving security 
systems, and the rising number of mobile phone users, internet users 
 each bank should inform employees of statements such as the mobile subscribers with 
cumulative annual growth rate 
 the information security policies should be formally structured, printed in detail, provided 
to each employee, and routinely reviewed 
 the employees and managers should be polled on a routine basis regarding the perceived  
effectiveness and potential for change 
 brief training sessions should be scheduled on at least an annual basis to update the 
employees on changes to technology, policy, or threats 
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6.5 Policy Recommendations Regarding Managers and Interview Topics 
 
Although the managers provided only a comparatively small sample, their perspective, 
experience, and resultant implications carried significant weight; one should regard their 
experience and perspective with seriousness, and their responses implied the situations are in fact 
as serious as published in the recent literature (i.e. Saudi Gazette, 2007 and Muhaya, 2010). 
Thus, recommendations for these areas are of comparable or greater importance. Naturally, areas 
which are considered in both instrumentation pieces are critical, and especially those which have 
been noted in literature as well. Some banks reported feeling very secure in comparison to the 
remainder of the nation, but have nonetheless reported problems with firewall breaches, viruses, 
and other issues which could be better addressed through evolution on a par with similar 
organisations in developed nations. According to the interviews, there are problems on networks 
more often than projected, and this is evident across all departments; meanwhile, the biggest 
concern for information system security is always protecting the network, and at this point in 
time, the most vulnerable technology is the firewall and security software. Employees hope that 
both improvements in available software take place at a rate faster than those would wish to 
break into the network can develop hacking methods, and that they continue to have access to 
defence technology within a fair amount of time once it becomes available. These areas can be 
addressed through the aforementioned recommendations as well as an emphasis on technology. 
 
The manager perspectives imply a greater need for technological improvements, although the 
employee responses suggest that the technology alone is not sufficient to address the lower-level 
everyday issues. Ideally, both should be addressed, with investments in technology only taking 
place when there have been clear improvements over existing technology. Members of upper 
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management should discuss existing improvements to technology in the proposed routine 
meetings, and decide whether the improvements to hardware or software would translate to a 
useful difference to information security processes or demands. The greater concern of the 
threats from commercially available technology can only be addressed through the 
improvements of technology and procedures on a comparable scale, but improved efforts to 
study and communicate these threats in an organised manner would decrease the potentials for 
the threats to catch the organisations ‗off guard.‘ Similar to the lack of organised emergency 
management or disaster recovery, there does not appear to be an organised procedure to facilitate 
this communication (nor requirements to locate and assess threats); clearly, this should be 
implemented into policy.  
 
Software maintenance was more commonly mentioned by managers than employees, although 
employees may have simply taken this area for granted. This should simply be an area of 
concern, observation, and discussion that is a formal part of policy. The relations of operations to 
firewalls and SSL were found to be the greatest concerns in the organisations observed, and this 
was noted in literature as well.  
 
The remainder of the other implications from the interviews, such as a lack of concern for 
development, general concerns of threats, and apathy towards compliance and ethics, can be 
addressed through similar means as those described in the previous section.  
 managers should conduct individual studies of organisational factors influencing personal 
ethics managers should better motivate employees to facilitate optimal security  
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 upper management should continue setting the groundwork for continuing improvement 
(by assessing the most influential institutional factors, and their relationship with 
managers and employees) 
 the employees and managers should be polled on a routine basis regarding the perceived  
effectiveness and potential for change 
 managers should petition for changes to policy or relevant factors (i.e. software) based on 
this feedback 
 managers should be liable to report any potential threat to security, and be provided with 
further means to handle threats should the present themselves 
 managers should request to update or upgrade the existing firewalls and anti-viral 
programs managers should either have a means of performing these actions solely, or 
should have access to someone who can perform this action immediately  
 members of upper management should discuss existing improvements to technology in 
the proposed routine meetings 
 managers should decide whether the improvements to hardware or software would 
translate to a useful difference to information security processes or demands 
6.6 Summary and Implications to Stakeholders 
Listing the main recommendations of this effort, these were determined to be: 
 managers should conduct individual studies of organisational factors influencing personal 
ethics managers should better motivate employees to facilitate optimal security  
 upper management should continue setting the groundwork for continuing improvement 
(by assessing the most influential institutional factors, and their relationship with 
managers and employees) 
 180 
 the Saudi government could play a further role in promoting these developments 
 safeguarding the economy 
 the recommendations from Althaneer and Nelson (2009) should be followed, including: i)  
increased cоnfidentiаlity оf ѕenѕitive infоrmаtiоn (соnсerned with рreventing diѕсlоѕure 
оf infоrmаtiоn tо unаuthоrised uѕerѕ), ii) integrity (соnсerned with enѕuring dаtа саnnоt 
be mоdified withоut аuthоrisаtiоnѕ), and iii) avаilаbility (соnсerned with enѕuring 
infоrmаtiоn muѕt be аvаilаble tо аuthоrised uѕerѕ when they require them)  
 mobile phones should be a key area of focus in awareness and improving security 
systems, and the rising number of mobile phone users, internet users 
 the increasing capacity of mobile technology to be integrated with online technology 
should be at the forefront of information system education and development for years to 
come  
 each bank could inform employees of statements such as the mobile subscribers with 
cumulative annual growth rate 
 the information security policies should be formally structured, printed in detail, provided 
to each employee, and routinely reviewed 
 the employees and managers should be polled on a routine basis regarding the perceived  
effectiveness and potential for change 
 managers should petition for changes to policy or relevant factors (i.e. software) based on 
this feedback 
 brief training sessions should be scheduled on at least an annual basis to update the 
employees on changes to technology, policy, or threats 
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 managers should be liable to report any potential threat to security, and be provided with 
further means to handle threats should the present themselves 
 managers should request to update or upgrade the existing firewalls and anti-viral 
programs managers should either have a means of performing these actions solely, or 
should have access to someone who can perform this action immediately  
 members of upper management should discuss existing improvements to technology in 
the proposed routine meetings 
 managers should decide whether the improvements to hardware or software would 
translate to a useful difference to information security processes or demands 
 the remainder of the other implications from the interviews (i.e. a lack of concern for  
development, general concerns of threats, and apathy towards compliance and ethics) 
should be addressed through similar means as those described in the previous section 
 
Essentially, organisations facing multiple problems and issues addressed through the present 
study and literature are advised to completely restructure their IS procedures; this would serve to 
encompass the entirety of concerns, best practices, and flexibility for routine assessments and 
developments. The changes demanded are so great that there are major implications for 
stakeholders, in relation to both technological improvements and restructuring policies. A table 
of these concerns was presented in the analysis section, is reproduced in the figure below, and is 
the subject of the continuing analysis in the following chapter.  
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Issue Importance to Stakeholders 
Technology upgrade demand Stakeholders should note that: additional 
resources and means to acquire or improve 
technology in demand, current emphasis on 
development in other areas may require change 
in priority 
Apathy regarding compliance Compliance need not be addressed, while 
emphasis may even be removed from this area 
in future developments 
Apathy regarding ethics Ethical guidelines should remain intact, 
however, any developmental initiatives or 
resources diverted to improving ethics may be 
better diverted to a more practical area. 
Mixed opinions regarding policies Policies should be examined individually and 
more cautiously in any considerations for 
reform, while the time dedicated to this process 
should depend on the varying responses 
regarding this topic.   
Security concerns These should increase the prioritisation of 
technology, research, and overall reform 
initiatives.  
Ability for nation to address problems Stakeholders should remain mindful of the 
incapacity of the nation to address root 
problems in the near future, becoming 
motivated and facilitating motivation for 
change. 
Inability to take action matching strive for 
technology 
Similar to the other areas, stakeholders should 
increase the motivation and prioritisation for 
actual change, although it also shows the 
motivation for acquiring technology alone is 
generally considered sufficient. 
 
Figure 6.3: Summary of Key Recommendation Topics and Implications for Stakeholders 
 
Upper and lower management must assume additional responsibilities to ensure that the 
prioritisation recommended in literature and demand confirmed in the previous analyses are 
sufficiently integrated into practice; this demands technological improvements and assessments, 
routine meetings considering potential threats and improvements to systems, altering policies to 
address employee operations and demands, and removing the apathy towards both threats and 
 183 
compliance. These policies should be tailored to the specifications of the individual 
organisations, printed and distributed, strictly enforced, and updated (with the cycle repeated) as 
deemed necessary in periodic analyses. Managers must have a means of making changes prior to 
these analyses, whether it be through suggestion and assisted research or immediate development 
pending policy restructuring. Training must also be given additional prioritisation, and the 
suffering awareness can be facilitated through this and the inclusion of employees in routine 
meetings. See Chapter 8 for further relations with literature.  
 
Chapter 7: Evaluation of Stakeholder Recommendations 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Stakeholders from the ten institutions targeted for analysis were targeted for feedback regarding 
the recommendations proposed in Chapter 6. As reading the entirety of the chapter alongside 
express written feedback and recommendations for future development did not seem feasible (or 
ideal to recruit participation), the researcher developed an additional set of questionnaire 
instrumentation to apply to stakeholders. Three stakeholders from each institution were 
contacted, forming a sample of 30 participants overall,.  
 
While the findings of the primary research are important to stakeholders, the feedback from 
stakeholders regarding the direction of recommendations is important for the development of the 
company; stakeholder opinion and influence are major factors in development, and with many 
issues important to stakeholders addressed in proposed recommendations, an assessment of their 
feedback regarding the key points of these recommendations is valuable to the study. Generally 
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considering or addressing issues in annual general meetings, Board of Directors‘ meetings, or 
Executive Committee meetings, stakeholders are commonly known to express their concerns in 
areas including the soundness of organisational governance, asset protection, and return on 
investment, while all of these issues are relevant to the findings of the primary research. 
Stakeholders may respond to these issues and recent actions by judging whether reform efforts 
have been sufficiently thorough, rating the effectiveness of growth or profit, and offering 
recommendations or posing questions in other areas. Through this area of the research, the issues 
in the primary research can be addressed in a sample of stakeholders directly, allowing the 
researcher to apply and discuss the combined evaluations of managers and stakeholders. This has 
implications for the demand for action and the nature of change, thereby allowing the researcher 
to ‗close the loop‘ as mentioned while leading to the concluding discussion of this research 
initiative.  
 
7.2 Stakeholder Recommendations 
7.2.1 Sampling 
The managers participating in the interviews were contacted regarding recommendations for 
accessible stakeholders. Brief lists were provided from one manager from each facility, and these 
stakeholders were contacted regarding their willingness to participate. As the target sample size 
was 30 stakeholders, equally representing the companies analysed, subsequent stakeholders were 
not contacted once three participants had agreed to contribute to the sample. With this, 
convenience sampling was the predominant method used aside from inclusion criteria. 
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7.2.2 Instrumentation 
As stated, a survey questionnaire was developed and applied for this area of the research. A total 
of 12 items were strategically developed to address key areas of the recommendations, as well as 
the primary areas of importance, outlined in Chapter 6. While the interviews revealed differences 
in opinions between managers and banks, and the banks are assumed to be operating with 
different technological capacities and unique policies, the instrumentation used was the same for 
each stakeholder; no custom consideration was made, and the instrumentation examines the 
general areas of concern, common areas of neglect and demands for improvement, common 
attitudes, and the recommendations which had been developed considering these areas. Some of 
the questions were designed to assess the prioritisation of each noted area of importance, others 
to rate the effectiveness of the specific qualitative recommendations, and others to rate the 
perceived demands for change in information security. It was assumed that the stakeholders were 
aware of the issues outlined in the study, as well as the general demand for improvements in the 
nation; however, the stakeholders were recommended to read provided material (covering the 
background and issues of concern) if they were not familiar with the rationale for information 
security changes in Saudi Arabia. See following section for relations to recommendations, and 
see Chapter 8 for relationships with objectives (as well as analysis in relation to literature).  
 
The instrumentation questions were developed as follows: 
 
1. ―Upper and lower management are recommended to assume additional responsibilities, to 
ensure that IS prioritisation recommended in literature is sufficiently integrated.‖ Please rate 
how strongly you agree with this statement (1 representing no agreement and 10 representing 
strong agreement). ___________ 
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2. Regarding the statement presented in Question 1, please indicate the ratio you feel these IS 
responsibilities should be divided (e.g. 50% upper management and 50% lower management). 
____________ 
 
3. Technological improvements and assessments are recommended as a top priority for 
progressive change. Do you agree (Y/N)? If yes, please rate the prioritisation you feel should 
apply to this area (please use a scale of 1-10)______ If no, please state why you do not feel this 
should be a priority in change________ 
 
4. Routine meetings considering potential improvements to systems are also recommended as a 
high priority for progressive change. Do you agree (Y/N)? If yes, please rate the prioritisation 
you feel should apply to this area (please use a scale of 1-10)______ If no, please state why you 
do not feel this should be a priority in change________ 
 
5. Removing apathy towards threats and compliance is another of the most highly recommended 
changes towards improved IS. Do you agree that this should also be one of the leading priorities 
(Y/N)? If yes, please rate the prioritisation you feel should apply to this area (please use a scale 
of 1-10)______ If no, please state why you do not feel this should be a priority in 
change________ 
 
6. The final leading priority recommended for improved IS is altering policies to address 
employee operations and demands. Do you agree that this should also be one of the leading 
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priorities (Y/N)? If yes, please rate the prioritisation you feel should apply to this area (please 
use a scale of 1-10)______ If no, please state why you do not feel this should be a priority in 
change________ 
 
7. Considering the outlined recommendations for improving IS in accordance to common 
demands, tailoring policies to the specification of the organisation, printing and distributing 
them, strictly enforcing them, and updating them as necessary (in accordance with periodic 
analyses) are recommended. Please comment 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. To achieve the above, managers must have a means of inciting change, whether through 
recommendation and pending additional research, or immediate development pending policy 
restructuring. Each has potential advantages; do you recommend the i) recommendations 
pending research and approval, ii) immediate developments and policy restructuring, iii) a vote 
to take either action, or iv) another approach? If you selected iv), please describe 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Do you agree formal training (at least one full day) is required to properly address IS issues 
(Y/N)? Why or why not?_________________________________________________________ 
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10. Do you agree that compliance and ethics are only minor concerns, while the majority of 
employees generally do not create any issue responsible for current levels of IS (Y/N)? 
Comments?____________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Do you agree that restructuring initiatives must be developed, implemented, and maintained, 
or do you feel that generally improving awareness within companies will lead to change? Please 
explain _______________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Please provide any other comments you feel are useful in this effort to improve the provided 
recommendations; any information is appreciated. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7.2.3 Results 
The pilot study of the questionnaire revealed that the original draft of the instrumentation was 
sufficient for the final distribution, and thus the data provided by those respondents was included 
in the study. Once the targeted quantity of 30 had been achieved, the sample was deemed 
complete, with the results compiled.  
 
Responding to the first question, asking for a rating from 1-10 regarding the assumption of new 
managerial responsibilities, the average response was a 7.6. This shows that the average 
stakeholder feels that the managers need to assume a substantial amount of new responsibilities, 
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while this is the ideal direction towards progressive change. This also shows that the general 
context of the recommended changes was well received, with the majority stakeholders willing 
to participate in this assessment feeling that changes are needed to address issues in IS. The 
second question revealed that stakeholders feel that upper management is more responsible for 
these changes that lower management, with the average ratio provided by respondents being a 
70-30 split of added responsibilities; this is generally in agreement with the recommendations, 
although no ratio had been presented in the recommendations, the outlined direction and changes 
require more actions from those with sufficient power (and less actions from those controlling 
and monitoring lower functions). Meanwhile, stakeholders are more capable of discussing the 
recommendations and proposed changes with those they feel should be evoking them, but they 
generally must recommend courses of action for change for those whom have less contact with 
the stakeholders. The average ratio of recommended responsibilities is shown in Figure 7.1 
below.  
 
 
Figure 7.1: Recommended division of new IS responsibilities controlled by management 
 
The third question asked respondents to state whether they agree with technology improvements 
and assessments being a top priority. Here, 50 percent of respondents stated they agree with the 
statement, and 50 percent stated they did not agree; with this, the reason for the substantial 
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disagreement was the wording of the statement, as stakeholders generally felt that the use of 
technology (including assessments) should be the primary focus, with the technology itself being 
more adequate in the current situation (especially hardware). The respondents rated the 
prioritisation of this area at an average of 6.2. Additional comments regarding the prioritisation 
of this area included the need for a few software improvements compared to the greater need for 
improved organisation, monitoring, and policy; moreover, roughly one-quarter of the 
stakeholders commented that organisation should be pursued first, with technological demands 
outlined and addressed following these efforts, making the probability for demanding 
technological improvements high but ultimately unknown without institution-specific analysis of 
detailed specifications related to demands.  
 
Regarding the fourth question inquiring about the demand for routine meetings discussing IS 
capacity and demand, the majority of the respondents agreed that this type of improved 
communication is needed to better address areas of IS. Thus, 67 percent agreed with the 
recommendation, while the remaining third of the respondents stated that the current levels of 
discussion in their institutions are sufficient in terms of time and frequency (but generally require 
improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of these discussions). The average rating for 
prioritisation was 6.2, with additional comments regarding prioritisation including increased 
analyses being conducted outside of meetings, brought to attention at the meetings, and the 
amount of time dedicated to IS being recommended on a case by case basis. Here, approximately 
one third of the respondents did not feel that routine attention to IS in meetings was necessary 
aside from the brief mentioning of findings or concern. Figure 7.2 reveals the general willingness 
of stakeholders to support routine IS discussion in meetings; the fact that the majority of 
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stakeholders feel such an investment in time would be worthwhile further shows the general 
support for additional diverted effort, as well as the recognition for substantial development in 
IS. 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Percent of sample recommending routine discussions of IS prioritised in meetings 
 
The fifth question asked respondents to address the observed apathy regarding compliance and 
potential threats; the research recommendations suggested a prioritisation (and thus increased 
attention and effort applied) towards the existing apathy. When asked whether they agree that 
this should be one of the leading priorities in a campaign for improved information security, 73 
percent of the respondents reported that they agreed, with the remaining 27 percent reporting that 
they feel these areas should not be prioritised in such a campaign. Rating the prioritisation they 
feel should apply to the area, the average stakeholder rated the prioritisation to be at 7.6. This 
shows one of the more significant prioritisations in the campaign, with a large number of 
comments stating that apathy towards threats is a much greater problem than apathy towards 
compliance (as was also implied from the interview questions). A small portion of respondents 
(approximately on quarter) commented that compliance should be addressed but in a minimal 
(non-prioritised) manner. 
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Addressing the sixth question, examining the demand to alter IS policies to better regulate 
employee operations and demands, 80 percent of the respondents agreed this area should be 
prioritised. With this, the average rating of prioritisation was a 7.8, being the most highly rated 
recommended priority. The minority 20 percent provided comments including that policies must 
be added or enforced to address the most pressing issues, with the potential for existing policies 
needing to be altered was minimal for their circumstances. Naturally, the exact variables relevant 
to this are expected to vary significantly between organisations, as policies are an area most 
prone to differences compared to the other areas considered. In spite of this, the generalised 
recommendations aimed at the common and shared themes between organisations, produced this 
highly supported and prioritised recommendation.  
 
The seventh question asked respondents to provide comments regarding the recommendations 
for tailoring the existing policies to better meet the demands to improve IS (while still 
considerate of the organisational variables and needs), printing and distributing policies 
throughout the organisation for maximum awareness, and updating them in accordance to routine 
examinations. The overwhelming majority of respondents simply agreed with this, stating that 
they felt this would be the best course of action for any bank attempting to implement such 
initiatives to take. Others felt that these areas would naturally follow from the other mentioning 
of altering policy; there were mixed comments regarding the nature of routine examinations and 
updates, with some agreeing there should be periodic assessments, with others feeling this may 
be a waste of resources in the absence of a probable cause. Through the pilot study implied that 
additional and meaningful information could be generated through the inclusion of this question 
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(and its due consideration of the summary of recommendations provided), the responses did not 
reveal anything that was not implied from previous responses.  
 
The eighth question requested that the stakeholders comment on the managerial needs of inciting 
change, through recommendation and pending research (versus immediate developments and 
policy restructuring). Acknowledging the potential advantages, the study requested that 
respondents state whether they recommend either action over the other, a vote to take either 
action, or some other approach; in response, 20 percent sided with changes favouring (further) 
research and restructuring, 30 percent favoured immediate developments and policy 
restructuring, 40 percent reported that the vote would be the best action, and the remaining 10 
percent thought another approach would be best. The 10 percent reported that they thought the 
best approach would be to, rather, a combination approach based on a vote; here, members of 
management (presumably with stakeholder influence) would vote on how to designate desired 
developments in either of the two areas. This shows that the recommendations are generally 
supported by the stakeholders, but half of them feel they would discuss them further before 
attempting to take action to actually change anything. The other half generally supports the 
recommendations, and feels that the best way to go about seeing real change is dependent more 
on circumstance and permissible methods of action. This was expected to some degree, as the 
recommendations were admittedly based on the shared themes and demands noted in the primary 
research. The final questions in the survey attempted to gain more insight regarding stakeholder 
evaluation and more specific aspects of plans for progressive development within the individual 
institutions.  
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The ninth question asked the respondents if they agreed that formal training, involving at least 
one full day of structured information exchange or preparation, is required to properly address 
existing IS issues. Unfortunately, this question does not consider the quantity of individuals 
potentially involved in the training, leaving the respondents to select a response whether they 
feel two individuals should be trained or half of the company trained; this was not noted in the 
pilot study while the researcher assumed the responses would still be sufficiently useful. 
Fortunately, the follow-up ‗why or why not‘ element of the question allowed the researcher to 
extract at least some meaningful information from the stakeholders. Addressing the closed 
element of the question, 80 per cent of the respondents agreed that at least some formal training 
was required to meet desired IS objectives, generally in support of the need for change and the 
methods required to bring the changes. Addressing the ‗why or why not‘ component, 
respondents gave responses ranging from lower level management needing training, upper level 
management needing training regarding IS management and leadership, lower level security 
workers needing training regarding their own pursuit of IS issues and communication with 
management, training for managing research and development, and training for change 
management. The remaining 20 percent of respondents felt that this could be addressed without 
formal training, and could slowly be addressed informally through management initiatives, 
meetings, and integrations of such actions into job description. While this appears to be more 
challenging, less organised, and having the potential for lower levels of effectiveness (or even 
efficiency) in outcome, the potential for overall efficiency is nonetheless evident; further 
discussion on these topics at theoretical levels is provided in the following section.  
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The tenth question asked respondents to state whether they agree that compliance and ethics are 
only minor concerns, while most employees‘ non-compliance does not contribute to current 
issues in IS; 90 percent of respondents reported agreeing with this question. Although the 
commentary generally agreed with the recommendations, comments included recommendations 
for examining compliance and impact in greater depth, emphasising compliance with a lesser 
consideration of ethics, and asking employees if they have noticed ethics affecting daily aspects 
of IS.  
The eleventh question then asked respondents if they agree that restructuring initiatives should 
be developed, implemented, and maintained, or if they feel that improving awareness alone can 
facilitate the required changes. Here, the majority of the stakeholders agreed that awareness 
alone could not bring about the types of changes demanded, with only 20 per cent asserting this 
method should be sought. These stakeholders provided an extension of the logic provided in 
regards to the meetings and structure, stating such effort would not be demanded while a general 
encouragement and informal call to action in daily routines would lead to the changes demanded; 
these stakeholders felt their institutions are capable of inciting significant change without 
strategic planning, development, and change management.  
Although the institutions with the higher levels of organisation and general success in operation 
may have the capacity to achieve such feats in a way which appears to be more efficient than 
seemingly more consuming restructuring campaigns, it is common knowledge among 
management and organisational literature that significant changes benefit more from change 
management; these campaigns need not be consuming, but they should be organised, planned, 
and monitored to some degree to ensure success (Muhaya, 2010). This is discussed in further 
detail in the following section, while this preliminary analysis accompanying the results suggests 
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that strives for efficiency responsible for shortcomings in IS are evident in a considerable portion 
of stakeholders as well. Meanwhile, the stakeholders which agreed that restructuring initiatives 
must be developed, implemented, and maintained did not specify if they felt the extent of 
formality and structured recommended in change management best practices would be required 
for successful change; however, the variations between stakeholder opinions, management 
opinions, and the recommendations in best practices is an area worthy of consideration in 
developing IS (as well as other areas).   
 
Lastly, the twelfth question asked respondents to provide any other comments they felt would be 
useful in the overall initiative to improve the subareas of the provided recommendations; 
fortunately, the majority of the respondents did provide some commentary, with only 30 per cent 
declining to contribute to this particular item. The most common comment (mentioned to some 
extent by 40 percent of the sample) agreed with the findings of the preliminary research that 
management was commonly prioritising efficiency over effectiveness in IS, with some 
stakeholders pressing for the prioritisation of effectiveness and continuous updates. 
Approximately 20 per cent of stakeholders commented on the lack of concern for emergency 
management and disaster recovery policies, were aware of the existing literature reporting this to 
be a common issue across Saudi Arabia, and recommended a formal approach to at least this 
area; with this, approximately 30 percent stated they felt certain IS demands could be addressed 
informally, and only a partial amount of the recognised areas demanded a formal campaign or 
initiative to effectively guide change towards the objectives. 
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7.3 Evaluation 
7.3.1 Introduction 
There are many recommendations that need to be followed, and the arguments for this are clear, 
considering both the range of literature reviewed and the research assessed. The argument for the 
recommendations is further supported by this evaluation, while it also considers stakeholder 
recommendations.  
7.3.2 Stakeholder relations 
With the majority of demands for change acknowledged in the majority of stakeholders, the 
implications for management and the institutions are thereby amplified. Although a considerable 
portion of the respondents did not feel that formal initiatives are required for effective change, a 
larger portion reported feeling there is a genuine demand for formal change in at least a portion 
of the areas. With this, only a fraction of the institutions may agree to plan and implement a 
campaign for improving information services, but the majority of stakeholders and managers 
agree with the needed direction for change in the areas discussed. This implies a comparable 
perspective in managers and stakeholders, and implies the stakeholders generally agree with the 
recommendations of literature guiding this research, in spite of the current state of the system 
and present lack of informal or formal change initiatives. Whether the agreed demands for 
change are formal or informal, the results from the stakeholders and managers imply that 
attempts to pursue best practices and IS upgrades are held with a higher regard, and the study 
may have prompted additional research, informal efforts and increased awareness, or even some 
structured attempt to address the issues pointed out. The demand for stakeholder support for 
significant changes appears to have a high potential to be met with this level of support, based on 
the current sample and responses, but changes requiring a wide range of stakeholder support may 
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still be challenged by the much larger samples affecting all institutions. This report could serve 
to encourage managers wary of stakeholder response to pursue action.  
7.3.3 Management 
The 7.6 rating for increased managerial responsibilities has proportional implications for the 
demands on managers to play a critical role in improving information systems. As described in 
the previous chapters, a common issue restricting developing IS to its current potential is a 
mentality that existing threats have been addressed to maintain the existing levels of operation 
and incidents. Managers may also feel too preoccupied with their duties or stresses for 
improvements in other areas, leading to the lower level of prioritisation in IS; meanwhile, some 
stakeholders feel that this is an area in need of top priority, while others agree that it need not be 
prioritised beyond the basic developments required for basic service, likely leading to division 
regarding the prioritisation of optimising development. With the rise of technological 
capabilities, it is commonly known that systems which appeared to be more secure only a few 
years in the past may be vulnerable to many threats in a small amount of time, and Saudi Arabia 
has been found guilty of an inability (or apathy) to continually ‗catch up‘ with technological 
developments; also as stated in previous chapters, even if the entire nation maintains a 
comparable level of gradual technological development, increasing globalisation and entrance of 
new technology further increases the potential for treats (Saudi Gazette, 2007; Muhaya, 2010). 
Banks should be at the forefront of IS optimisation, and it appears that the combination of 
literature and findings, manager opinion, and stakeholder opinion may be required to prompt the 
organisations to ‗take the lead‘ in optimising IS within the nation. In addition to helping their 
own organisation while reducing the threat for security breaches, the models these institutions 
follow for optimisation can serve as a model for other Saudi organisations to follow.  
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7.3.4 Combined evaluations 
The 70-30 rating for the split in managerial decisions suggests that the stakeholders have a direct 
means of discussing how they feel changes should be developed, implemented, or monitored, as 
they generally have easier access to members of upper management. Meanwhile, the split 
regarding technology improvements and assessments shows that a great deal of discussion will 
likely take place before stakeholders and managers agree on significant changes. The analysis 
and general recommendations leaned towards software improvements more than hardware, with 
the comments provided by the stakeholders suggesting that this is the most likely change to take 
place.  
 
Stakeholders generally agree with the need for improved organisation, monitoring, and policy, 
with explicit expression for prioritising organisation. The recommendations acknowledged its 
importance, but reflecting on the original results with this in mind, it is evident that the majority 
of complications could be addressed through a combination of improved awareness and 
organisation. Meanwhile, however, this also implies that the organisation should involve 
structure in all areas, with the informal improvements preferred by a substantial portion of the 
sample being less than ideal in favour of formal or more organised ones. The capacity to 
organise progressive development without formal changes to policy or highly structured 
initiatives may be limited (in terms of implementation, monitoring, or unforeseen demands for 
adjustments), but it may be possible to address the demands of the portion of stakeholders 
preferring the most discrete and direct improvements, avoiding the potentially distracting and 
draining campaign approach; further research or attention in this area could benefit 
understanding or efforts.  The two thirds of stakeholders agreeing that routine meetings 
discussing IS (or at least including IS discussions in all routine meetings) are unlikely to be 
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overwhelmed by popular opinion or resistance to change, assuming the effort for change is made, 
but it is unlikely that new meetings will be established; IS should not be given a low priority 
simply because no threats have actually breached the system, with new threats, security 
technology, and existing states of the system in place at least mentioned in the existing routine 
meetings. Such discussions should occur on at least a quarterly basis, with the stakeholder results 
implying they further agree with designated employees researching these threats and protection 
potentials to provide this information.  
 
The apathy towards compliance and potential threats is likely to only be addressed in terms of 
potential threats; managers and stakeholders alike feel that apathy towards compliance due is 
only rarely due to any serious issue directly related to IS functionality; rather, compliance is 
recommended to be addressed through awareness and questioning employees, while the apathy 
for potential threats is to be addressed through the combination of changes recommended 
(restructuring policy, training, awareness, etc.) With this, one of the most highly recommended 
changes was the restructuring of IS policies to better regulate operations while addressing 
demands, with the 80 per cent of stakeholders agreeing this should be prioritised suggesting that 
at least some changes are likely to be incited in the near future. The remaining 20 percent 
suggesting that existing policies must be better enforced are likely to contribute to changes in 
this area as well, with the specific variables involved naturally differing between organisations 
and circumstance.  
 
Preferences for change management are likely to be debated, but the general support for 
improvements in IS are nonetheless prioritised. The fact that there were comparable responses 
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regarding formal training compared to other formal initiatives further reflects division regarding 
the optimal approach to change in this area.  
 
Further details regarding more specific changes at the institutional level are naturally possible 
with the development of separate recommendations for the specific shortfalls and preferences of 
each institution (and the specific evaluations of each set of recommendations), while the analysis 
of the institutions revealed shared themes common across each institution; moreover, these 
findings were comparable to the IS findings in literature observing Saudi Arabia IS in general. 
The fact that the majority of the stakeholders agreed with the recommendations for IS 
improvement was likely facilitated by the presence of the related studies, the findings of the 
literature, and knowledge of the conditions observed in the primary research. The differences in 
opinion could be due to varying levels of communication with the managers, varying levels of 
awareness, and different prioritisations of components in business models (i.e. preferring a 
continuous approach on prioritising maximum profit versus a cautious approach). Considering 
the causes for differences could be meaningful in further research, but the majority opinions of 
managers and stakeholders regarding the topics approached in the research strongly supports the 
notion that banks are equally ‗guilty‘ of the lack of IS optimisation, and are thereby in need of 
improvements. This type of stakeholder support could improve or even incite attempts to address 
the issues implied by literature and confirmed in this study.  
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7.4 Summary 
 
The primary research revealed many areas that could benefit from improvement initiatives in IS, 
with areas importance to stakeholders including demands for i) technological improvements, ii) 
apathy towards compliance, iii) apathy towards ethics, iv) mixed opinions regarding policies, v) 
security concerns, vi) the ability for the nation to address issues, and vii) the inability to take 
action matching the strive for technology. Stakeholder evaluation suggests that all of these areas 
are indeed important across the entirety of the stakeholder body for the institutions in question, 
with the exception of components iii) and vii), which were respectively given less priority and 
addressed through other means. In any case, this analysis clearly reveals that IS problems have 
been noted in literature, are acknowledged by prominent members of leading banks, and are 
further acknowledged by stakeholders. Perhaps with increasing awareness, such leading 
institutions will set a new standard for national IS, and provide a model for similar developments 
found to be commonly required across the nation. Studies such as this may promote awareness in 
a way which forces concerns into perspective for the institutions, facilitating the changes they 
have otherwise been hesitant to make. If not, the findings suggest that threats growing to 
breaches, and demands for emergency management, may be the only events capable of inciting 
these types of changes.  
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Chapter 8: Discussion, Conclusions, and Final Recommendations 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This research effort has expanded the existing knowledge base regarding information security, 
revealing that even Saudi banks are not immune to the problems located in information security 
literature; meanwhile, as banks have a greater need for IS amid greater consequences for 
breached security, the resultant demand for development is greater compared to a scenario where 
medium sized retail businesses were found to be veritably devoid of: emergency management 
and disaster recovery plans, organised systems and technology matching threat capacity, or other 
weaknesses described by this analysis and discussion. The research and analysis led to the 
formulation of recommendations in line with previous literature (as shown in Chapter 6), with 
the majority of stakeholders agreeing with this guided direction for development. This chapter 
provides additional discussion, conclusion, recommendations, and closing commentary relevant 
to this research effort; through this, the project is summarised, relationships in concepts and 
theory are explored further, and recommendations for future research and development are 
described in detail. Clearly, despite the fact that Saudi institutions have generally been safe with 
existing IS systems, their potential to be overwhelmed by existing threats and to be thrown into 
an emergency situation without protocol is great enough to warrant substantial awareness and 
developmental initiatives. 
8.2 Discussion 
8.2.1 Further Analysis of Findings 
 
The findings support the general findings of literature, despite the obligations of financial 
institutions (Saudi Gazette, 2007; Abu-Musa, 2009; Muhaya, 2010). With this, many elements of 
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the results and feedback are relevant to the literature conclusions and recommendations, 
fortunately leading to a near consensus capable of inciting development. The 100 total 
respondents participating from the ten institutions were thereby representatives of some of the 
most prestigious institutions with the greatest information security needs, and provided data 
revealing that the prioritisation of both optimising technology and improving protocol are low. 
Although banks have the financial and organisational capacities to have implemented the 
changes recommended in literature and best practices at the time they were published, but both 
the desire to research these topics while investing in these aspects of IS were found to be low 
priorities (if considered at all) across the employees observed.  
 
As stated in the results and analysis chapter, the percentages of employees serving in the 
aforementioned list of organisations was also calculated from provided totals, with 
approximately 18 per cent from Al-Jazira Bank, 14 per cent from Arab National Bank, 11 per 
cent from Al-Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp., 14 per cent from Riyadh Bank, 6 per cent from 
Saudi American Bank, 11 per cent from Saudi British Bank, 6 per cent from Albilad Bank, 6 per 
cent from Saudi French Bank, 8 per cent from Saudi Hollandi Bank, and 6 per cent from Saudi 
Investment Bank. Although the percentages of the employees were slightly disproportionate, and 
the study could have been improved through a larger sample including 30+ members from each 
organisation (not to mention additional interviews), the results and interviews nonetheless 
revealed the comparable trends with findings in literature; the validity and reliability of the 
instruments combined with these facts validates the results, analysis, and recommendations.  
 
Further examining the perspective of employees participating in the study, their respective 
positions have effectively conveyed knowledge of the inner workings of IS in their respective 
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organisations. With this, the leading position among the respondents was a variation of a 
computer technician (such as ―technical supervisor,‖ ―systems operator,‖ and similar titles), 
while approximately 59 per cent of respondents reported being employed in this position. As 
more than half of the employees had direct knowledge of operation and development in IS, they 
were perhaps more aware of the shortcomings, demands, and influential processes than the 
analysts observing functions of IS in some of the studies included in the literature review. All 
employees had confirmed having a substantial role in IS prior to participation, and the researcher 
attempted to be sure in order to best facilitate this meaningfulness and value in perspective, 
potentially contributing to the existing knowledge base more so than existing studies. In addition 
to the stated 59 per cent portion of computer technicians in the sample, lower-level management 
positions were most common, with 24 per cent of employees having some sort of team leader 
position (with titles including ―department supervisor,‖ ―assistant manager,‖ ―technical 
supervisor,‖ and others); beyond this, the remaining portion of employees (17 per cent) were 
members of middle or upper management, with the average time spent at the organisation (listed, 
time in other similar positions in different organisations was possible) was 7.6 years. This further 
contributes to the perspective demanded for an effective study, and combined with the validity 
and reliability emphasised in the strategic development of the instrumentation, the implications 
of the findings provided through the combination of this sample and instrumentation were indeed 
significant. Closing the research loop through the stakeholder analysis adds further weight to the 
implications for those responsible for the current states of development, with a considerable 
potential for pressuring these organisations to take further action for development. Although 
their superior significance to findings in other studies is debatable, their comparable significance 
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is clear, with the collaborative implications of all studies being great in the face of threats 
evolving more rapidly than defences (or even operational protocol).   
8.2.2 Relation of Major Findings to Current Literature 
As described in the literature review, the trends in Saudi institutions are thought to be a by-
product of shared traits across the nation. Whilst Saudi Arabia has the largest economy in the 
Middle East, it is still commonly described as a ‗developing‘ country as opposed to a 
‗developed‘ one, with this status related to some aspects of technological and organisational 
development in spite of the national success with oil and foreign investments. While prior plans 
incited ICT development between 1990 and 2000, emphasising the improvement of education, 
financial, legal, and technical skills. Unfortunately, however, these plans were not parallel to the 
IS strategies best practices, technology, and protocol common place in developed nations, while 
the threats growing in developed nations gained increasing potential to apply to Saudi 
institutions. The 2005 NCITP plan described required a five year developmental initiative to 
improve national IT in general, but this too could not parallel the developments in nations such 
as the United Kingdom, while the threats arising from higher levels of development were entirely 
applicable to local IS.  
 
According to Alfawaz, Nelson, and Mohannak (2010), ―understanding the complex dynamic and 
uncertain characteristics of organisational employees who perform authorised or unauthorised 
information security activities is deemed to be a very important and challenging task‖ (p. 2).  
While the challenge clearly applies to even the prestigious organisations assessed, the 
importance of these issues at the organisational level appeared to be lacking, thereby demanding 
some motivating factor in addition to any assessment of the capacity to implement 
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developmental plans. The power of the banks is assumed to be great enough to implement even 
major efforts to overhaul IS, but the apathetic attitudes and lack of organisation in certain areas 
suggested that the developmental initiatives would also require effort to motivate the 
organisation demanded to carry out such a plan. Alfawaz, Nelson, and Mohannak (2010) also 
studied three cases in relation to IS: a private organisation with more than 5,000 employees, 
various participants, from public organisations, and a non-profit organisation employing an 
estimated 3,600 people. Here, the authors had the opportunity to assess senior managers, 
information security managers, information technology specialists, and other managers and 
users. Unexpectedly, the results of this study do not directly compare to the results of the case 
studies, as the three primary causes of security incident and barriers to improving IS were 
determined to most commonly include compliance and behavioural issues (Alfawaz, Nelson, and 
Mohannak, 2010). In the primary research, compliance was not determined to be a major cause 
of incident, but forms of compliance were directly or indirectly considered responsible for the 
existing states of development.  
 
Beyond the primary concern of compliance and behaviour, Alfawaz, Nelson, and Mohannak 
(2010) reported that the next most inhibiting areas included downloading internet software, 
password sharing, using shortcuts, browsing potentially vulnerable content, ignoring policies, not 
sharing information regarding security practices, failing to report security violations, and not 
enforcing IS rules. Here, roughly half of the findings are relevant to the study; despite half of the 
areas not being mentioned or related to significant influence, this is not to state that these areas 
do not apply to the organisations on any level, but the failure to share beneficial information, 
failure to act on compliance violations, and ignoring the relevant procedures outlined in literature 
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were reported to be much more influential. Alfawaz, Nelson, and Mohannak (2010) stated that 
the most important of the areas isolated  in their analysis including the commitment of top 
management, the training and skill capacities in IT, security awareness programs, the 
organisational structure of IT, the roles of IS managers, motivation systems, and implementation 
of security standards. These are the most relevant aspects of literature in the findings of the 
study, with the results, analysis, and implications directly paralleling these findings throughout 
the institutions. Central to the remaining areas is the commitment of top management, who 
generally holds the power to organise or address the other areas, and are thereby at least partially 
responsible for current states of development despite the opinions of the employees operating 
within their company. Also in direct parallel with the primary research, their study generated 
findings which were reportedly consistent with the perspective that individual compliance is not 
only related to the capacity of that employee‘s skills, but is related to the environment and 
organisational structure. While this was assumed throughout the research, it is likely that the 
managers agreeing that individual compliance and ethics did not contribute to major flaws in IS 
had similar mentalities (Alfawaz, Nelson, and Mohannak, 2010).  
8.2.3 Other Noteworthy Areas and Implications 
Although the findings and recommendations for this work have major implications for 
substantial development across the nation, while some credit to institutions is given for their 
ability to keep up with the standards across the developing nations, it should not be implied that 
developed nations have idealised models implemented nationwide. Research and development in 
the United States has addressed similar issues in comparably significant organisations, with the 
United States General Accounting Office (GAO) (2003) reviewed the Financial Management 
Service (FMS) to assess IS measures and controls; the findings of insufficiently assessed risks 
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and weaknesses in controls despite the quantity of controls, leading to recommendations for IS 
overhaul. Comparable findings from the research conducted in this thesis have similar 
implications, while it is acknowledged by managers and stakeholders that the institutions 
generally require investments in resources, time, and organisational development to meet needs 
which employees are generally aware of. This relates back to the assumption that the 
commitment of top management has played a significant role in overlooking weaknesses and 
development, while it may require an initiative just to obtain this commitment prior to any 
development for successful change.  
 
The relation of the findings to the conclusions of Hunton et al. (2005) is also significant. This 
author attempted to comprehend, assess, and evaluate the levels by which financial auditors and 
IS specialists observe differences in the nature and uniqueness of audit risks associated with 
organisational systems. This study found that financial auditors were substantially less concerned 
about topics considered critical in IS including network and database security, the security of 
applications, the interdependence of processes, and general control of risks. This could have an 
influence on the commitment of top management or the opinions of certain stakeholders (or 
others), and should be examined by concerned organisations making an effort to implement or 
manage changes. Meanwhile, in the study by Al-Maghrabi et al. (2009), the findings revealed 
that perceived usefulness, enjoyment and subjective norms greatly influence both direct and 
indirect mediated effects on continuance intentions of consumers in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia (KSA); perhaps this can assist the development of future planning.  
 
Considering the Saudi environment in further detail, and assuming that this environment has 
been one of the greatest influences on the rate of development or existing concern regarding 
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threats that have yet to physically effect the organisation, the conclusions of the narrow range of 
literature conducted in the area provide further insight for the direction of efforts attempting to 
address the results. The general demand for improved IT and IS in Saudi Arabia has nonetheless 
existed alongside its use of technology, with superior technology generally being preferred, 
assuming that the investments in time and resources are considered to be worthwhile. In the 
absence of significant incident to existing IS systems, and the lack of demand for emergency 
management protocol, herein lies a major issue. Despite making considerable efforts (with many 
of these being partially successful) to meet these technological demands through government 
initiatives or other plans, similar technological demands (and clear rationale for their existence) 
remain common across the nation; many research analyses, governmental analyses, and 
independent organisations have confirmed this, as was noted in the findings of the Saudi Gazette 
(2007) and research analysts outlined.   
 
Re-examining one of the most large-scale surveys documenting the demand in the past five 
years, the Saudi Gazette (2007) reported the results of a global survey comparatively analysing 
1,200 organisations across 48 countries, including a portion of prominent Saudi Arabian 
organisations. Clearly, this is relevant to the current study, and while all the banks taking part in 
the study described in this thesis had an official information security policy, the level of 
organisation and integration with areas outlined in modern best practices is lacking; this is true 
both in terms of the ability to develop the IS systems in accordance with the widely recognised 
demands (an organisational and managerial issue) and in terms of the emergency management 
protocol. The recommendations to improve IS were the foundation of recommendations aimed at 
addressing weaknesses while optimising the systems, as they included a rationale for improved 
software and applications, improved hardware, improved usage of existing technology, 
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awareness of threats and strategic design, or even improved organisational cultures and training 
which facilitate enhanced security.  
 
Profit and efficiency of functionality appear to be the primary motivator of developments or 
change in the observed institutions, with IS seeming to have (and possibly continue to) a much 
lower priority in the absence of physical security breaches or major threats. In this sense, it 
appears that Saudi Arabia may need to be in a near panic of certain types of attacks, or otherwise 
having grossly outdated technology and systems, to warrant the types of overhaul and redesign 
recommended in modern IS literature. Although this prioritisation appears to make sense in 
business terms to those involved, literature has also effectively applied theory to explain why IS 
should maintain a higher priority. This is especially applicable to Saudi Arabia, as the nation 
must improve and maintain IS to support the development of the entire economy. The current 
conditions in Saudi Arabia thereby demand improved technology as well as protocol, in addition 
to a demand from financial institutions and businesses; these demands were noted by Abu-Musa 
(2003) nearly a decade ago and are (unfortunately) still relevant in the present year.  
 
8.3 Conclusions 
 
As stated in the research methods, 30 questionnaire items were designed to address 10 subareas 
within the overall inquiry. Restating these subareas prior to discussing the hypotheses, the 
inquiries are: i) what are the primary threats affecting information security in financial 
institutions within Saudi Arabia? ii) how are these threats unique to this sector? iii) what policies 
and procedures are currently in place? iv) how well do employees follow information security 
policies and procedures? v) what factors affect the willingness of employees to comply with 
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policies and procedures? vi) how do personal ethics affect compliance with policies and 
procedures? vii) how do various institutional factors impact employees‘ willingness to comply 
with policies and procedures? viii) are there aspects of the current information security policies 
of procedures that make it difficult for employees to comply? ix) how do overall organisational 
characteristics affect the successful execution of information security success? and x) what 
improvements can be made to increase effectiveness of information security operations? 
 
Addressing the capacity for the research to address the recommendations and meet the 
hypothesis, the conclusions of this study are found to be both informative and indicative of a 
successful research effort. The aims and objectives of the study were to identify specific threats 
to IS in Saudi financial institutions, further attempting to identify how the threats are impacted 
by employees; with this, the study attempted to isolate factors which affect employee willingness 
to following IS policy and procedure. Additional objectives included examining the current 
methods of organisation and adherence to policy, assessing the importance of organisational 
characteristics that can affect employee compliance with policies, developing guidelines for the 
banks to allow them to establish increasingly effective IS systems, and to provide 
recommendations for policy and practice. Although this research and discussion was capable of 
reaching the objectives, it did meet each objective equally; here, the ‗most accomplished‘ 
objective was the isolation of influential factors, followed by the development of 
recommendations, while the ‗least accomplished‘ recommendation was assessing the 
significance of characteristics that can affect employee compliance. This weakness was due to 
the findings that compliance at the level of IS employees did not affect the overall integrity or 
operation of the system itself, and rather applied to areas that even managers did not feel played 
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a role in the ability for the system to defend the institution from threats. Meanwhile, the other 
objectives were accomplished to a sufficient degree satisfying the general research aim and 
intentions of the researcher, further contributing to the goals of providing original research and 
guidelines for progressive development.  
 
Addressing each research question, and the basic results: 
 
i) The main threats to Saudi IS within financial institutions are lack of emergency plans, the 
viable capacity to upgrade technology, the threats from external technologies (including hacking, 
mobile devices, and more), and difficulty in organising and maintaining a structure which 
facilities the implementation of best practices.  
 
ii) IS threats within the Saudi financial sector are unique, as sensitive information and funds are 
protected; this creates both a great potential for damage and a great incentive for criminals, and 
employees generally recognise this. Online banking does seem to pose a particularly unique 
threat as breaching security may result in distributing the funds without the need for additional 
action.  
iii) Policies and procedures in place require active and passive security measures, employees and 
managers alike generally agreed here. While policies in most of the organisations are effective to 
some degree, they generally implement many aspects of best practices.  
iv) Employees generally do not have any particular issue or problem following security policies 
and procedures; however, innovation and developmental efforts suffer. Policies and procedures 
in place do require some improvements (generally according to law). 
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v) The factors affecting the willingness for compliance with policies and procedures are 
generally related to management. Company policy for punishments is generally sufficient to 
keep employees from neglecting duties altogether; despite this, the policies were reported to be 
generally lax and only ensure that employees follow a bare minimum of active and passive 
safeguards against risks or threats.  
vi) Personal ethics do not play a major role in policies and procedure. Although the majority of 
compliance is mandated and punishable by legislation, actions which are not directly observable 
or recorded are most likely to be reliant on personal ethics.  
vii) Institutional factors do not seem to have a major impact on employee willingness to comply 
with policies and procedures. Such factors affect the nature of the position, and play a role in 
nature of employee willingness for compliance.  
viii) A lack of training and access to resources proved to be considerable factors, while the 
organisation of the employees and operation facilitates this to some degree.  
ix) Organisational characteristics play a major role in affecting the ability of employees to 
successfully execute information security while experiencing success, in agreement with the 
hypothesis for this item. The organisation of processes, the incentives and motivation of 
employees, managerial styles, goals, and allocation of processes and resources all play a major 
role in achieving and sustaining information security success. 
x)  There are numerous potential improvements in demand for information security operations; 
these can be achieved through Saudi financial institution employees, managers, and the 
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government. Employees could receive additional training on a routine basis regarding addressing 
attacks, and new issues relevant to reducing threats.  
While the inquiries and instrumentation were generally successfully addressed to provide 
meaningful results, with the areas found to have less influence given decreased prioritisation, the 
research can also be discussed comparing the hypotheses of these inquiries to findings in the 
analysis and recommendations; these elements also serve as fitting discussion in a concluding 
analysis of the topics and research design. With this, the hypotheses regarding ethics and 
compliance were generally incorrect, with the hypotheses regarding other areas being generally 
correct. According to the hypothesis for the first research inquiry, the main threats to Saudi IS 
within financial institutions are the viable capacity to upgrade technology, the threats from 
external technologies (including hacking, mobile devices, and more), and difficulty in organising 
and maintaining a structure which facilities the implementation of best practices; this was 
generally found to be true, but the definition of ‗viable‘ had come to imply that development 
would not take place despite the agreement of managers and stakeholders. Meanwhile, the 
hypothesis for the second inquiry stated IS threats within the Saudi financial sector are unique, as 
sensitive information and funds are protected. Moreover, this was assumed to create both a great 
potential for damage and a great incentive for criminals, while online banking poses a 
particularly unique threat (as breaching security may result in distributing the funds without the 
need for additional action). Lastly, the gathering of bank card numbers can allow violators to 
commit fraud, theft, or outright identity theft, while there is less potential for this to occur in 
other industries. This was generally assumed to be true, as such crimes have a higher potential 
than through the information vulnerabilities of other organisations. Additionally, the bank threats 
are unique in that this potential is great and the motivation for breaching bank security is higher, 
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but the threats capable of creating an incident in these organisations have a high probability of 
being powerful enough to penetrate IS systems across the country.  
 
The third inquiry hypothesis was generalised and was supported in the study as it is in literature. 
It stated that policies and procedures in place require active and passive security measures; it 
further stated while IS in Saudi organisations are effective to some degree, they generally do not 
(or cannot) use the best resources available, nor do they implement many aspects of best 
practices. The research clearly confirmed this. Examining the fourth hypothesis, it stated that 
employees generally do not have any particular issue or problem following security policies and 
procedures, but innovation and developmental efforts suffer. This assumed that while policies 
and procedures in place require some improvements (generally according to law), employees 
play little to no role in improvement and development; the results also showed that this was also 
true. The fifth hypothesis stated that the factors affecting the willingness for compliance with 
policies and procedures are mostly related to the law and management, while company policy for 
punishments is generally sufficient to keep employees from neglecting duties altogether. Aside 
from the apathy discovered, this was also shown to be true. The sixth hypothesis was shown to 
be generally true but parts of it would receive less attention in recommendations due to the 
findings, as it stated personal ethics may play a major role with policies and procedure, while 
low ethical values make the employees prone to taking the quickest or easiest approach. This 
latter element is related to the conclusions of the research, as it appears to be the underlying 
cause of the observed lack of development amid the organisational capacity.  
The seventh hypothesis asserted that institutional factors have a major impact on employee 
willingness to comply with policies and procedures, while the institution determines which areas 
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are considered, the punishment for neglect, the reward for effort and compliance, and the nature 
of the operation; with this, such factors were assumed to affect the nature of the position, and 
were hypothesised to play a role in the nature of employee willingness for compliance. Here, the 
potential for this impact was observed, but the lack of action in some areas revealed that 
members of management should have greater power in development. Next, the eighth hypothesis 
simply assumed that a lack of training and access to resources is the greatest factor in challenges 
to IS, while the organisation of the employees and operation facilitates this to some degree. The 
latter part of this was proven, although the lack of training was found to be a significant issue, 
and the access to resources was only proven to be a problem at the level of employees and lower-
level management.  
Examining the hypotheses of the final two inquiries further reveals the successful direction of the 
study and correct implications of literature, with the ninth hypothesis stating that organisational 
characteristics play a major role in affecting the ability of employees to successfully execute 
information security; here it was assumed that the organisation of processes, the incentives and 
motivation of employees, managerial styles, goals, and allocation of processes and resources all 
play a major role in achieving and sustaining information security success. The findings support 
this assumption, and do not disprove it in any way, but further evidence in each of the areas 
could serve to show that they each play a significant role. Lastly, the hypothesis for the tenth 
item asserted that there are numerous potential improvements which could be made to 
information security operations, and these can be achieved through Saudi financial institution 
employees, managers, and the government. Meanwhile, employees could receive additional 
training on a routine basis regarding addressing attacks, and new issues relevant to reducing 
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threats. The research results and depth of recommendations have shown this portion of the 
hypothesis to be true. 
Generally speaking, the research shows that Saudi IS is at a crossroads, while management teams 
must make more informed decisions, and IT staff should improve service and communication in 
IS. Meanwhile, facility managers should be mindful of the incompleteness of even modern tools, 
and research and implementation efforts should be conducted periodically; these would help to 
ensure that vulnerabilities due to incompleteness do not give rise to breaches. Numerous 
potential threats have plagued information security specialists in recent years, while these threats 
evolve alongside the changing uses of developing technology. Future research and development 
should be ever vigilant to monitor these threats, assess the potential for change in IS, and discern 
the most effective methods for developing and adopting change strategies. The following section 
outlines the recommendations for future research and development in greater detail. 
8.4 Limitations of Study 
The primary limitations of this study will be the accessibility, funds, and time associated with 
such a project. Ideally, all financial institutions could be included while all employees with 
sufficient experience could contribute information. Naturally, this is not possible, and the 
researcher had attempted to optimise available resources in a practical manner. Meanwhile, the 
study is further bound by the ability of the questionnaire to extract data, and the ability for the 
employee to respond with complete accuracy, while both areas are assumed to contribute to the 
slight degradation of the research results and analysis. Moreover, while the researcher has taken 
effort to ensure no bias exists while remaining objective, additional biases and limitations may 
nonetheless exist unbeknownst to the development of this study. However, as described in 
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section 3.7-3.8, the researcher maintains that validity and reliability have been sought throughout 
all points of this study. 
8.5 Recommendations for Future Research and Development 
8.5.1 Areas in need of change: Potential for progressive development or research 
Summarising the findings of the recommendations, the primary research revealed many areas 
that could benefit from improvement initiatives in IS, with areas importance to stakeholders 
including demands for i) technological improvements, ii) apathy towards compliance, iii) apathy 
towards ethics, iv) mixed opinions regarding policies, v) security concerns, vi) the ability for the 
nation to address issues, and vii) the inability to take action matching the strive for technology. 
With this, the subsequent stakeholder evaluation suggests that all of these areas are indeed 
important across the entirety of the stakeholder body for the institutions in question, with the 
exception of components iii) and vii), which were respectively given less priority and addressed 
through other means. To address these issues, one of the most general but potentially effective 
actions for future research and development is increasing awareness, as such leading institutions 
can set a new standard for national IS while providing a model for similar developments across 
the nation. Studies such as this may promote awareness in a way which forces concerns into 
perspective for the managers and other members of the institutions, thereby facilitating the 
changes they have otherwise been hesitant to make. If this does not take place, then the findings 
suggest that threats will grow to breaches, with demands for emergency management likely 
being the only event capable of inciting these types of changes. With this, the organisations are 
further advised to pursue on-going research, attempt to persuade members of upper management 
to organise and invest in such developments, and to routinely compare their existing potential 
with best practices in IS as well as the growing threats. Additionally, upper and lower 
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management must assume additional responsibilities to ensure that the prioritisation 
recommended in literature, while they should further demand technological improvements and 
assessments, routine meetings considering potential threats and improvements to systems, 
altering policies to address employee operations and demands, and removing the apathy towards 
both threats and compliance. Any limitations to such efforts should be brought to the attention of 
still higher management, and continually examined in the future. It would be beneficial for all 
members of management to pursue research in limitations of developments deemed worthy of 
investment. If the actions attempting to persuade management are not effective, the campaigning 
individuals may be able to incite changes through appealing to stakeholders.  
8.5.2 Tailoring policy 
These policies should be tailored to the specifications of the individual organisations, printed and 
distributed, strictly enforced, and updated (with the cycle repeated) as deemed necessary in 
periodic analyses. Managers must have a means of making changes prior to these analyses, 
whether it be through suggestion and assisted research or immediate development pending policy 
restructuring. Training must also be given additional prioritisation, and the sufficient awareness 
can be facilitated through this and the inclusion of employees in routine meetings. Amid any 
major restructuring effort, any institute not participating could also benefit from the inclusion of 
the ISO 27000 standards; this was not considered in the research amid the emphasis in other 
areas and growing number of inclusion (less than 30 Saudi organisations in 2011), but it is 
widely acknowledged that conversion to these standards is beneficial to IS (Compliances Forum, 
2008; IsecT Ltd, 2011).  
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8.5.3 Saudi Arabia and further research 
Ultimately, Saudi Arabia is like many other fast-developing countries in that it faces IS problems 
which are generally of a greater magnitude than the IS issues in developed nations of the world. 
Despite efforts to improve IS and IT infrastructure in general, the Saudi government has been 
unable to strategise and implement a sufficiently complete solution, and these attempts should be 
continually pursued by both the government and organisations. Research should be continually 
conducted in the area to follow up on previous studies, consider the potential for government 
assistance or organizational restructuring, and to emulate or integrate the more advanced 
technologies and developments in literature. 
8.6 Closing Commentary 
 
Numerous methods for improving IS have been proposed from and to information security 
specialists in recent years, and while the threat evolves alongside the changing uses of 
developing technology, continuous analysis and strategic implementation is in high demand 
across the entire Saudi economy. Future work should emphasise more specific aspects of existing 
security systems as well as more specific barriers to development. 
 
Saudi auditors attempt to control the system, and Saudi users use the system according to 
legislation developed and implemented by the Saudi government; however, no party has been 
able to address the issues recommended in literature (i.e. Muhaya, 2010) which were confirmed 
by this analysis. Meanwhile, Saudi security professionals must be mindful of the incompleteness 
of even modern tools, while research and implementation efforts should be conducted 
periodically (as well as when needed) to ensure that vulnerabilities due to incompleteness do not 
give rise to security breaches. Ultimately, the bank IS are at a crossroads, while management 
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teams must make more informed decisions, and IT staff should improve service and 
communication regarding system security. With this, facility managers must be mindful of the 
incompleteness of even modern tools, and research and implementation efforts should be 
conducted periodically. Future research and development should be ever-vigilant to monitor 
these threats, assess the potential for changes in IS technology and practices, and discern the 
most effective methods for adopting and managing change. 
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Appendices  
Appendix A: Questionnaire 
FOR YOUR PROTECTION, ALL INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE RESPECTED WITH 
THE STRICTEST CONFIDENTIALITY. NO NAMES WILL BE RECORDED, AND NO 
PERSONAL INFORMATION WILL BE SHARED. 
Demographic Information 
Age: 
Gender: 
Organisation: 
Position: 
Time Served at Organisation: 
Questionnaire 
1) Please rate the level of threat severity to information system security you are currently 
experiencing, on a scale of 1-10 (with 10 denoting the highest threat level). 
2) Is the level indicated in 1) typical? Yes No 
3) Please rate the average level of threat severity to information system security you are currently 
experiencing, on a scale of 1-10 (with 10 denoting the highest threat level). 
4) How often is information system security addressed by management in your facility? 
5) Are routine upgrades made to software and hardware? 
6) Are policies and procedures routinely updated? 
7) How effective do you rate the policies and procedures, on a scale of 1-10? 
8) In terms of ―routinely,‖ ―occasionally,‖ or ―never,‖ how often are information systems 
security examined and tested? 
9) In terms of ―routinely,‖ ―occasionally,‖ or ―never,‖ how often are employees trained or 
provided with additional education regarding IS systems? 
10) In terms of ―excellent,‖ ―good,‖ ―average,‖ or ―poor,‖ how well do managers follow 
information security policies and procedures?  
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11) In terms of ―excellent,‖ ―good,‖ ―average,‖ or ―poor,‖ how well do employees follow 
information security policies and procedures? 
12) What is the primary reason that managers may not follow policy? 
13) What is the primary reason that employees may not follow policy? 
14) Are you aware of any threats that are unique to your institution? Yes No 
15) What is the nature of this threat? 
16) Are you aware of any threats that are unique to your sector? Yes No 
17) What is the nature of this threat? 
18) Do you feel personal ethics play a role in managers‘ compliance? Yes No 
 If there is any reason you wish to explain why you chose ‗Yes‘ or ‗No‘, your opinion will 
 be taken into consideration:   
19) Do you feel personal ethics play a role in employees‘ compliance? Yes No 
 If there is any reason you wish to explain why you chose ‗Yes‘ or ‗No‘, your opinion will 
 be taken into consideration:   
20) Do you feel information system security is an area which requires more attention in your 
institution? Yes No 
 If there is any reason you wish to explain why you chose ‗Yes‘ or ‗No‘, your opinion will 
 be taken into consideration:   
21) Do you feel information system security is an area which requires more attention in your 
sector? Yes No 
 If there is any reason you wish to explain why you chose ‗Yes‘ or ‗No‘, your opinion will 
 be taken into consideration:   
22) Please name the improvements you feel should be made to managerial functions regarding 
information security. 
 
 23) Please name the improvements you feel should be made to compliance policy regarding 
information security. 
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24) Do you feel employees should be required to undergo additional training regarding 
information system security? Yes No 
25) Do you feel company representatives should devote more effort to information system 
security and threat awareness? 
26) Is the level of information system security technology adequate in your institution? Yes No 
27) Please rate the adequacy, on a scale of 1-10, of information systems security technology. 
For items 28-30, please rate how important you feel the following topics are in your institution. 
28) Information Systems: 
29) Information System Security: 
30) Information System Security Policy: 
Thank you for your participation! Your information will be kept confidential and used in an 
academic study aimed at informative observation and improvements. 
---------------------------------------- 
(to be completed by researcher) 
Organisation: 
Annual turnover: 
Number of employees: 
Size of IT/IS department: 
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Appendix B: Interview Transcripts 
Riyad Bank Employees (2) 
 
Question 1: (―What do you feel is the biggest concern for information system security in Saudi 
Arabia?‖) 
 
Response 1: One of the most noticeable concerns experienced often here are viruses and internet 
security. But, the biggest concern overall is hacking, because of course breaching the system can 
cause a great amount of damage. 
 ―What do you feel is the most relevant concern?‖ 
Response: The potential for private technology to exceed internal technology. 
 
Response 2: The biggest nation-wide concern is the growth and use, or misuse, of technology. 
Mobile technology is a particular concern, and is known to be a threat to bank security in Saudi 
Arabia.  
 
Question 2: (―What do you feel is the biggest concern for information system security in your 
organisation, and do you see variations in concerns between departments?‖) 
 
Response 1: We feel very secure compared to the rest of the nation, but our organisation has 
experienced the most problems with firewall breaches and acquiring viruses. There are problems 
on our networks more often than projected, and this is evident across all departments. 
 
Response 2: The biggest concern for information system security is always protecting the 
network, and at this point in time, the most vulnerable technology is the firewall and security 
software. We hope that both improvements in available software take place at a rate faster than 
those would wish to break into the network can develop hacking methods, and that we continue 
to have access to defence technology within a fair amount of time once it becomes available.  
 
Question 3: (―How do you think concerns can be addressed within the nation, and do you feel 
your organisation could address the concerns differently?‖)  
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Response 1: There is not much that can be done to address concerns in the nation, organisations 
can only attempt to access security technology through their own investments. The government 
can attempt to improve aspects of the public sector, but even with increased resources, this alone 
would not have the impact on private banking needed for information systems to be directly 
comparable to those in the US or UK. Our organisation has tried to allocate funds differently for 
improvements, with mixed results. 
 
Response 2: The nation has tried to address concerns, and as it seems to be trying nearly as hard 
as possible, progress will likely remain at a steady rate. Improvements have been made, and are 
continually made, and considering these facts there is little that can be done differently at this 
point in time.  
 
Question 4: (―Do you feel that employees and managers need to improve their levels of 
compliance, and if so, do you see greater compliance in either employees or managers?‖) 
 
Response 1: Yes, that is one of the biggest correctable problems that can be seen, but 
unfortunately concern is also low so little has been done. The best way to make improvements 
here is through awareness and change management processes. Managers have seemed to be more 
compliant overall in recent years, but instances of non-compliance have more commonly been 
greater deviations from what is expected. Of course the nature of management positions involves 
greater power, so non-compliance is more likely to be more serious in nature. Non-management 
or ‗normal‘ employees are more commonly non-compliant, but these instances are also more 
likely less serious. 
 
Response 2: Undoubtedly, compliance has been and continues to be an issue of concern and 
focus. Managers and employees alike should make sure they are following procedures, but when 
a manager chooses to be non-compliant in areas related to information systems and security, the 
results have a greater tendency to be more serious. Managers generally feel that they are ‗above‘ 
policies and obligation, while employees seem to think they have a greater chance of avoiding 
detection if they choose to take shortcuts. 
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Question 5: (―Does it appear that major reforms are needed within any policies concerned with 
information security threats?‖) 
 
Response 1: I would say reforms are needed in many areas, but that the level of reform needed is 
normal and changes are always needed. I wouldn‘t say any ‗major‘ reforms are needed. 
 
Response 2: Change and change management must be emphasised so the organisation can 
change as needed, and as the company has been successful in security and operation, I do not 
think ‗major reforms‘ are needed. 
 
Question 6: (―Are ethics an issue in managers and employees, and if so, what can be done?‖) 
 
Response 1: Ethics is always an issue, it is almost a timeless issue, and in that sense, there is little 
that can be done. Greater incentives and greater consequences can help to insure compliance and 
ethics remain in all parts of information, security, and operation, but it seems as if it will always 
still be an issue. 
 
Response 2: Ethics are of course responsible for many non-compliant actions, as well as general 
actions at work, but it does not seem like much more can be done. The actions already taken 
have helped with issues in the past, and we can only hope that ethical issues observed now 
continue to be observed in information security as well as elsewhere. 
 
Question 7: (―Should there be a greater strive to improve technology within the organisation, 
and assuming this is always desired, what seems to be the best course of action?‖) 
 
Response 1: In my personal opinion information systems and security should have the greatest 
strive to upgrade technology virtually wherever possible, in an institution like this one. There 
does not seem to be any real strategy to this, aside from gaining the profits required while 
ensuring that profits dedicated to technological improvement do not negatively affect other areas. 
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Response 2: Yes, there should always be a greater strive to technology within our company and 
others like it. Without that, the threats from those outside that do strive for technology would be 
incredibly great, with the organisation at great risk. 
 
Question 8: (―If resources and time were no object, what changes would be most viable and 
effective?‖) 
 
Response 1: Improving hardware and software to top-of-the-line products, then giving the 
network the best design and security measurable known.  
 
Response 2: Replacing all of the current technology, and then ensuring it is properly supervised, 
maintained, and upgraded by employees.  
 
Question 9: (―How do you feel that security-related training should be approached in the 
future?‖) 
 
Response 1: Training sessions should be more involved and given more often. 
 ―How often do you feel that is necessary?‖ 
 Response: that is hard to say, because routine training would offer more while ‗as- 
needed‘ training sessions may run into similar problems. I would guess every six months,  
with cancelled sessions if no significant updates have been made, would be ideal.   
 
Response 2: With more consideration given to available technological improvements, outside of 
the nation as well as within it. 
 
Question 10: (―Are there any other changes you feel are required to minimise threats to 
information systems?‖) 
 
Response 1: Improved organisation and leadership may help, but that is just theoretical of course, 
and no paths to such major improvements have been successfully implemented in the past nor 
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appear to be realistically possible now. Companies with this level of success are content though, 
with security as well as performance. 
 
Response 2: Not really, no. While security could be better, there does not appear to be any real 
critical threats at the present time.  
Al-Rajhi Bank Employees (2) 
Question 1: (―What do you feel is the biggest concern for information system security in Saudi 
Arabia?‖) 
 
Response 1: The biggest concern is the possibility for threats from commercially available 
technology. People have equal or even greater access to technology that is capable of breaching 
security, and if it were capable of doing so undetected, there would already be a serious problem.  
 
Response 2: That would be the rates of development, development continues but threats develop 
at a rate more comparable to developed nations, while internal technology is slightly behind.  
 
Question 2: (―What do you feel is the biggest concern for information system security in your 
organisation, and do you see variations in concerns between departments?‖) 
 
Response 1: The biggest concern within the organisation is the availability and use of software. 
Ensuring that the best software is found, updated to address new threats, and otherwise used 
properly seems to be the greatest concern within the organisation. 
 
Response 2: Maintaining and improving the software. Sometimes threats can develop outside the 
organisation, while unknown to the information security specialists. This is a concern to all 
departments. 
 
Question 3: (―How do you think concerns can be addressed within the nation, and do you feel 
your organisation could address the concerns differently?‖)  
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Response 1: The nation itself is more concerned with the economy, finance, and development. 
There is concern for banks, but in terms of development rather than information security. The 
organisation can only continue to develop in its own way, there is little ways of seeking help in 
the nation. 
 
Response 2: If the overall national economy improved, then of course it would be easier to 
develop all departments as needed. Otherwise, organisations will have to address concerns 
individually.  
 
Question 4: (―Do you feel that employees and managers need to improve their levels of 
compliance, and if so, do you see greater compliance in either employees or managers?‖) 
 
Response 1: Compliance is somewhat of an issue, but not a major one. Compliance doesn‘t 
usually lead to improved threat. Managers seem to feel ‗above the law,‘ but employees feel that 
there is less risk for the policies that apply to them.  
 
Response 2: Both managers and employees should be advised regarding improved compliance, 
but the importance of this has not changed much over the past years. 
 
Question 5: (―Does it appear that major reforms are needed within any policies concerned with 
information security threats?‖) 
 
Response 1: No, the policies mostly seem to be okay. 
 
Response 2: The company might benefit from policies requiring the changes we are discussing. 
 
Question 6: (―Are ethics an issue in managers and employees, and if so, what can be done?‖) 
 
Response 1: Ethics are always an issue, and the only things that can be done are stricter policies 
and consequences. New changes can also bring new opportunities for ethics to become an issue 
elsewhere, and it does not appear that any company has found a way to ensure ethics is no issue.  
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Response 2: Ethics are something that managers should be more mindful of, observing on their 
own and ensuring proper employee conduct. The best thing that can be done is by being selective 
when choosing authorities, and being mindful of their actions (and allowances) as they grow 
with the company. 
 
Question 7: (―Should there be a greater strive to improve technology within the organisation, 
and assuming this is always desired, what seems to be the best course of action?‖) 
 
Response 1: Security should continue to seek the best technology available yes, so long as the 
money is invested in truly beneficial improvements. Elsewhere in the organisation, this is more 
debatable. The best course of action is to simply increase profits while researching the 
technology on the market. 
 
Response 2:  The strive should be ‗great,‘ but it already is, so I would not say that it should be 
‗greater.‘ The nation in general has access to effective technology, but it is slightly different than 
the technology available in developed nations. There is no known practical path to improving 
technology so that is identical.  
 
Question 8: (―If resources and time were no object, what changes would be most viable and 
effective?‖) 
 
Response 1: If resources and time were no object, the bank‘s network infrastructure would be 
remodelled using the best technology available.  
 
Response 2: An expansion of facilities and the placement of new facilities in new locations could 
increase profits well enough to have an investment for the future, and this could then be used to 
address the areas we have discussed. That, to me, would be the most effective change and path 
forward.  
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Question 9: (―How do you feel that security-related training should be approached in the 
future?‖) 
 
Response 1: It should be more in-depth, and carried out more often, so that employees are aware 
of what is available, in terms of both threats and defences.  
 
Response 2: It should be more technical in nature, so that employees are more aware of the tools 
and features available to them.  
 
Question 10: (―Are there any other changes you feel are required to minimise threats to 
information systems?‖) 
 
Response 1: Aside from the obvious technology and network changes that could help, the 
company could also benefit from  
 
Response 2: Changes to the overall company structure could help, but that is not assured.  
National Commercial Bank Employees (2) 
Question 1: (―What do you feel is the biggest concern for information system security in Saudi 
Arabia?‖) 
 
Response 1: The biggest concern would be a combination of technological development outside 
of institutions needing security and a lack of awareness of general technology within the 
institutions.  
 
Response 2: The largest concern is the ability to develop at a greater rate while the economy 
develops at a similar rate. 
 ―Do you think the current level of development will lead to greater issues?‖ 
 Response: Not necessarily, but of course the potential is there. 
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Question 2: (―What do you feel is the biggest concern for information system security in your 
organisation, and do you see variations in concerns between departments?‖) 
 
Response 1: The greatest concern here at the National Commercial Bank is the size of the data 
and funds stored, compared to the nature of upgrades and organisation. The bank attempts to 
address departments as needed, so there does not appear to be critical variations between 
departments. 
 
Response 2: The network and some technological components are not always improved at the 
same rate of the bank‘s development, which can produce changes to threats. 
 
Question 3: (―How do you think concerns can be addressed within the nation, and do you feel 
your organisation could address the concerns differently?‖)  
 
Response 1: There is little that can be done on a national level, so the organisation could address 
concerns differently by applying change how it is needed and as changes become available. 
 
Response 2: No, and yes because the organisation is capable of making changes as needed. 
 
Question 4: (―Do you feel that employees and managers need to improve their levels of 
compliance, and if so, do you see greater compliance in either employees or managers?‖) 
 
Response 1: Yes, but this is always true, it is almost human nature to some extent, but it is never 
plainly accepted. Managers have set examples for employees here in most relevant areas, 
including compliance with policies. 
 
Response 2: In information security-related positions compliance is generally not a problem, 
neither within manager-based positions or normal employee positions.  
 
Question 5: (―Does it appear that major reforms are needed within any policies concerned with 
information security threats?‖) 
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Response 1: Major reforms could better protect against threats, but policies alone do not need 
‗major‘ changes at this time. 
 
Response 2: Policies requiring updates and development, including technological development, 
could better ensure that the organisation‘s security develops on a level more comparable with the 
development of the technology itself, but it then would likely not be able to make decisions or 
have discretion. Discretion seems to be the best approach at this point, despite the possible issues 
with motivation and freedom stemming from it. 
 
Question 6: (―Are ethics an issue in managers and employees, and if so, what can be done?‖) 
 
Response 1: Ethics are always an issue. They do not seem to be responsible for any increased 
threat or critical issues here, though. 
 
Response 2: The only thing that can realistically be done about ethical problems is to examine 
each instance of ethical violation on a case by case basis. In information security, this seems to 
be less of a problem than within other areas of the bank. 
 
Question 7: (―Should there be a greater strive to improve technology within the organisation, 
and assuming this is always desired, what seems to be the best course of action?‖) 
 
Response 1: In the organisation overall yes, but within the organisations‘ security-related areas (I 
assume this is what you intend to ask), the existing level of ‗striving‘ should simply continue. 
The emphasis on technological improvements in these areas is already great, and little else could 
be done, as far as I am aware. 
 
Response 2: The current course of action seems effective, despite the issues in technology 
described in existing articles and publications, the company has not experienced major breaches 
or threats that seem to jeopardise the company‘s integrity in any major way. It is a concern but 
not on a level near crises, in this organisation anyhow. 
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Question 8: (―If resources and time were no object, what changes would be most viable and 
effective?‖) 
 
Response 1: We could always improve everything and expand, reaching more customers and 
being sure that all of their information is safe, and this would truly be effective. The most viable 
change would be to ensure employees have a higher level of education and training in the future. 
 
Response 2: Additional paid employees providing additional labour and ideas would certainly 
benefit the organisation if money and wages were no object, but this is not ‗viable‘ under normal 
circumstances (although it would be effective).  
 
Question 9: (―How do you feel that security-related training should be approached in the 
future?‖) 
 
Response 1: It should be more thorough and more often. 
 
Response 2: Training should be more considerate of technical aspects and technological 
potential, it seems to be too general now. 
 
Question 10: (―Are there any other changes you feel are required to minimise threats to 
information systems?‖) 
 
Response 1: Not other than those discussed, none come to mind. 
 
Response 2: Improving leadership may help… but I could not say that it actually ‗required‘ 
because of the current circumstances.  
Arab National Bank Employees (2) 
Question 1: (―What do you feel is the biggest concern for information system security in Saudi 
Arabia?‖) 
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Response 1: The biggest concern is the English technology, which the company has a hard time 
‗keeping up with‘ and then using with the employees and customers. This is mostly in terms of 
software, as it is easier to ensure that the company has some of the best hardware available. 
 
Response 2: Software is a concern from what I have seen, but I do not feel that I can speak for 
the whole nation. 
 
Question 2: (―What do you feel is the biggest concern for information system security in your 
organisation, and do you see variations in concerns between departments?‖) 
 
Response 1: Software and the English technology is undoubtedly a concern in the organisation, 
and the acts of convincing those with greater power that improvements are needed is difficult, as 
well as the processes of integrating and using the technology within the organisation as often as 
would be beneficial. This is less of a problem for security or online banking, but is a concern 
nonetheless. 
 
Response 2: As I mentioned in my last response, software is a concern for the organisation, and 
others like it from what I have seen. This appears to be evident across all related departments, 
although somewhat differently as departments may rely on different software and tools. 
 
Question 3: (―How do you think concerns can be addressed within the nation, and do you feel 
your organisation could address the concerns differently?‖)  
 
Response 1: There is little that can be done on a national level, aside from national 
improvements which only indirectly affect the concerns you are discussing with me. 
 
Response 2: The organisation can take actions independently of the nation, which relies on 
greater forces. This is both a benefit and limitation, although the company can seek help outside 
of the nation at times when desired. 
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Question 4: (―Do you feel that employees and managers need to improve their levels of 
compliance, and if so, do you see greater compliance in either employees or managers?‖) 
 
Response 1: Compliance is always a concern, but is always considered, so no major 
improvements seem to be needed. A neglect of compliance or reviews would be bad, though. 
Employees seem to be more compliant, because they are more likely to lose their jobs and 
remain unemployed for such actions. 
 
Response 2: Both managers and employees should improve, but managers should strive for 
flawless compliance. 
 
Question 5: (―Does it appear that major reforms are needed within any policies concerned with 
information security threats?‖) 
 
Response 1: No, threats become part of awareness issues and discussion when they become 
apparent, and actions are taken if it is determined that this is needed. 
 
Response 2: Policies regarding training and software or network upgrades could be more 
demanding, but especially as discretion would be required, the changes would not really be 
‗major.‘ 
 
Question 6: (―Are ethics an issue in managers and employees, and if so, what can be done?‖) 
 
Response 1: Not to any substantial extent, policies and reviews should just be sure to be 
considerate of this and all areas. 
 
Response 2: Ethics could improve information security defences as well as any other areas, but 
compliance and ethics generally do not directly affect the defence itself. 
 ―What areas do you observe it affecting?‖ 
 Observation and maintenance, usually because the employees feel that the system or  
others will detect what they overlook. Despite breaching protocol, they are often correct  
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to a large extent.   
 
Question 7: (―Should there be a greater strive to improve technology within the organisation, 
and assuming this is always desired, what seems to be the best course of action?‖) 
 
Response 1: No, the ‗strive‘ should continue, but it need not become greater. There is already a 
strong desire to improve technology wherever possible, as the people here are quite fond of it. 
 
Response 2: The ability to improve technology could improve, but I would not consider this to 
be an ‗increased strive‘ because the desire to improve technology has existed. 
 
Question 8: (―If resources and time were no object, what changes would be most viable and 
effective?‖) 
 
Response 1: Our network connections and the main software used could be improved, and more 
employees could be used to improve the network for security effectiveness. General information 
system effectiveness could be improved by hiring a team of more qualified (in technology) 
expert professionals to choose technology best fit for the organisation and remodelling it 
accordingly. 
 
Response 2: Firewalls, anti-virus software, and better encryptions would be the most effective 
security upgrades, but decent versions of this technology exist already. 
 
Question 9: (―How do you feel that security-related training should be approached in the 
future?‖) 
 
Response 1: Training for managers is probably something that should improve, employees have 
more resources and could ask managers for assistance at any time. The requirements for hiring 
employees could be improved, though, and help to minimise these issues. 
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Response 2: It should be conducted formally more often, most training is not in-depth or detailed 
on the level that it should be. Both resources and time have been challenging (as training in this 
way removes employees from work), so this would need to be considered in the future. 
 
Question 10: (―Are there any other changes you feel are required to minimise threats to 
information systems?‖) 
 
Response 1: No, the above statements may even be exaggerations, although I understand the 
reasoning behind sources stating that information security has been a challenge. The above 
changes alone would lead to a situation that could be considered ‗ideal.‘ 
 
Response 2: Restricting tools which are generally used for breaching security may be more 
helpful, but I am unsure how further details would be approached. 
Saudi American Bank Employees (2) 
Question 1: (―What do you feel is the biggest concern for information system security in Saudi 
Arabia?‖) 
 
Response 1: Saudi Arabia has to worry about technology developing at different rates, and there 
are a lot of travellers in the country, and technology capable of breaching security can be brought 
in rather easily. 
 
Response 2: Currently, most actions that are capable of violating information security can be 
detected, but improving technology (especially some of the mobile technology) seems to have 
potential for hacking without the same kind of detection, so it is a concern. 
 
Question 2: (―What do you feel is the biggest concern for information system security in your 
organisation, and do you see variations in concerns between departments?‖) 
 
Response 1: There are no real differences in security concerns between departments. The biggest 
concern at the present is meeting customer concerns with technology that we can safely secure. 
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Response 2: The concerns for the organisation are the same mentioned for Saudi Arabia. The 
threat of improving private technology threatens this organisation as well as others. 
 
Question 3: (―How do you think concerns can be addressed within the nation, and do you feel 
your organisation could address the concerns differently?‖)  
 
Response 1: There is really nothing that the nation can do, security depends on private 
developments. 
 
Response 2: The organisation can attempt to invest in improvements or even research and 
development, and although there is more incentive for the nation to do this, it is generally not 
deemed practical by the company. 
 
Question 4: (―Do you feel that employees and managers need to improve their levels of 
compliance, and if so, do you see greater compliance in either employees or managers?‖) 
 
Response 1: No, compliance is not perfect, but it is not a major issue either. 
 
Response 2: Compliance could always be better, but I would not call it a problem. Managers are 
usually more compliant. 
 
Question 5: (―Does it appear that major reforms are needed within any policies concerned with 
information security threats?‖) 
 
Response 1: There could be stricter requirements to improve technology, but there are times 
where this policy may seem to ‗get in the way‘ and need discretion anyhow. 
 
Response 2: There could be more policies and procedures in place for detecting existing and 
potential threats, but that would be an improvement and not a ‗major reform‘ in all likelihood.  
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Question 6: (―Are ethics an issue in managers and employees, and if so, what can be done?‖) 
 
Response 1: Ethics are an issue, but they are not considered to be the cause of any major failures 
or problems.  
 
Response 2: Ethical issues in managers are more serious on a higher level, while ethical issues in 
employees are more serious on the lower levels. Both result in problems, and though ethics has 
seemed to play a role in some problems, other aspects of the company are prioritised in 
development. 
 ―What are these aspects?‖ 
 Response: Most of them are actually not related to security, and are part of normal  
business development, but security is considered as the company continues to improve  
technology and electronic services. 
 
Question 7: (―Should there be a greater strive to improve technology within the organisation, 
and assuming this is always desired, what seems to be the best course of action?‖) 
 
Response 1: The desire for technology is usually there, but perhaps changes in research and 
strategy for acquisition could be improved. The company could benefit from charging some 
employees with researching security elements more vigorously, and this is something that is 
discussed from time to time.  
 
Response 2: There is usually an extremely competitive strive to improve technology in terms of 
services to customers, and changes to security technology change in response to this as well as to 
changes to internal technology. The strive to improve service-related to technology will always 
be the greatest, because it is competitive. 
 
Question 8: (―If resources and time were no object, what changes would be most viable and 
effective?‖) 
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Response 1: If resources and time were no object…the changes that would be most effective 
would be rebuilding the internal network for internal processes and services with the best 
technology available.  
 
Response 2: There is some technology that could be changed to help security a little bit, but most 
changes that would be effective in that situation are related to information systems (alone) and 
general business. 
 
Question 9: (―How do you feel that security-related training should be approached in the 
future?‖) 
 
Response 1: It should be more frequent, and detailed, and more relevant. 
 ―Has it been irrelevant in the past?‖ 
 Response: In that it has been too general in some cases, yes.  
 
Response 2: It should be more technical in nature, having more emphasis on the best tools and 
best practices. Literature could also have more of a part in training development. 
 
Question 10: (―Are there any other changes you feel are required to minimise threats to 
information systems?‖) 
 
Response 1: Not really, if even the changes discussed were possible, the company would be 
much better off.  
 
Response 2: An increased number of employees, but that does not seem to be practical at this 
point in time. 
Saudi British Bank Employees (2) 
Question 1: (―What do you feel is the biggest concern for information system security in Saudi 
Arabia?‖) 
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Response 1: The availability of software and materials that can be approached with the language 
barriers, an information technology specialist that can make the most use of the best available 
tools often has be fluently bi-lingual and skilled in the technology. 
 
Response 2: The biggest concern is the lack of concern itself, it seems, because some people 
don‘t seem to realise the potential of existing threats. 
 
Question 2: (―What do you feel is the biggest concern for information system security in your 
organisation, and do you see variations in concerns between departments?‖) 
 
Response 1: The biggest concern is developing security for an information system that assists 
such a wide range of customers with a wide range of services. 
 
Response 2: Our system is complex in itself, and building security that is both effective and 
versatile is challenging. 
 
Question 3: (―How do you think concerns can be addressed within the nation, and do you feel 
your organisation could address the concerns differently?‖)  
 
Response 1: Concerns cannot really be addressed within the nation, at least not directly. The best 
thing that can happen on a nation-wide level is economic improvement, but even this would 
affect the organisations differently.  
 
Response 2: The organisation‘s actions being different from the rate of the development of the 
nation is the only real way to gain a competitive advantage, and this organisation has the benefit 
of being one of the more successful companies of its kind. Beyond that there is no planned way 
of acting differently to get ahead with concerns, but it is possible, and hopefully this gives you 
some information regarding the question.  
 
Question 4: (―Do you feel that employees and managers need to improve their levels of 
compliance, and if so, do you see greater compliance in either employees or managers?‖) 
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Response 1: Compliance is not much of a concern within the company in past years, but 
employees have had more violations. There are more employees than managers of course, but 
they also seem to be more prone to violating security and other protocol. 
 ―What do you think the reason for that is?‖ 
 Response: I think the reason is a combination of there being less consequence  
(generally) and less of a chance that their negligence will be realised.  
 
Response 2: Compliance doesn‘t seem to be an unusual concern anyway, and it seems to be 
comparable across the company as well as in comparison to other companies.  
 
Question 5: (―Does it appear that major reforms are needed within any policies concerned with 
information security threats?‖) 
 
Response 1: It has been hard to create policies that are both detailed and not in need of discretion 
as variables change. Security and the nature of the system could be reformed for the clear 
benefit, such as through network restructuring, advanced software use, and other ways, but there 
doesn‘t seem to be a good way to improve security through major policy reform. 
 
Response 2: Policies regarding training, researching and upgrading technology, and improving 
the nature of organisation (such as through increased dedication and staff) could reduce threats, 
but unfortunately their does not seem to be a definite path to ‗major‘ improvements with any 
practical investment. 
 
Question 6: (―Are ethics an issue in managers and employees, and if so, what can be done?‖) 
 
Response 1: Ethics, like compliance, are not a major concern with the company. The company 
has no major plans for change in this area. 
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Response 2: Not really. Ethical issues seem to be an underlying cause with some concerns, such 
as compliance and basic employee conduct, but it is one of the least prioritised areas within the 
company‘s plans for development. 
 
Question 7: (―Should there be a greater strive to improve technology within the organisation, 
and assuming this is always desired, what seems to be the best course of action?‖) 
 
Response 1: I think the company could stand to invest a little more funding and effort into 
improving technology, especially in terms of researching the market for possible improvements, 
but the current processes seem to be good enough to create a considerable competitive 
advantage.  
 
Response 2: The best course of action appears to be to approach technology mindful of potential, 
without making unnecessary upgrades or upgrading before a new line of products comes onto the 
market. Beyond this, there is little that we can do. 
 
Question 8: (―If resources and time were no object, what changes would be most viable and 
effective?‖) 
 
Response 1: Educating employees, improving the network structure, and improving software 
would be the most effective actions.  
 
Response 2: The security system could be best improved using new firewalls, and plans should 
be created for things like disaster recovery. Our SSL would also be improved, or even replaced.  
 
Question 9: (―How do you feel that security-related training should be approached in the 
future?‖) 
 
Response 1: It should be revised completely, many parts of it have just been put together without 
the effort required, often times with important information not realised until later. 
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Response 2: It should place more emphasis on the concerned realised by experts, rather than 
considering mostly corporate concerns.  
 
Question 10: (―Are there any other changes you feel are required to minimise threats to 
information systems?‖) 
 
Response 1: Firewall protection should have more effort devoted to it, to make sure there are no 
loopholes and that it is updated as needed.  
 
Response 2: A general investment of human and material resources in security would be an ideal 
first start, allowing the other areas discussed to be more possible.  
Albilad Bank Employee 
Question 1: (―What do you feel is the biggest concern for information system security in Saudi 
Arabia?‖) 
 
Response: Acquiring and improving defensive software at a rate which is ahead of the potential 
for threats seems to be the main concern, both inside the company and protecting the services 
offered to clients. 
 
Question 2: (―What do you feel is the biggest concern for information system security in your 
organisation, and do you see variations in concerns between departments?‖) 
 
Response: The same basic threat to the nation is observable in the organisation, but the 
organisation faces more of a struggle with upgrading technology as needed, because that requires 
private funding.  
 
Question 3: (―How do you think concerns can be addressed within the nation, and do you feel 
your organisation could address the concerns differently?‖)  
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Response: The government could help itself improve security for information systems in the 
public sector, but that would not have much of an impact on concerns within financial 
institutions. This organisation could simply choose to improve security to the highest level, 
investing considerable money in the process, but that would not cater to the competitive 
advantage. The competitive advantage takes the greatest priority within most decisions regarding 
those kinds of investments. 
 
Question 4: (―Do you feel that employees and managers need to improve their levels of 
compliance, and if so, do you see greater compliance in either employees or managers?‖) 
 
Response: Employee non-compliance is handled by managers on a regular basis, but there is less 
action taken for managers in similar situations. Some improvement is needed in both areas, but it 
is hard to measure the extent or develop a strategy to achieve perfect compliance. 
 
Question 5: (―Does it appear that major reforms are needed within any policies concerned with 
information security threats?‖) 
 
Response: No, I would say that the systems and security could benefit from major reform, but the 
policies themselves cannot have the discretion required for technological improvements as 
technology changes. The only developments in policy which would have the greatest influence 
would be improvements for crisis plans or disaster recovery, which is given little consideration 
in existing policy. 
 
Question 6: (―Are ethics an issue in managers and employees, and if so, what can be done?‖) 
 
Response: Ethics do not seem to be much of an issue outside of compliance, and as I cannot say 
compliance is a major concern, I would not say any serious new level of attention needs to be 
given to compliance.  
 
Question 7: (―Should there be a greater strive to improve technology within the organisation, 
and assuming this is always desired, what seems to be the best course of action?‖) 
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Response: There should be a major strive to improve technology wherever possible, but it 
already exists. The emphasis on competitive advantage through services will always remain, and 
technological improvements outside of this area does not seem to be practical. 
 
Question 8: (―If resources and time were no object, what changes would be most viable and 
effective?‖) 
 
Response: If resources were no object, then I would say that the continuing optimisation of 
technology would be effective. Expanding the staff would also be effective. 
 
Question 9: (―How do you feel that security-related training should be approached in the 
future?‖) 
 
Response: Training needs to be improved all around, specifically in terms of technical 
applications and upgrades, but it could use improvement in just about every area. 
 
Question 10: (―Are there any other changes you feel are required to minimise threats to 
information systems?‖) 
 
Response: Some employee should be charged with the task of improved continual research in 
terms threats, developing defences, and developed best practices. 
Saudi French Bank Employee 
Question 1: (―What do you feel is the biggest concern for information system security in Saudi 
Arabia?‖) 
 
Response: The biggest concern is keeping up with the technology and practices, which continue 
to change at fast rates.  
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Question 2: (―What do you feel is the biggest concern for information system security in your 
organisation, and do you see variations in concerns between departments?‖) 
 
Response: Firewalls and SSL have the most security-related issues here. These issues generally 
affect the company equally. 
 
Question 3: (―How do you think concerns can be addressed within the nation, and do you feel 
your organisation could address the concerns differently?‖)  
 
Response: There doesn‘t seem like there is anything that could be done on a national level, but 
people here could generally try to improve standards and practices for security. This applies to 
the technology as much as strategic development. Many people need better plans for how to react 
to certain threats, because no planning in these areas leaves them especially vulnerable.  
 
Question 4: (―Do you feel that employees and managers need to improve their levels of 
compliance, and if so, do you see greater compliance in either employees or managers?‖) 
 
Response: Compliance will always be a minor issue with any policy, so it will always be a 
concern but will not likely have any increased emphasis.  
 
Question 5: (―Does it appear that major reforms are needed within any policies concerned with 
information security threats?‖) 
 
Response: No, there are no ‗major‘ reforms that are needed for policy as far as I am concerned, 
but slight improvements could be made in most departments. 
 ―Do you have an example?‖ 
 Response: There is little protocol for emergency plans, if something were to go wrong  
with the network or services, much time would likely be lost since there are none of these 
plans. 
 
Question 6: (―Are ethics an issue in managers and employees, and if so, what can be done?‖) 
 267 
 
Response: Ethics are an issue, yes, and policies and new strategies often try to improve ethics in 
many ways. It is not considered a serious issue, even though ethics could be a lot higher. 
Unfortunately it takes major problems in ethics for ethics to gain great attention. 
 
Question 7: (―Should there be a greater strive to improve technology within the organisation, 
and assuming this is always desired, what seems to be the best course of action?‖) 
 
Response: Ideally, the organisation would have the best technology, so in this sense there is a 
‗strive,‘ but the lack of further action is based on resources, strategy, policy, etc. I think the only 
increased actions which should take place are in firewalls and protection software, because the 
networks are sufficient and the service technology has evolved at a decent rate. 
 
Question 8: (―If resources and time were no object, what changes would be most viable and 
effective?‖) 
 
Response: Restructuring technology and organisation seem to have the most potential, aside 
from expanding. 
 
Question 9: (―How do you feel that security-related training should be approached in the 
future?‖) 
 
Response: It should be more thorough, especially in terms of development beyond systems and 
procedures in place. 
 
Question 10: (―Are there any other changes you feel are required to minimise threats to 
information systems?‖) 
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Response: Nothing specific. 
Saudi Hollandi Bank Employee 
Question 1: (―What do you feel is the biggest concern for information system security in Saudi 
Arabia?‖) 
 
Response: Technology, practices, and planning. 
 
Question 2: (―What do you feel is the biggest concern for information system security in your 
organisation, and do you see variations in concerns between departments?‖) 
 
Response: The organisation has had problems with dedicating the time and resources suggested 
from threat implications, and may be more vulnerable than is realised. The fact that many 
employees simply don‘t know the answer regarding threat potential in certain areas is something 
that should be considered. 
 
Question 3: (―How do you think concerns can be addressed within the nation, and do you feel 
your organisation could address the concerns differently?‖)  
 
Response: There doesn‘t seem to be much that people can do in the national in terms of strategy, 
each organisation should simply invest in improvements as they become available. No superior 
strategy has been realised. 
 
Question 4: (―Do you feel that employees and managers need to improve their levels of 
compliance, and if so, do you see greater compliance in either employees or managers?‖) 
 
Response: Compliance always needs improvement because it is almost always less than perfect, 
especially over a given time. There should be greater incentives for developing security and 
greater consequences for breaching policy. 
 
 269 
Question 5: (―Does it appear that major reforms are needed within any policies concerned with 
information security threats?‖) 
 
Response: In terms of backup and recovery planning, yes, but aside from that no ‗major‘ reforms 
seem to be needed. 
 
Question 6: (―Are ethics an issue in managers and employees, and if so, what can be done?‖) 
 
Response: Ethics are something that we value, but we mostly emphasise compliance with policy 
and procedure. Ethics could be improved with greater incentives, or consequences, but the 
emphasis will remain in other areas. 
 
Question 7: (―Should there be a greater strive to improve technology within the organisation, 
and assuming this is always desired, what seems to be the best course of action?‖) 
 
Response: I think so, but there is a debate about that across the company. 
 
Question 8: (―If resources and time were no object, what changes would be most viable and 
effective?‖) 
 
Response: A new network with new services, thereby improving competitive advantage and 
potential for future development. 
 
Question 9: (―How do you feel that security-related training should be approached in the 
future?‖) 
 
Response: It should be carefully planned, and not just ‗dealt with,‘ as the mentality seems to be. 
 
Question 10: (―Are there any other changes you feel are required to minimise threats to 
information systems?‖) 
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Response: A greater emphasis on security as a field might lead to new improvements, but outside 
of that, it seems to already be a developing topic of emphasis. 
Saudi Investment Bank Employee 
Question 1: (―What do you feel is the biggest concern for information system security in Saudi 
Arabia?‖) 
 
Response: Competition and demand, because security must always accompany these changes. 
Growing technology without the security to match is basically ‗asking for trouble.‘  
 
Question 2: (―What do you feel is the biggest concern for information system security in your 
organisation, and do you see variations in concerns between departments?‖) 
 
Response: Firewall problems, or ‗loopholes,‘ are one. High levels of encryption are another. 
Those two areas are common topics in recent concerns. 
 
Question 3: (―How do you think concerns can be addressed within the nation, and do you feel 
your organisation could address the concerns differently?‖)  
 
Response: Experts could cooperate in attempt to improve information security as a field, but it 
doesn‘t seem like there will be enough of an incentive for that any time soon, either within the 
nation or within the organisation. 
 
Question 4: (―Do you feel that employees and managers need to improve their levels of 
compliance, and if so, do you see greater compliance in either employees or managers?‖) 
 
Response: They both do, technically, since it is less than perfect. Compliance is rarely a serious 
concern.  
 
Question 5: (―Does it appear that major reforms are needed within any policies concerned with 
information security threats?‖) 
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Response: Some reforms for improvement and protocol for emergency procedures could help, 
but no major reforms appear necessary in routine operations. 
 
Question 6: (―Are ethics an issue in managers and employees, and if so, what can be done?‖) 
 
Response: Ethics, like compliance, are rarely a serious issue. Employees have different ideas 
about what it means to be ethical, and the company is only demanding in certain areas. 
 
Question 7: (―Should there be a greater strive to improve technology within the organisation, 
and assuming this is always desired, what seems to be the best course of action?‖) 
 
Response: It already exists, and the company implies it cannot afford to divert efforts any farther. 
 
Question 8: (―If resources and time were no object, what changes would be most viable and 
effective?‖) 
 
Response: Expansion could help quite a bit, and so could remodelling all information technology 
and networks. They would both be practical for their own reasons. 
 
Question 9: (―How do you feel that security-related training should be approached in the 
future?‖) 
 
Response: It should become more of an educational process and less of a quick attempt to change 
bare-minimum processes as they are realised.  
 
Question 10: (―Are there any other changes you feel are required to minimise threats to 
information systems?‖) 
 
Response: No, I think there will always be threats, and only the most innovative people can 
conceive defences to threats that have yet to exist. 
